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Abstract 
This study focuses on internationally accepted labor standards and norms governing the 
individual employment contract, including ILO conventions and recommendations, EU labor 
standards (Directives) and the European Community Social Charter (Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers). The study also analyzes relevant provisions in the main labor law 
of each Eastern European and Central Asian (ECA) country associated with commencing or 
terminating employment and during the period of employment. References are made to 
relevant practices from EU15 countries. Overall, despite similar origin of country labor laws, 
the current set of labor regulations in the region provides a wide array of legal solutions. The 
minimum content of the employment contract in most ECA countries coincides, and goes 
beyond, the requirements of the labor standards even in the countries that are non-signatories 
of relevant treaties. Some of these entitlements, however, have the potential to adversely 
affect labor market participation.  
Keywords: Labor law, Labor standards, Employment contract, Working time, Annual leave, 
Contract termination, Minimum wage. 
JEL classification: J41, J80, J81, J83, K31. 
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As the result of systemic changes in the economy and society, rather than cyclical only, in the 
last two decades the world of work has radically changed in Eastern European and Central 
Asian (ECA) countries.
2
The labor relationship has been influenced by aspects of the sociocultural and psychological 
transition of the society. The ideologies of employees of the state-owned firms, or state and 
collective farms, have been replaced by those of owners, employers, entrepreneurs, wage 
earners of private firms, or the self-employed. These aspects have induced new work ethics 
and discipline. The previous universal and mandatory system of job security and employment 
stability has been replaced by a more liberal institutional framework for firings and hirings, 
and more flexible labor relations overall. These changes have shaped the dynamics and 
content of labor legislation, and labor market institutions in the region.  
 Transition reforms have led to rapid structural shifts in the economy 
by the ownership of firms, in their structure by sectors, occupations, or skills in demand. 
Many new alternative forms of engagement and jobs have been generated, including in the 
informal sector. Widespread non-participation but also unemployment has become a 
common phenomena. Instead of a state-run planned economy, the rules and regulations of 
product and labor markets now dominate. 
In the socialist period, since employment was an obligation of every individual in the 
working age bracket, participation rates were relatively high.
3
Currently, reflecting the impact of transition reforms on labor markets, the employment rate 
in the region varies from 43 percent in FYR Macedonia and 45 percent in Serbia to 75 
percent in Latvia and 76 percent in Estonia (in 2006; population aged 15-59; UNICEF 2008). 
Unemployment in turn is as high as 36 percent in Macedonia but only 5.6 percent in 
Lithuania (Annex Table A1). The overall business environment, including labor legislation 
and other labor market institutions, heavily contributes to such outcomes. 
 In the pre-reform period, in the 
USSR, the highest employment rates were registered in the Baltic republics. According to the 
1989 census, in Estonia 86.1 percent of the working age population (ages 16-54/59) was 
engaged in “socially useful work” and 7.7 percent studied in day-time schools; 29.4 percent 
of pensioners also worked, including almost 60 percent in the first five years after retirement 
age. Employment rates were also high in other Baltic republics: in Latvia, it equaled 87 
percent of working-age population and in Lithuania, 84 percent. The situation was similar in 
Central Eastern European countries (CEE). 
                                                        
1 We would like to acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions provided by Rita Almeida, Pilar 
Salgado-Otónel and César Chaparro Yedro in the writing of this paper. 
2 In this paper, ECA countries are divided into three subgroups as follows. EU10: Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania; South East Europe (SEE): 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and FYR Macedonia; Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS): Belarus, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (no data are available on Turkmenistan). EU15 includes Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3 On the specifics of the Soviet labor market, see, for example, Oxenstierna 1990; Marnie 1992. vii 
At the time of socialism, a job was guaranteed to all graduates. Moreover, graduates had 
compulsory assignments for their first jobs and as a rule, young specialists had to serve at 
least three years in their first assignment. Lengthy continuous service, possibly a lifetime 
spent with the same employer, was the ruling model. Fixed-term or part-time employment 
was an exception, surrounded by legislative restrictions and limitations, and a change of 
ownership, bankruptcy and group dismissals were unthinkable.  
The right of the employer (e.g., the state enterprise or organization, the state or collective 
farm) to terminate employment was highly restricted by law and by the bureaucratic barriers 
created by the trade unions. A worker's lifetime-career was not split into separate periods of 
individual employment. Instead, it was considered as one continuum, an uninterrupted 
process, even if it happened to be spent with a series of state employers. This used to mean 
that rights and benefits, connected to seniority (e.g., notice periods, annual holiday, wage 
category or certain premiums) were, in general, conditional on an employee’s work 
experience accumulated over the course of a lifetime. Employers had incentives to retain 
rather than dismiss employees during slow periods (i.e., to fend against unplanned labor 
shortages). In the rare event that a company was restructured and employees were dismissed, 
they were always placed with another state enterprise (For  a  detailed discussion, see 
Lehoczky et al. 2005). 
Within the region, the reconciliation of social and economic functions of the enterprise had 
been viewed as complementary. The better the economic results of the enterprise and the 
higher its productivity, the higher would be the social funds for collective consumption and 
the share of these benefiting each employee. Enterprise-based services and the provision of 
non-wage benefits included housing, preschool education, recreational facilities, catering, 
and medical care. Enterprises were responsible for the delivery of family benefits for 
working parents. Some social activities, such as housing construction or establishing 
kindergartens, were even incorporated into the state plans and considered to fulfill the state 
social program. This view contrasts with a purely economic concept of an enterprise, with the 
sole objective being to maximize profits. 
The labor market in the economies of the former Yugoslavia was shaped by the particular 
legacy of the “self-management” system for enterprises, and the existence of the so-called 
social ownership, which led to a high level of job protection and overall rigidity, and to 
widespread labor hoarding (See World Bank 2004).
4
In the self-management system, changes for economic, technological or other reasons were 
decided upon by the worker’s council. It could be expected that workers would not opt for 
technological improvements and other organizational changes if job loss was a possibility. 
  Under the self-management system, 
employment relationships were not viewed as relationships between two parties,  the 
employer and the employee.  Instead, they were viewed as relationships of mutual 
dependency, reciprocity and solidarity between workers using  the resources in social 
ownership and, on the basis of the right to self-management under the law, deciding 
themselves on their rights and obligations stemming from the work (Končar 2008). 
                                                        
4  Social ownership was defined as a common property of all people working with resources in a social 
ownership. viii 
Since there is strong evidence that the origin of a country’s laws is an important determinant 
of its regulatory approach, in labor as well as in other markets (Botero et al. 2004), these and 
many other historical factors have an impact on the  development  of  labor law in ECA 
countries. Despite major revisions in the 1990s and 2000s, the ideology of the current labor 
laws (labor codes) in many countries in the region still dates back to the 1970s, 1980s or 
early 1990s when the laws were first adopted. 
Only two ECA countries still have old laws in effect, albeit amended numerous times. The 
Code of Laws on Labor of Ukraine (The Labor Code) of 1971, as amended, is the principal 
legislative act governing employment relationships in Ukraine. It bears the legacy of socialist 
labor relations, providing fairly strong employee protection and detailed regulations of 
almost every possible aspect of labor relations (Kupets and Leshchenko 2008). The Polish 
Labor Code adopted in June 1974, albeit amended numerous times and harmonized with the 
European Union laws, remains the main and binding labor law in the country. 
Various institutional arrangements can provide employment protection: the private market, 
labor legislation, collective bargaining agreements and, not the least, court interpretations of 
legislative and contractual provisions. Legislation may set only minimum standards, which 
are extended by collective agreements. On the basis of these norms, parties – either in a 
collective or in an individual agreement – are free to negotiate terms exceeding the respective 
minimum standards. 
Labor law, which governs subordinate employment, is based on the need to protect the 
worker, who is regarded – legally and socially – as being in the weaker bargaining position. 
Furthermore, in many ECA countries, work can also be performed on the basis of civil law 
contracts that are used for the work carried out by self-employed persons as well as to govern 
short-term employment relationships. 
Employment law protects workers from arbitrary or unfair treatment while addressing labor 
market failures to deliver efficient and equitable outcomes, such as insufficient information, 
potential discrimination against vulnerable groups and incomplete insurance of workers 
against the risks of losing their job (Pierre and Scarpetta 2007). Reforms in labor legislation 
primarily affect hired employment in the formal sector, although there is some evidence of 
spillover effects to the informal sector. Hired employment, which is largely formal, differs 
significantly by country: from 34-41 percent of the total employment in Albania, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Uzbekistan to 93 percent in Russia and 94 percent in Belarus (CIS STAT 2007).  
Employment in civil services and in public services may constitute around half or more of 
the hired employment in the formal sector in some ECA countries and can be governed by 
separate pieces of labor legislation – more generous and protective than entitlements in the 
Labor Code or Labor Act. For example, in Hungary, the 1992 legislation created three laws, 
with three different types of employment status identified as “employee”, “public employee” 
and “civil servant” (Lehoczky et al. 2005). 
Employment in particular firms may also be governed by local (internal) regulatory acts, 
which define the procedure of work at the enterprise and enumerate duties in greater detail. 
These acts, however, may not provide conditions for the employees, which would be less 
favorable than those established by the main labor law, other laws and normative acts.  ix 
The main labor law provides only for minimum legislative requirements that employers and 
employees must comply with on commencing or terminating employment and during the 
period of employment. Other legislative acts, internal regulations or collective agreements 
may provide supplementary guarantees to workers. 
To this end, this study will first focus on internationally accepted labor standards and norms 
governing the individual employment contract vis-à-vis three sets of documents.
5  All ECA 
countries have ratified the eight ILO core Conventions (except Uzbekistan, which has not 
ratified Conventions No. 87 and 138). These fundamental Conventions, except on the 
minimum age, will not be a topic of this report.
6 As far as the ratification of other ILO 
Conventions is concerned, the countries vary significantly from twelve conventions ratified 
by Uzbekistan and 16 conventions ratified by Georgia to 82 conventions ratified by Bulgaria 
and 81 conventions by Poland (See Annex Table A2).
7  Next, most ECA countries are bound 
by the norms of the European Social Charter. This is a document signed by the members of 
the Council of Europe in Turin, on 18 October 1961 in which they agreed to secure to their 
populations the specified social rights in order to improve standards of living and social well-
being. It was later revised in Strasbourg in May 1996. Nineteen ECA countries have ratified 
the Social Charter but the number of accepted paragraphs of the Charter varies from 25 in 
Latvia to 95 in Slovenia (Annex Table A2). In addition, Serbia, Montenegro and Russia have 
signed the Social Charter.
8  Finally, the EU defines minimum requirements for employment 
issues through Directives. There are currently 21 Directives in force in the area of Labor 
Law, the most important of which are also discussed in this paper.
9
Although formally these three sets of international documents are binding only to signatories, 
other non-signatory countries are increasingly aligning their labor legislation according to the 
norms and regulations stipulated in these treaties. The basic provisions and norms listed in 
the above-mentioned international treaties, conventions and directives form internationally 
accepted minimum labor standards will be discussed in greater detail in this study. It will also 
summarize and refer to country implementation reports and other EU and OECD 
documents.
   
10
                                                        
5 For the list of ILO Conventions and Recommendations, and EU legislation discussed in the paper, see Annex 
Table A1. 
 
6  ILO core conventions include: the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize   
Convention, 1948 (No. 87); the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); the 
Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29);  the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105); the 
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 (No. 182); the 
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); and the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111). 
7 http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/lang--en/index.htm. 
8 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp. 
9 A Directive is a type of EU law that sets out minimum standards and requires Member States to achieve a 
particular result by a certain deadline without defining the precise form or method of implementation. 
10  The terms “Implementation”, “Compliance” and “Effectiveness” are commonly used interchangeably; 
however, they are different. Implementation refers to the measures taken by states for the conventions to take 
effect within the framework of their domestic law.  Compliance looks at whether countries in fact adhere to the 
provisions of the treaties and implementing measures they have undertaken.  This is more difficult than 
measuring implementation and it goes beyond looking at domestic rules and regulations. Strict (full) compliance 
is rarely – if ever – achieved. The determination of the ‘acceptable level’ would in any case prove extremely x 
Second, the study will analyze relevant provisions in the main labor law of each ECA 
country, be it the labor code, law or act, law on labor relations, employment contracts act, or 
law on employment relationships associated with commencing or terminating employment 
and during the period of employment. It will also analyze the design features of some key 
issues attached to the individual employment contract. (The list of labor laws from 27 ECA 
transition countries is presented in Annex Table A3.)
11
The study is based on a comparative analysis of the main indicators/parameters of the 
individual contract particular to the labor law of each country. It is intended as a sourcebook 
for practitioners from the ECA region who are working on reforming the labor legislation in 
their respective countries. Relevant characteristics of the labor law in ECA countries are 
largely presented in the Annexes. Therefore, the study will look into suggested labor norms, 
regulations and entitlements through the prism of ILO-relevant conventions and 
recommendations, EU labor standards (Directives) and the European Community Social 
Charter (Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers). The list of relevant ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations and EU labor legislation is presented in Annex Table 
A4. References are made to practices from EU15 countries. 
 
 
The main findings of the paper are as follows: 
•  Despite common roots, each of the ECA countries has its own history of labor law 
development, with differing labor market conditions and contrasting legal and social 
security systems. Some countries, such as Slovenia (1990), Hungary and Estonia 
(1992), Kyrgyzstan (1994), or Albania, Croatia and Uzbekistan (1995), adopted new 
labor laws early on while other countries aligned the existing laws to prevailing labor 
market conditions by amending particular provisions. At that time,  the laws still 
reflected the legacy of the previous system when the legislation was created mainly to 
govern the employment relationships of persons working for large production 
enterprises.  
•  Over the last decade, a second generation of reforms in labor legislation has been 
carried out in many ECA countries. Ten countries became a member of the European 
Union, which required transposing the whole acquis communautaire into the national 
labor law, and most other countries have also overhauled their labor laws. In recent 
years, new labor laws have been adopted in Estonia and Montenegro (2008), the 
Czech Republic and Georgia (2006), FYR Macedonia and Serbia (2005), and 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (2004). Kyrgyz Republic and FYR Macedonia amended 
their labor laws in 2009. Legislative reforms in this area are ongoing. 
•  The minimum content of labor regulations governing the employment contract in 
most ECA countries coincides, and goes beyond, the requirements of the ILO 
                                                                                                                                                                            
difficult due to the subjective nature of the exercise. Related to compliance is the issue of the effectiveness of a 
treaty.  A country may be compliant, but the treaty may be ineffective in attaining its objectives (See, for 
example, Weiss and Jacobson 1998). 
11 From Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), two labor laws are discussed, the Labor Code of the Federation of 
B&H, and the Labor Code of the Republic of Srpska (the third labor law from Brcko District was not available). 
Kosovo still has an interim labor law (the Essential Labor Law from 2001). The Labor Code of Turkmenistan 
was also unavailable. xi 
Conventions, the European Social Charter, or EU Directives even in the countries 
which are non-signatories of relevant treaties.  
•  ECA countries are making adjustments in their regulatory frameworks that reduce 
and eliminate unnecessary rigidities in order to ensure that the benefits to enterprises 
entering the formal sector outweigh the costs of working within the rules of the 
formal economy. Overall, in the last two decades reform of the national employment 
protection legislation has focused on easing existing regulation to facilitate more 
contractual diversity. Fixed-term contracts, part-time contracts, on-call contracts, 
zero-hour contracts, contracts for workers hired through temporary employment 
agencies, freelance contracts, etc., have become an established feature of modern 
labor markets. Recent reforms are largely associated with easing the recourse to 
temporary forms of employment while leaving existing provisions for regular or 
permanent contracts practically unaltered. 
•  In most ECA countries, collective bargaining is not very widespread and collective 
agreements are relatively weak. Thus, the role of legislation as a safeguard for 
workers is much more essential than, for example, in EU15 countries where the 
majority of workers are somehow covered by collective arrangements. Moreover, 
very often firm-level trade unions, if any, are under strong management influence. 
They are unable to push employers to increase wages or at least to pay them on time, 
to lessen staff reduction and to improve working conditions. Some countries, most 
notably Montenegro and Romania, have mixed systems with a combination of both 
law and collective bargaining, giving general or sectored collective agreements the 
force of law by creating procedures to make them ‘generally binding’.  
•  Nevertheless, in many ECA countries, the labor law remains in some important ways 
too prescriptive for today’s realities. Employment protection legislation could be 
restricted to focus on core and enforceable labor standards, and to provide a greater 
role for trade unions and employers’ associations in order to determine employment 
relations through collective bargaining, with the aim of finding the balance between 
flexibility and security. 
The study is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, we briefly discuss the factors that instigate 
modernization (or “flexibilization”) of the labor laws in ECA countries. In Chapter 2, we 
present the rules and regulations attached to commencing employment, as well as emerging 
forms of contractual  relationships. In Chapter 3, the focus is shifted towards the 
establishment of the minimum wage, and implications of minimum wages on labor market 
outcomes. In Chapter 4, we report provisions associated with leave and holidays. Chapter 5 
presents main rules and regulations associated with termination of employment contracts. 
The Conclusion closes with a brief assessment of the main findings and best practices. 
 1 
Chapter 1.  New Requirements to Labor Laws 
Flexible labor legislation is essential for promoting the creation of new businesses, growth of 
established firms, and job creation. A task of the labor law and other labor market institutions 
is to balance the need to protect workers’ rights with the need to increase flexibility in the 
labor market, and to establish a more conducive environment for the creation of productive 
employment opportunities and the enhancement of social dialogue.  
Most recently the European Commission, as well as ILO, has been promoting a concept of 
flexicurity, which is described as an optimal balance between labor market flexibility and 
security for employees against labor market risks.
12
Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (from the perspective of the employer 
and the employee, of “insiders’ and “outsiders”) through modern labor laws, collective 
agreements, and work organization. 
  The concept is a response to the needs 
that European labor markets are facing. Flexicurity policies can be designed across four 
policy components (EC 2008): 
Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies ensuring that citizens have the opportunity 
to have high quality initial education, that they complete at least their secondary 
education and that they acquire new skills and upgrade existing skills throughout their 
working lives. It is also about ensuring that enterprises invest more in human capital and 
allow employers to develop their skills. 
Effective active labor market policies helping the unemployed return to work through 
job placement services and labor market programs, such as training and job creation. Job 
search courses and job clubs have been shown to be among the most effective measures 
in helping the unemployed find a job. 
Modern social security systems, especially adequate unemployment benefits to act as a 
safety net when people change jobs, as well as healthcare benefits in case they fall ill and 
pensions for when they retire. 
Further reforms in labor legislation and other labor market institutions constitute an integral 
part of the reforms in the  overall business environment. As noted by the European 
Commission’s Green Paper, ”the modernization of labor law constitutes a key element for the 
success of the adaptability of workers and enterprises” (EC 2006). This is especially true for 
many ECA countries that struggle with low labor force participation and employment levels, 
high unemployment and a significant informal employment. 
                                                        
12 The term “flexibility” includes several dimensions. It can refer to employers’ desire for variable (flexible) 
labor inputs, in terms of numbers employed or hours worked, to match changes in demand for products or 
services. It can also refer to changing the tasks and skills of employees to increase productivity. The first type is 
sometimes described as ‘external’, ‘quantitative’ or ‘numerical’ flexibility; the second as ‘internal’, 
’qualitative’; or ‘functional’ flexibility. It can also refer to employees’ desire for variable (flexible) contractual 
arrangements and working conditions to match changing private and domestic needs. Flexibility may concern 
different forms of contractual arrangement (including ‘atypical work’), particularly as regards working time, to 
better suit the work-life balance.  
 See: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/flexibility.htm. 2 
There is a large international literature documenting empirical evidence that flexible labor 
legislation contributes to better labor market outcomes in terms of higher overall labor force 
participation and employment. Stricter EPL in turn is associated with a lower turnover in the 
labor market and a greater prevalence of temporary jobs, with both jobs and unemployment 
spells tending to last longer (See, for example, Scarpetta 1996; Nickell, 1997; Elmeskov, 
Martin and Scarpetta, 1998; Bertola, Boeri and Cazes 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; 
Nickell and Layard, 2000; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Young 2003; Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, 2005; Allard 2005; Bassanini and Duval 2006; Amable et al. 2007).
13
In 2003 the report to the European Council from the European Employment Task Force, 
chaired by Wim Kok, observed that as a result of rigid employment protection legislation 
(EPL), a two-tier labor market might emerge divided between the permanently employed and 
the  relatively well-protected "insiders" and "outsiders", including those unemployed and 
detached from the labor market as well as those precariously and informally employed. The 
latter occupy a grey area where basic employment or social protection rights may be 
significantly reduced, giving rise to a situation  of uncertainty about future employment 
prospects (EC 2003).
  
Empirical results from OECD countries suggest that mandatory dismissal regulations have a 
depressing impact on productivity growth in industries where layoff restrictions are more 
likely to be binding. (For an overview of the literature on linkages between job protection 
legislation and productivity, see Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 2009.) Strict labor regulation 
is also associated with a larger unofficial economy, especially in countries with limited 
enforcement capacity, and with a higher share of self-employment (Grubb and Wells 1993; 
Botero et al. 2004; OECD 2008; Djankov and Ramalho 2009). Rigid EPL tends not only to 
discourage hiring and firing, but may also slow down adjustment to shocks and impede the 
reallocation of  labor. Typically, strict EPL makes it harder for certain groups, including 
youth, women, and displaced older workers, to enter or re-enter the labor market, at least on 
an open-ended contract. 
14
The European Commission “Employment in Europe 2006” report refers to findings that 
stringent employment protection legislation tends to reduce the dynamism of the labor 
market, worsening the prospects of women, youth and older workers. The report underlines 
that deregulation "at the margin", while keeping stringent rules for regular contracts largely 
intact, tends to favor the development of segmented labor markets with a negative impact on 
productivity. It also stresses that workers feel better protected by a support system in case of 
unemployment than by employment protection legislation (EC 2006). 
  
Literature is emerging on the impact of EPL in transition countries (Riboud et al. 2002; 
Cazes and Nesperova 2003; Micevska 2004; Rutkowski and Scarpetta 2005). Based on the 
analysis of EPL in eight transition countries, Cazes and Nesporova (2003) concluded that the 
                                                        
13  For an overview of the findings from the 29 selected studies on the effects of EPL on labor market 
performance in OECD countries, see OECD 1999; and from 11 other studies, see OECD 2004. 
14 In a study carried out in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, workers who moved from formal to informal 
wage employment experienced a decline in monthly earnings, while the reverse move produced the opposite 
effect. Moreover, moves by women from informal to formal yielded the largest gains. The lowest-earning 
workers had a greater incentive to opt out of formality, which increased the likelihood of remaining in poverty 
(Duryea et al 2006). 3 
impact on labor market performance and labor market flows in transition countries seems to 
be rather modest. Based on the analysis of labor data, Haltiwanger and others (2003) found 
that rigid employment protection legislation is associated with lower employment rates and a 
higher long-term unemployment share. However, these relationships differ between OECD 
and transition economies. In particular, transition economies experience a weaker (less 
negative) relationship between the employment rate and EPL but a stronger (more positive) 
relationship between EPL and long-term unemployment. 
The need for a shift towards more flexible work organization structures, de-standardization 
of employment contracts and diversification of working time arrangements in the economies 
in the ECA region is driven by numerous factors. Although still less than in EU15 countries, 
there is an increasing demand for non-standard forms of employment contracts, be it fixed-
term, part-time, on-call, zero-hour, teleworking, freelance  or  hirees  through temporary 
employment agencies. These can differ significantly from the standard contractual model in 
terms of the degree of employment and income security and the relative stability of the 
associated working and living conditions. 
Among EU10 countries, between 54 percent in Slovakia to 78 percent in Estonia of the non-
financial business economy workforce was employed in SMEs, with less than 250 persons 
(Table 1). Employment in the SME sector is, in particular, driven by an increasing share of 
micro enterprises employing less than 10 people as well as by small enterprises employing 
between 10 and 50 employees; it is the primary generator of new employment.  In some of 
the  ECA countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, micro enterprises 
account for over 30 percent of the jobs in the non-financial business economy, and flexibility 
of labor regulations is often the key for their survival (Eurostat 2006). However, current labor 
laws to a large extent were designed keeping in mind the needs of large enterprises.  
Table 1:  Key SME Indicators in the Non-financial Business Economy  
In EU27 and EU10 States (2005) 
















Value added  
EU-27  19602  85000  3090  99.8  67.1  57.6 
Bulgaria  240  1318  5  99.7  72.6  53.2 
Czech R.  878  2461  30  99.8  68.9  56.7 
Estonia  38  305  4  99.6  78.1  75.1 
Latvia  62  469  5  99.7  75.6  71.1 
Lithuania  93  619  5  99.7  72.9  58.5 
Hungary  556  1783  20  99.8  70.9  50.2 
Poland  1405  5289  59  99.8  69.8  48.4 
Romania  410  2463  13  99.5  60.8  48.4 
Slovenia  88  371  8  99.7  66.4  60.6 
Slovakia  42  501  7  98.8  54.0  44.5 
Note:  Tthe non-financial business economy excludes agriculture, public administration and 
other-non-market services, as well as the financial services sector. 
Source: Eurostat 2008a. 4 
In the last two decades, there has been a major shift from less skilled, blue-collar 
manufacturing jobs towards more skilled, white-collar service sector jobs. Employment in 
the service sector predominates throughout ECA, except Armenia and Tajikistan (CIS STAT 
2008). In the  pre-transition period, the service sector was extremely underdeveloped; 
therefore, it has had the highest capacity to absorb surplus labor. 
The increased exposure to international market forces adds to the labor market risk inherent 
to  economic growth (Boeri, Helppie and Macis 2008). So, in terms of enhancing the 
competitiveness of the business and investment climate, it is beneficial for the countries in 
transition to have a “competitive” labor law, in particular, in order to attract foreign 
investors. Recent studies indicate that greater flexibility in the host country’s labor market 
relative to that in the investor’s home country is associated with larger foreign direct 
investment flows (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2004). 
Rapid demographic changes, including ageing of the population, intensive labor migration, 
prolonged education and changes in the way households now allocate their time and income, 
trigger the need for more flexibility for employees, too. In the interest of improving their 
work–life balance, workers need more choices regarding working time arrangements, 
especially during the “rush hour” of their life when working, caring and education pressures 
come together.  
Also in light of EU15 experience, the countries in the region could consider adopting a 
lifecycle approach to work that may require shifting from the concern to protect particular 
jobs through stringent labor legislation to a framework of support for employment security, 
including social support and active labor market measures in order to assist workers during 
periods of transition. In particular, recent experience shows that moderately strict EPL, when 
combined with a well-designed system of unemployment benefits and a strong emphasis on 
active labor market programs, can help create a dynamic labor market while also providing 
adequate employment security to workers (OECD 2006). This is particularly important in a 
world characterized by the gradual disappearance of life-long jobs and an increasing need for 
job mobility. 
Bargaining on terms and conditions of employment should become more market-driven in 
order to overcome current rigidities.  In this regard, social dialogue in ECA countries should 
play a much bigger role in framing collective and/or firm-level solutions enabling "insiders" 
as well as "outsiders" to successfully  transition between different employment situations 
while also assisting businesses to respond more flexibly to the demands of an economy and 
to changes in the competitive landscape. Employment protection legislation could be 
restricted to focus on core and enforceable labor standards and provide a greater role for 
trade unions and employers associations to determine employment relations through 
collective bargaining, with the aim to find the balance between flexibility and security.  
Trade unions are best positioned to assess the situation in their enterprises and industries and, 
through collective bargaining, develop rules that determine such important matters as wages, 
benefits, and overtime and part-time work arrangements but that also strengthen surveillance 
in the fight against undeclared work. In light of a sharp drop in union density, and limited 5 
labor bargaining–especially at the firm level, the role and importance of trade unions and 
collective bargaining in the ECA region has significantly diminished.
15
Nevertheless, employers’ organizations in the region tend to be even less organized. These 
associations have the difficult task of organizing enterprises not only with divergent interests 
but also very often are competitors or critically intertwined in a buyer-supplier relationship.  
In other words, at first sight it seems easier for the employers to organize given their small 
numbers, lower turnover rates, stronger networks and resources. In reality, employers have a 
more fragmented and specialized organizational structure than workers.  
   
In countries where collective bargaining is not very widespread and collective agreements are 
relatively weak, the role of legislation as a safeguard for workers is much more essential than 
in countries where the majority of workers are covered by collective arrangements. In many 
ECA countries, employment laws are often ineffective because of evasion, weak enforcement 
and failure to reach the informal sector. Even though labor legislation might be rigid de jure, 
de facto it is not enforced and is widely evaded. Achieving greater labor market flexibility 
through non-enforcement of laws is not an optimal choice because it undermines the rule of 
law, exposes firms to costly uncertainty, impedes decent formal employment growth and 
leaves workers without adequate protection (Rutkowski and Scarpetta 2005). 
Wage arrears are proof of the state’s inability to protect the basic rights of workers. 
Especially in a time of economic downturn, accumulated wage arrears tend to rapidly 
increase. They reached 8.7 billion rubles in Russia by the end of the first quarter of 2009 (a 
threefold increase over the same period a year ago), and 1.6 billion grivnas in Ukraine 
(US$200 million, or more than double the amount a year ago). In Latvia, in the fourth quarter 
of 2008, 6.4 percent of employees experienced wage arrears (Kuddo 2009). Therefore, as 
noted by the previous ILO Director General, “Labor legislation without good inspection is an 
exercise in ethics, but not a binding social discipline.” (World Bank 2007d). 
Many ECA countries need to develop modern Labor Inspectorates to effectively enforce core 
worker rights, to supervise the implementation of labor regulations and to provide technical 
assistance and advisory services to enterprises. Labor inspection is more than a mere 
bureaucratic organization, or simply a technical “tool”. As highlighted by ILO, it is “a force 
for reform and a powerful means of initiating change” (ILO 2003). The 2006 ILO General 
Survey Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations underscored this, calling on governments to recognize the “vital 
contribution to development and social cohesion made by an effective labor inspection 
service.” (ILO 2006). Labor inspectors can also play an important educative role by working 
with firms and workers to encourage compliance. 
The enforcement of laws on minimum wages is a prime example. In Romania, enforcement 
reisdes with labor inspectorates and specialized supervisory bodies of the Ministry of Labor 
                                                        
15 The highest union density rate among ECA countries for which the data are available is reported in Ukraine, 
96 percent (the percentage of wage employees affiliated to labor unions), and the lowest in Estonia, nine 
percent. (Lawrence and Ishikawa 2005; Kupets and Leshchenko 2008). The weighted average for union density 
in 10 new EU Member States is 22 percent, while the density in the 15 “old” EU Member States is 30 percent. 
In most CIS states, the union density rate is still relatively high, for example, around 75 percent in Russia while 
in Georgia only 13 percent of labor, by the government data, is unionized. 6 
and Social Protection. In the case of Ukraine, financial bureaus, the State Tax Inspectorate, 
and the Procurator General and its direct reports are responsible for enforcing the minimum 
wage legislation (Annex Table A7). In Russia and Ukraine, trade unions are involved in 
monitoring compliance; and although sanctions for non-compliance are regulated, 
enforcement is weak, inspections are infrequently carried out due to a lack of resources and 
fines are rarely imposed. This would suggest that minimum wages would have little impact 
since the wage is paid at the discretion of the employer with little government oversight, or if 
there is, little cost of punishment.  
International studies of best practice highlight a number of characteristics of high-quality, 
well-functioning labor inspection services. These include adequate resources (both staff and 
infrastructure); recruitment and training policies designed to attract and retain high quality 
inspectors; central administration to improve consistency and reduce duplication; preventive 
targeting of firms based on risk; integration of different types of inspections to reduce the 
inspection burden on business; and a focus on prevention and  education as well as 
enforcement (OECD 2008; Schrank and Piore 2007; ILO 2006; Treichel 2004). Good 
cooperation is,  in particular,  required between the labor inspectorate and other agencies, 
social partners, institutions and NGOs. 
It is the recommendation of  ILO (2006) that advanced countries have at least one labor 
inspector per 10,000 employed persons and that transition countries have one inspector per 
20,000 employed persons. In the CEE, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic meet the 
recommended number of inspectors for advanced countries, and the Czech Republic meets 
the transition country guidelines. 
In addition to significant employment in the informal sector (see, for example, Schneider 




  According to  the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) of firms in ECA, the average percent of workforce reported for tax purposes was 90 
percent. At either extreme, Albania and Macedonia reported 75 and 79 percent, respectively, 
and Armenia reported 96 percent. In addition, a significant share of hired employees work 
without written labor contracts, in violation of labor laws. As for wages, the rate of tax 
compliance in 2005 was on average in ECA 86 percent of the wage bill that has to be taxed 







                                                        
16 On the concepts of “employment in the informal sector” and “informal employment”, see Hussmanns 2004 
and ILO 2000. 7 
Figure 1:  Tax Compliance in CIS, SEE, EU8, and ECA Countries (2005) 
 
Source:  EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) (2005). 
Thereby, by making labor regulations more flexible, the government can encourage informal 
businesses to operate formally and create more jobs. This expands the reach of regulation and 
the associated social protections to more people, benefiting especially the young and women.  
Finally, lack of public awareness on legal rights associated with employment may also impair 
the enforcement of the law in a number of countries. Workers should know their legal rights 
and how to enforce them. Evidence, to the contrary, suggests that public opinion is often ill-
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Chapter 2.  Entry into Employment 
The most important document that sets out the individual rights and obligations of the parties 
to an employment relationship is the employment contract. This is also the most important 
contract in their lifetime for the majority of people in the region. In the socialist system, an 
employment relationship existed between the worker and state/public organization or 
enterprise; under current labor laws, it is between an employer (or in some countries, such as 
in Ukraine, defined in the law as between the owner  of an enterprise, organization or 
institution or the authorized agency thereof, or a natural person) and an employee.
17
The existence of an employment relationship is internationally recognized in ILO 
Employment Relationship Recommendation No. 198 (2006) by the following:  
  
a.  The fact that the work: is carried out according to the instructions and under the 
control of another party; involves the integration of the worker in the organization of 
the enterprise; is performed solely or mainly for the benefit of another person; must 
be carried out personally by the worker; is carried out within specific working hours 
or at a workplace specified or agreed by the party requesting the work; is of a 
particular duration and has a certain continuity; requires the worker's availability; or 
involves the provision of tools, materials and machinery by the party requesting the 
work. 
b.  Periodic payment of remuneration to the worker; the fact that such remuneration 
constitutes the worker's sole or principal source of income; provision of payment in 
kind, such as food, lodging or transport; recognition of entitlements such as weekly 
rest and annual holidays; payment by the party requesting the work for travel 
undertaken by the worker in order to carry out the work; or absence of financial risk 
for the worker. 
2.1.  Mandatory Provisions of Employment Contract 
Except short-term or casual work arrangements, employment relationships in all ECA 
countries should be legitimated in a written employment contract. The only exception is the 
new Georgian Labor Code from 2006, which equally endorses verbal contracts by stating that 
the employment agreement is executed in writing or verbally but the employer must issue a 
certificate of employment upon request of the employee that includes data on performed 
labor, labor compensation and duration of the employment agreement. De facto oral work 
                                                        
17 The definition of the terms "employee", “employer”, "contract" and "employment relationship" is left to 
national legislation. The Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community 
provides the following definitions in very general terms: (a) "employer" means the natural or legal person party 
to employment contracts or employment relationships with employees, in accordance with national law and 
practice; (b) "employee" means any person who, in the Member State concerned, is protected as an employee 
under national employment law and in accordance with national practice. 9 
agreements are common in many countries in the region. In Armenia, according to the 2004 
labor force survey (LFS), 23 percent of employees in firms and organizations worked based 
on an oral agreement, evidence that it is necessary to deepen the legal and contractual 
regulation of labor relations (NSS 2005). 
Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer's obligation to inform 
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship stipulates 
that an obligation to inform employees in writing of the main terms of the contract or 
employment relationship shall not apply to employees having a contract or employment 
relationship:  
(a)  with a total duration not exceeding one month, and/or - with a working week not 
exceeding eight hours; or  
(b)  of a casual and/or specific nature provided, in these cases, that its non-application 
is justified by objective considerations.  
In Estonia, an oral employment contract may be entered into only for employment for a term 
of less than two weeks while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the duration of such an engagement 
without a contract can last up to two months. Slovakian legislation considers two exceptions, 
neither of which gives rise to an employment relationship. The first exception affects the 
relationship known as contract for work, defined for a contract whose duration does not 
exceed 300 hours per year. The second refers to contracts for work by a student, understood 
as those held between an employer and a student of a high school or a university, as long as 
the duration of work does not exceed 20 hours per week in a maximum twelve month 
average. 
Furthermore, by the Directive, the employee must be provided with information on any 
change in the essential elements of the contract or employment relationship except in the 
event of a change in the laws, regulations and administrative or statutory provisions. 
The same Directive lists the essential aspects of the contract or employment relationship of 
which an employee should be notified: 
(a)  the identities of the parties;  
(b)  the place of work; where there is no fixed or main place of work, the principle 
that the employee is employed at various places and the registered place of 
business or, where appropriate, the domicile of the employer;  
(c)  (i) the title, grade, nature or category of the work of the employee; or (ii) a brief 
specification or description of the work;  
(d)  the date of commencement of the contract or employment relationship;  
(e)  in the case of a temporary contract or employment relationship, the expected 
duration thereof;  10 
(f)  the amount of paid leave to which the employee is entitled or, where this cannot 
be indicated when the information is given, the procedures for allocating and 
determining such leave;  
(g)  the length of the periods of notice to be observed by the employer and the 
employee should their contract or employment relationship be terminated or, 
where this cannot be indicated when the information is given, the method for 
determining such periods of notice;  
(h)  the initial basic amount, the other component elements and the frequency of 
payment of the remuneration to which the employee is entitled;  
(i)  the length of the employee's normal working day or week;  
(j)  where appropriate, (i) the collective agreements governing the employee's 
conditions of work; or (ii) in the case of collective agreements concluded outside 
the business by special joint bodies or institutions, the name of the competent 
body or joint institution within which the agreements were concluded.  
This information may be given to the employee, not later than two months after the 
commencement of employment, in the form of:  (a) a written contract of employment; and/or 
(b) a letter of engagement; and/or (c) one or more written documents, where one of these 
documents contains at least all of the information listed in (a), (b), (c), (d), (h) and (i). 
Permitting an employee to commence work is equivalent to entering into an employment 
contract, regardless of whether the employment contract has been formalized.  
The minimum content of the employment contract in most of the EU10 countries coincides, 
and even goes beyond, the requirements of the Directive. However, legislation exists where 
the content does not cover the list of issues contained in the Community regulation; this is the 
case of the Czech and Slovakian legislation. For example, the Czech national law does not 
oblige to inform on employment conditions relative to the title, grade, nature or category of 
the work, the date of the commencement of the contract, the duration of the contract, in the 
case of temporary employment and, where appropriate, the collective agreements of 
application. 
The European Social Charter asks the signatories to ensure that workers are informed in 
written form, as soon as possible, and in any event not later than two months after the date of 
commencing their employment, of the essential aspects of the contract or employment 
relationship. The labor legislation in most ECA countries is stricter in this regard: as a rule, 
an employee cannot commence work without an employment contract being signed. The 
Polish Labor Code stipulates that if an employment contract is not made in writing, an 
employer shall,  not later than on the day of the commencement of work, provide the 
employee with written confirmation of the identities of the parties, the type of contract and 
the terms. The remaining information required by the Directive should be given separately, 
also in writing, to the employee within seven days from the date of commencement of work. 
In Serbia and FYR Macedonia, as in a few other countries, the employer is obliged to register 
all new employment contracts with the public employment service (PES), mainly for health 
and social insurance purposes. In the Ukraine, only a labor contract between an employee 11 
and an individual employer should be registered with the state employment service where the 
individual resides within one week of actually starting work. This exacerbates the already-
heavy work load of the PES, although electronic submissions of the contracts was recently 
instated. 
Regulations for non-compliance with these provisions varies throughout the region. On one 
side of the spectrum, especially in the Western Balkan countries, labor inspectors can fine the 
employer on the spot if they find out that somebody is engaged in the firm without a written 
employment contract, for example, in Montenegro.  On the other side, the Estonian law 
formalizes the process by creating two copies of the employment contract (one held by the 
employer and the other by the employee), national law does not state any legal ramifications 
for cases of non-compliance with the written contract. 
2.2.  Working Age and Statutory Retirement Age 
The legal rights of children and young people at employment are protected in many 
international treaties.
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In addition, the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention No. 182 (1999) obliges each 
member state that ratifies the Convention to take immediate and effective measures to secure 
the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor as a matter of urgency. 
There are two classifications: (i) unconditional forms of worst child labor and (ii) hazardous 
work. The former is slavery and practices similar to slavery (sale, trafficking, debt bondage, 
serfdom, compulsory or forced labor–including compulsory recruitment of children for 
armed conflicts). The latter includes work that, by its nature or under the circumstances that 
it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.  
 According to the ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 138 (1973), a 
minimum age for admission to employment or work within its territory shall not be less than 
the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, in any case, shall not be less than 15 
years. National laws or regulations may permit the employment or work of persons 13 to 15 
years of age in light work that is (a) not likely to be harmful to their health or development 
and (b) not such as to prejudice their attendance at school, their participation in vocational 
orientation or training programs approved by the competent authority or their capacity to 
benefit from the instruction received. 
The EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights states that the employment of children is prohibited. 
The minimum age of admission to employment may not be lower than the minimum school-
leaving age, without prejudice to such rules as may be more favorable to young people and 
except for limited derogations. Young people admitted to work must have working 
conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any 
work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to 
interfere with their education. 
                                                        
18 “Young person” means any person under 18 years of age; “child” means any young person of less than 15 
years of age or who is still subject to compulsory full-time schooling under national law; ”adolescent” means 
any young person of at least 15 years of age but less than 18 years of age who is no longer subject to 
compulsory full-time schooling under national law. 12 
The European Social Charter prescribes that the minimum age of admission to employment 
shall be 15 years, subject to exceptions for children employed in prescribed light work 
without harm to their health, morals or education. Also the minimum age of admission to 
employment shall be 18 years with respect to prescribed occupations regarded as dangerous 
or unhealthy. The labor laws should provide additional guarantees to young people under 18 
years of age, such as the prohibition of night work; the right to a minimum of four weeks' 
annual holiday with pay; the accounting of time spent by young persons in vocational 
training during the normal working hours with the consent of the employer shall be treated as 
forming part of the working day; and so on. 
Similar provisions are stipulated in the Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the 
protection of young people at work, namely that the minimum working or employment age is 
not lower than the minimum age at which compulsory schooling as imposed by national law 
ends or 15 years in any event. In addition, the maximum working time of young people 
should be strictly limited, for example, for adolescents to 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week, 
and for each 24-hour period, a minimum rest period of 12 consecutive hours. 
In the Soviet Union, the working age was defined as from age 16 to up to 55 for females, and 
60 for males. Therefore, in CIS states the minimum age for entering into an employment 
contract is still 16 years (with the exception of Azerbaijan); yet, in most EU10 and SEE 
countries (except Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Romania), it is 15 years (See 
Annex Table A1). For example, the Uzbek Labor code stipulates that the employment shall 
be allowed from the age of 16  years.  A 15  year old may be employed with the written 
consent of a parent or a guardian. 
In most ECA countries, the legal pensionable age has been kept low for a long time. Partly 
this is explained by the low life expectancy in the region, and partly by the poor health status 
of many pensioners, reflecting the extremely bad working and living conditions in the past in 
socialist industries, enterprises or regions. Prior to the transition, the standard legal retirement 
age in socialist countries (except Poland) was 55 for females and 60 for males. For retirees 
having a sufficient service length in the Far North and Far East regions of the USSR, the 
pension age was 55 years for men and 50 years for women. Furthermore, various early 
retirement schemes were available, thus making the effective retirement age even lower. 
By international conventions and treaties, the definition of a statutory pensionable age is left 
to the countries themselves, and currently there is a great variance of retirement ages: from 
65 for both males and females in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 65 for males and 60 for females in 
Albania, Croatia, Georgia and Poland to the still low 60 for males and 55 for females in 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Uzbekistan (See Annex Table A1).  
The differences in life expectancy at retirement between the EU15 and ECA countries are 
much less pronounced.
19
                                                        
19 See, for example, http://data.un.org/Search.aspx?q=life+expectancy. 
 In some transition countries, such as in Russia, it is complicated to 
prove the necessity of raising the retirement age when life expectancy at birth but also at 
retirement is low and declining. 13 
Given the demographic trend towards ageing of the working population, various international 
documents call for elimination of any legal and administrative obstacles to the employment 
of older workers. EU Council recommendation 82/857/EEC of 10 December 1982 on the 
principles of a Community policy with regard to retirement age suggests that (i) as from a 
specified age, and if necessary within an age limit, employed persons should be free to 
choose the age from which they could take their retirement pensions; and, (ii) failing that, 
and provided that the system stipulates a specific age for the granting of a pension, employed 
persons should have the right, during a specified period, to apply for a pension in advance of 
the prescribed age or to defer it beyond that age.  
Furthermore, flexibility as regards the pension age can also be achieved whereby entitlement 
to a retirement pension arises after a given number of years of occupational activity or 
membership of an insurance scheme. Several ECA countries have incorporated relevant 
guarantees into their labor legislation, which will be discussed below. Some countries have 
introduced early retirement schemes for purely labor market reasons. For example, in FYR 
Macedonia, unemployed females aged 57 and over and males aged 59 and over are provided 
early retirement allowance until they reach the retirement age of 62 or 64 years respectively 
and are entitled to an old-age pension. This allowance is financed from the regular budget of 
the Employment Agency. By the end of 2007, beneficiaries (but only 21,300 individuals) 
comprised 86 percent of all the recipients of the unemployment benefit, and high costs are 
increasingly crowding-out alternative expenditures, such as on active labor market programs 
(ALMPs). 
2.3.  Term of Employment Contract 
A contract of employment can be concluded for an indefinite term, for a fixed term or for the 
time of completion of a specified task. Usually in the absence of an agreement,  to the 
contrary, an employment relation is established for an indefinite duration. 
In labor legislation in the region, most attention is paid to relevant arrangements associated 
with fixed-term employment, which in the socialist period was deemed to be an exceptional 
form of employment, conditioned by the nature of work or by other objective conditions. In 
recent years, fixed-term work has been increasing not only in EU15 countries but in ECA 
countries as well.
20 Fixed-term contracts are heavily concentrated among young people (in 
the EU close to 40 percent for individuals aged 15-24) and also among other labor market 
entrants, the unemployed, those with the lowest education levels - in general among people 
who have weaker bargaining power.
21
                                                        
20 The term 'fixed-term worker' means a person having an employment contract or relationship entered into 
directly between an employer and a worker where the  end of the employment contract or relationship is 
determined by objective conditions such as reaching a specific date, completing a specific task, or the 
occurrence of a specific event. 
 On the other hand, especially for these workers, fixed-
term work can provide a bridge into employment and an opportunity to gain experience and 
skills. This is especially true for first time workers who lack experience and are given an 
opportunity to be trained and to receive an income; businesses receive incentives to hire and 
21  An overview of fixed-term contracts in EU15 countries see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/labour_law/docs/fixed_term_impl_eu15_en.pdf 14 
keep theses workers once they have learnt the necessary skills. It is also more important in 
the primary, service and construction sectors than in manufacturing.  
By Eurostat data, almost 15 percent of women employees and around 14 percent of men were 
employed in jobs with fixed-term contracts in the EU as a whole in 2005.
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The main findings of the referred study on fixed-term contracts in the EU are: 
 A significant 
proportion of whom worked in fixed-term jobs because they could not find a permanent job.  
•   7.5 percent of all women employees and 6.7 percent of men in 2005 were employed 
in fixed-term jobs involuntarily. 
•   The share of both women and men employed in fixed-terms jobs and those employed 
in such jobs involuntarily increased between 2000 and 2005. 
•   Almost a third of women and men employees under age 30 had fixed-term contracts 
in 2005, of which around 40 percent were employed in fixed-term jobs involuntarily. 
•  The largest shares of involuntary fixed-term employees were in agriculture, and 
among those employed in private households. 
•  A much larger share of employees in elementary occupations were employed in 
fixed-term jobs involuntarily than those employed as managers, professionals and 
technicians. 
•  Some 43 percent of women and 48 percent of men employed in fixed-term jobs 
involuntarily had contracts of less than six months. 
Therefore, a disproportionate number of young men and women under 30 works in jobs with 
fixed-term contracts, partially because they are employed on temporary training or 
probationary contracts. Furthermore, men and women in elementary occupations, as well as 
agricultural workers, are more likely to be employed in fixed-term jobs involuntarily. While 
among managers, only 1  percent of men and women were employed in fixed-term jobs 
involuntarily, among workers in elementary occupations the ratio was 14 percent for women 
and 15 percent for men, and among skilled agricultural workers, 17 percent and 13 percent 
respectively (Eurostat 2008). 
In ECA countries, the proportion of fixed-term workers is 27 percent in Poland but only 1 
percent in Romania. This might be partly explained by restrictions in labor legislation. In 
Romania, fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks and the maximum duration 
is 24 months, whereas in Poland there is no restriction on the use and maximum duration of 
fixed-term contracts. The main reasons for working in temporary jobs (fixed-term contracts) 
are commonly that respondents cannot find a permanent job or that they have a contract for 
the probationary period. 
                                                        
22 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-07-098/EN/KS-SF-07-098-EN.PDF. 15 
Table 2:  Share of Employees with Temporary Contracts 
By Country and Sex (2Q 2008) 
  Total  Men  Women 
Bulgaria  5.1  6.0  4.2 
Czech R.  8.2  6.7  10.1 
Latvia  3.0  3.9  2.0 
Lithuania  2.7  …  … 
Hungary  7.9  8.7  7.0 
Poland  27.0  26.1  27.9 
Romania  1.3  1.3  1.2 
Slovakia  4.2  4.0  4.4 
Slovenia  17.0  15.0  19.2 
EU-27  14.2  13.3  15.1 
EU-15  16.5  15.4  17.7 
Source: Eurostat 2008b. 
Recent reforms in labor legislation in the region (in particular, in Azerbaijan, Montenegro 
and FYR Macedonia in 2008; in Georgia in 2006) are largely associated with liberalization of 
term contracts. Fixed-term work contributes to making labor markets more flexible. It 
provides a buffer for cyclical fluctuations of demand, allowing companies to adjust 
employment levels without incurring high firing costs. Fixed-term work also allows 
companies to reap market opportunities by engaging in projects of short duration without 
bearing disproportionate personnel costs. This is especially important in those labor markets 
where permanent employment is protected by strict regulations and high firing costs. To 
counterbalance the latter, some ECA countries have established the minimum service length 
of one to three years with the same employer to be eligible to claim severance pay, which 
makes fixed-term contracts of short term less attractive (See below section on contract 
termination). 
However, research has pointed out a number of risks associated with the use of fixed-term 
work, especially for workers but also for employers. For instance, fixed-term workers are 
subject to higher turnover, earn lower wages on average and receive less training (EC 2006). 
In addition, expansion of temporary employment may reinforce labor market duality. In fact, 
its main effect may be to produce high turnover in temporary jobs, with many workers going 
through several unemployment spells before obtaining a regular job (see Blanchard and 
Landier 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002). There is a risk that part of the workforce 
becomes  trapped in a succession of short-term, low-quality jobs with inadequate social 
protection, leaving them in a vulnerable position. EU-15 data show that around 60 percent of 
those who had taken up non-standard contractual arrangements in 1997 had standard 
contracts in 2003. However, 16 percent of them were still found in the same situation and 20 
percent of them had moved out of employment. 
When firms can easily hire temporary workers but it is costly to dismiss regular ones, firms 
do not have any incentives to convert workers from temporary to permanent contracts. Since 
temporary contracts can only be renewed a limited number of times or have a given duration, 
temporary workers – mostly young and unskilled – are forced into an endless rotation across 
temporary jobs. Their low probability of being converted into a permanent job, even if they 16 
are very good, reduces incentives to perform well and to learn in the job, with obvious costs 
in productivity growth (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego 1999).  
Furthermore,  temporary workers provide a buffer against unemployment for permanent 
workers. This is because in the case of economic difficulties, temporary workers will always 
be the first to go. This effect reduces the response of wages to increases in unemployment 
leading to higher wages and lower permanent employment rates than otherwise (Blanchard 
and Landier 2001; Bentolila et al. 1994).  
To prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or 
relationships, the EU Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on 
fixed-term work suggests listing  in national legislation one or more of the following 
measures: 
(a)   Objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships; 
(b)  Maximum total duration of  successive fixed-term employment contracts or 
relationships; 
(c)  Number of renewals of such contracts or relationships. 
It is also important to emphasize in the law that fixed-term workers should not be treated in a 
less favorable manner in an employment relationship than comparable permanent workers 
unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds arising from the law or collective 
agreement. The equal treatment should apply in various fields: health and safety, 
remuneration, duration and organization of working time, paid leave and public holidays, 
vocational training, social benefits, or information on available vacant posts and 
remuneration. 
The above-mentioned EU Directive suggests that, as far as possible, employers should 
facilitate access by fixed-term workers to appropriate training opportunities to enhance their 
skills, career development and occupational mobility. Employers should also inform fixed-
term workers about vacancies that become available in the undertaking or the establishment 
to ensure that they have the same opportunity to secure permanent positions as other workers. 
Such information may be provided by way of a general announcement at a suitable place in 
the undertaking or establishment. 
The labor laws in ECA countries display a wide range of solutions (Annex Table A6). In 10 
countries there are no restrictions on valid cases for fixed-term contracts while some other 
countries require objective reasons which are specified technically in various ways ranging 
from a more general requirement, such as temporary nature of the assignment, to more or less 
detailed lists in the legislation indicating the range and types of permissible fixed-term 
contracts. In Russia and Kyrgyzstan, while an extensive list of valid cases for conclusion of 
fixed-term contracts is listed in the national legislation (18 and 17 cases respectively), an 
important exception is made for SMEs: in Russia fixed-term contracts can be concluded with 
persons enrolling in small business organizations with the personnel numbering up to 40 
persons (up to 25 persons in the trading and consumer services organizations) as well as 
working for individual employers; and in Kyrgyzstan, firms with less than 15 employees can 
also conclude term contracts with new employees for one year.  17 
Limitations on the duration and/or the renewals of fixed-term contracts are also common. 
Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, and Poland, do not have any limit for a single 
fixed-term contract or maximum cumulated duration of successive contracts;  similarly, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova do not limit cumulated duration of such 
contracts.  In contrast, Serbia allows term contracts only for 12 months and several other 
countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia) for two years. 
According to the available data, there is a steady trend in some of ECA countries for an 
increase in the share of fixed-term contracts, especially among the newly hired employees. In 
2005, FYR Macedonia, which has a 34 percent unemployment rate and only a 41 percent 
employment rate, replaced previous restrictions on the conclusion of fixed-term contracts 
with  a  simple formulation,  “A fixed-term employment contract may be concluded for 
carrying out work which by its nature is of limited duration, with interruption or without 
interruption, for a period of up to four years”. With these and other improvements in labor 
legislation, the number of newly registered employment contracts significantly increased 
from 112,000 in 2004 to 191,500 in 2007 (of which 54 percent were fixed-term contracts). It 
also reflects the fact that more employers choose to formalize contractual relationships with 
their employees. Respectively, the share of informal employment  declined:  the share of 
employment in the informal sector, according to the labor force survey data, fell from 35 
percent in 2006 to 27 percent by the end of 2007.  
Hungary reported a similar trend. While the total percentage of fixed-term employees did not 
change significantly from 1997 to 2003 (from 6.3 to 7.2 percent), the ratio of fixed-term 
contracts among new employees grew from 40.1 to 52.3 in the same period (Lehoczky et al. 
2005).  
Labor legislation among the EU15 countries provides for a wide variety of options with 
respect to fixed-term contracts. To list a few examples, in Denmark, rules on fixed-term 
contracts are mainly found in collective agreements and breach of these rules gives rise to 
claim for damages. German legislation gives a non-exhaustive list of objective reasons 
justifying fixed-term contracts, for example, where the work is operationally required only 
temporarily, the employee substitutes another employee, the particular nature of the work 
justifies the limitation of the duration, the limitation is for a trial period, the limitation is 
justified by reasons connected with the person of the employee and where the employee is 
remunerated from budgetary funds set aside for fixed-term work and he or she is 
correspondingly employed. Fixed-term contracts can also be concluded without any 
particular objective reason justifying the fixed-term contract but in these cases the contract 
can be renewed only three times during a period of two years. In France, the fixed-term 
contract has an exceptional character and is subject to objective and precise conditions laid 
down in the Labor Code, such as the replacement of an absent employee, a  temporary 
increase in the activity of the company or work that is temporary by nature, such as seasonal 
jobs. The Finnish Employment Contracts Act of 2001 provides in general terms that any 
fixed-term contract has to be based on objective (justifiable) reasons. 
As far as the duration is concerned, in EU15 countries, the fixed-term contracts vary (with 
exceptions in some countries) from one year in Spain, 18 months in France, two years in 
Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden, and three years in the Netherlands and Portugal. There are 
no limits on duration in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Italy. In Germany, there is 18 
no maximum duration for a fixed-term contract with objective cause, and two years for a 
fixed-term contract without objective cause. In the UK, there is no limit as well but 
employees who have worked successive fixed-term contracts for a period of four years or 
more will become permanent employees unless the employer can objectively justify the 
continued use of a fixed-term arrangements. In Finland, there is no specific maximum 
duration for fixed-term employment contracts. However, after five years,  a fixed-term 
contract is subject to the same requirements for termination as an indefinite-term contract. 
Renewals for fixed-term contracts are more restricted, and even in the countries with the 
most flexible arrangements, as a rule, a justification is required. For example, in Belgium, the 
maximum term of a single fixed-term contract is not limited; however, it cannot be renewed 
without justification based on the nature of the functions or other legitimate reasons.  
Contracts of shorter duration can be renewed multiple times within a maximum total time 
period of two years (three years with prior authorization). In Denmark, renewal is allowed 
only for objective reasons while in Spain, no renewal is allowed at all.
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In many ECA countries, flexible arrangements for fixed-term contracts have the potential to 
be abused,  although  in  the  current circumstances, they could  become an engine for job 
creation. Relaxing restrictions on the use of temporary or fixed-term contracts and reducing 
firing costs for young or inexperienced workers would also improve incentives for firms to 
hire formal workers. 
  
2.4.  Probationary Period 
In ECA countries, except Albania, according to the labor law an employment contract may 
prescribe a probationary period in order to confirm that the employee has the necessary 
professional skills and abilities, suitable social skills and health to perform the work agreed 
on in the employment contract. It may be set upon the wish of the employer with the goal of 
assessing the suitability of an employee for the envisaged work (position), or at the request of 
the person being employed to define the suitability of the offered job (position) for him/her.  
A probationary period condition must be stated in a labor agreement. If no probationary 
period condition is stated in a labor agreement, an employee is accepted without a 
probationary period. 
The employer assesses the results of the probationary period and may dismiss the employee 
if the results are unsatisfactory. Upon dismissal due to the unsatisfactory results, as a rule, the 
employer is not required to give prior notice or pay compensation to the employee. However, 
in Lithuania, a written notice three days in advance by either of the parties is required prior to 
terminating the employment contract during the trial period. 
The length of the trial period is important because, during this period, regular contracts are 
not fully covered by employment protection provisions and usually unfair dismissal claims 
cannot be made. Azerbaijan and Hungary have the shortest trial period, where employers 
cannot use probationary periods, as a rule, of more than one month (Annex Table A6). In 
most ECA countries, probation may last up to other  months, which is also a very short 
                                                        
23 According to the World Bank database Doing Business 2009. 19 
probationary period. In many jobs, particularly high level positions, employers need more 
than three months to determine if a worker or employee is a good match. The lengthiest 
probationary period of up to six months is found in most SEE countries and Georgia. 
However, by some anecdotal evidence, especially in micro enterprises and in the service 
sector, some of the employers tend to abuse lengthy probationary periods by hiring the 
workers only for the trial period, and replacing them at the end of the period with new 
employees. In order to avoid such situations, in the Romanian national  legislation,  it is 
prohibited to successively employ more than three persons for trial periods for the same 
position. 
On the other hand, for many unskilled and semiskilled occupations, it would not be necessary 
to have a lengthy probationary period to verify the abilities of the worker. Therefore, the 
differentiation might be warranted to  explore  lengthier trial periods for employees in 
managerial/executive positions and shorter periods for unskilled workers. The most detailed 
differentiation is provided in Romania’s national legislation: up to 5 working days for 
unskilled workers; up to 30 calendar days for executive positions; up to 50 calendar days 
when employing disabled persons; up to 90 calendar days for management positions, and 3-6 
months for hiring higher education graduates.  
In many countries, the  probationary period is not applied to minors (Belarus,  Estonia, 
Lithuania, Russia and Tajikistan); disabled persons (Belarus and Estonia); pregnant women 
and women with children up to three years of age (Uzbekistan); and some other categories of 
employees. In some countries, a shorter or longer trial period may be stipulated in the 
collective agreement or agreed upon by the parties (Hungary and Ukraine). If the contracted 
term of a probation period expires and the employee continues to perform the work, it is 
considered that he or she has passed the probation period. 
2.5.  Other Flexible Forms of Labor Contract 
The drive for flexibility in the labor market has given rise to increasingly diverse contractual 
forms of employment, which can differ significantly from the standard contractual model in 
terms of the degree of employment and income security and the relative stability of the 
associated working and living conditions. This is reflected in variations in work organization, 
working hours, wages, and workforce size at different stages of the production cycle.  
These changes have created a demand for a wider variety of employment contracts. In 
addition to fixed-term contracts, also part-time contracts, on-call contracts, zero-hour 
contracts, contracts for workers hired through temporary employment agencies, freelance 
contracts, etc., have become an established feature of European labor markets. The share of 
total employment by those engaged in working arrangements that differ from the standard 
contractual model as well as those in self-employment has increased from over 36 percent in 
2001 to almost 40 percent of the EU-25 workforce in 2005 (EC 2006b). 
Atypical work can provide considerable economic and social benefits. It opens up the labor 
market to people for whom full-time employment is unfeasible or unattractive. It also 
provides more flexibility, mobility and dynamism to the labor market, which in turn may 20 
contribute to an innovative culture, improved economic performance and efficiency. 
Examples of regulation of atypical work in the labor legislation of ECA countries follow. 
In Estonia, on-call time may be established if, due to the nature of work, the employee needs 
to perform unexpected and urgent tasks (e.g. medical workers, rescue workers, etc.). The 
Estonian Employment Contract Act makes it possible for employers to require employees to 
be available during rest time (i.e. the employee has rest from work).  On-call  time is 
established in addition to the duration of general working time. On-call hours are not 
included in working time if the employee is not called to work. If the employee is called to 
work, the hours worked are counted as working time.
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Since on-call time is highly inconvenient for rest (a worker cannot travel far from home, 
must be ready to immediately attend work when called, etc.), this time is compensated by 
additional remuneration. The 2008 Employment Contracts Act of Estonia stipulates that if an 
employee and an employer have agreed that the employee shall be available to the employer 
for performance of duties outside of working time (on-call time), remuneration that is not 
less than one tenth of the agreed wages shall be paid to the employee. The hours worked are 
treated as overtime, since on-call time is additional to the general working time. 
 
In Hungary, “on-call” work is allowed for work that addresses the basic needs of the society, 
providing services to prevent or preclude accidents, natural disasters and severe damage or to 
preclude direct and severe danger to human life, body or health or where it is needed for the 
safe use of technology. Two forms of on-call work are recognized, where the employee must 
remain available and in a suitable condition for work. In "stand-by" work, the employee is 
obligated to be in a place designated by the employer while they are on duty. In "on-call" 
work, the employee may decide the place, as long as he or she is available in due time for 
work. The employee shall carry out no more than 168 hours of on-call work per month. 
Actual work carried out during on- all must be regarded as overtime work. 
In Lithuania, the employer may assign the employee to on-call work only in extraordinary 
cases when it is necessary to ensure proper operation of the enterprise or completion of 
urgent work. There are two types of on-call  work: at the enterprise or at home. The 
assignment to be on duty at the enterprise or at home after the working day, on rest days or 
on public holidays can be made not more than once a month or, with the consent of the 
employee, not more often than once a week. The duration of being on-call at the enterprise 
together with the duration of the working day (when an employee is on duty after the end of a 
working day) may not exceed the regular duration of a working day set in Labor Code (40 
hours per week, 8 hours a day; maximum working time (including overtime) must not exceed 
48 hours per 7 working days). The duration of being on duty at the enterprise on rest days 
and public holidays as well as at home may not exceed 8 hours a day. The duration of being 
on-call at the enterprise shall be counted as working time in full, and the duration of being 
on-call at home will be counted as at least half of the working time (Muda et al. 2006). 
Telework is a relatively new form of flexible employment that is at least as much driven by 
the needs of employees as by employers’ interest.
25
                                                        
24 The 1992 Employment Contracts Law (as amended) limited the duration of on-call time to 30 hours a month. 
 In most EU15 countries (France, Greece, 
25  Pennings  (1997) defines telework as " ... the work performed by a person (employee, self-employed, 21 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK), telework is seen as a new form of homework, which is 
characterized by the use of information and telecommunication technology (ICT). Telework 
is not a legal category. In some countries, teleworkers are considered to be a special type of 
homeworker. In many Member States, however, the ICT connection to a specific employer 
makes it quite easy - easier than with other types of homeworkers - to look at teleworkers as 
employees. Teleworkers who work for more than one commissioning organization and who 
do not work in a clear hierarchical mode are considered to be self-employed.  
Telework is recognized as an  employment relationship in several countries in the  ECA 
region. In Romania, teleworkers are employees who carry out, at their home, assignments 
typical of their positions. Such workers set up their own work schedule. However, as an 
expression of authority, the employer is entitled to check a teleworker's activity, under the 
terms set by the individual employment contract. The employment contract for telework must 
comprise: express mention that an employee must work at home; the schedule during which 
the employer shall be entitled to check the employee's activity; the actual manner in which 
such checks are carried out; the employer's obligation to ensure transport, to and from an 
employee's domicile, and as the case may be, of the raw materials and materials, which 
he/she uses in his/her activity, as well as the finished products made by him/her. Teleworkers 
enjoy all the rights stipulated by the law and the collective labor agreements applicable to 
employees whose workplace is at the employer's head office (Dima 2008). 
The uptake of telework in Hungary paralleled the widespread use of information technololgy. 
It served primarily as a way of supporting the labor market participation of persons with 
difficulties undertaking  labor outside of  the home (e.g. parents with multiple children, 
disabled persons, people living in remote areas, etc.) as well as school-leavers or unemployed 
intellectuals. The amendment of the Labor Code in 2004 provided legal certainty, by 
inserting  a  chapter on telework. The provisions define the concept of the teleworker: a 
worker engaged in activities on a regular basis within the employer's regular profile of 
operations at a place of choice, other than the employer's facilities, using computers and 
other means of information technology and delivering the product through electronic means 
(Lehoczky et al. 2005). 
Assistance to purchase the necessary IT equipment was available from public resources, and 
employers  were  eligible  for  support for the purpose of widening applied telework. 
Occasionally at the outset, the rules on outworking were applied in the absence of adequate 
regulation, in spite of the qualitative differences between outworking and teleworking. 
Telework is clearly a form of subordinate labor under the continuous control of the employer. 
Outworkers are much more in control of the process of labor and their responsibility is 
focused more closely on the result to be delivered; thus, their status is half way between 
employment and a civil law contract for work. 
In addition to the legal changes, the Ministry of Employment in Hungary launched a fund to 
promote telework, which resulted in the establishment of almost 4,000 teleworking jobs. The 
government's efforts to promote telework has so far resulted in an increase in the percentage 
                                                                                                                                                                            
homeworker, ...) mainly or for an important part, at (a) locations other than the traditional workplace for an 
employer or a client, involving the use of advanced technologies". 22 
of employees working as teleworkers from an estimated proportion of 2 percent to 4 percent 
of the total employed labor force.  
A relatively new type of work arrangement in ECA region is flexible distribution of working 
time (flexitime). The purpose is to make better use of employee work hours and meet their 
personal needs more satisfactorily within the framework of 40 hours per week. Slovakia and 
Slovenia  have introduced  the concept in the interest of increasing efficiency and better 
responding to the needs of workers. The 'core' hours during which the employee must be 
present in the workplace are determined by the employer, and they must be at least five hours 
each day. The period of 'optional' working time at the start and end of the day must be of at 
least one hour (for a 40 hour week). Also, prior negotiation with employee representatives is 
required to initiate flexitime. Another form of flexitime arrangements is the Moldovan Labor 
Code in which compressed workweeks of 4 or 4 1/2 days are permitted but weekly hours 
must not exceed 40 hours. 
In Romania, depending on the typical features of the company or of the work performed, an 
unequal distribution of the working time may be chosen, provided 40 hours per week is not 
exceeded. The flexible working program represents the division of the length of the working 
day into two periods: a fixed period during which all the employees are at their work places, 
and a variable, mobile period in which the employee chooses the times of arrival and 
departure, provided the working time is observed. The manner for establishing an unequal 
working schedule must be negotiated by collective labor agreement at the level of the 
employer, or, in the absence of such a collective agreement, it must be stipulated in the 
company's rules and regulations. The unequal work schedule may operate only if it is 
expressly stated in the individual labor contract. 
The Czech Labor Code regulates the following new instruments for distributing working 
time: (i) uneven distribution of working time; (ii) flexible distribution of working time; and 
(iii) working time accounts. Uneven distribution of working time is defined relatively 
liberally; the act only restricts it in the interest of setting rest periods as follows: “In the event 
of uneven distribution of working time into individual weeks in a schedule of shifts the 
average weekly working time without overtime must not exceed the prescribed weekly 
working time for a period of at most 26 consecutive weeks. Only a collective agreement may 
define such period as at most 52 consecutive weeks. The length of a shift must not exceed 12 
hours in the event of uneven distribution of working time.” Latvia and Poland balance 
uneven distribution of working time in four months, while Hungary, within a year. 
Flexible distribution of working time is far more common than part-time work in the Czech 
Republic. As part of the uneven distribution of working time, the employee chooses when to 
start and finish on individual days within periods of time set by the employer (“optional 
working time”). A period of time in which the employee is obliged to be in the workplace 
(“basic working time”) is inserted between two periods of optional working time. On the 
application of flexible schedule of working hours to unevenly scheduled working hours, an 
employee is required to fulfill the average weekly working hours within a four-week 
settlement period. In any case, the total shift length may not exceed 12 hours (Koldinska 
2007). 23 
The “working time account” is a new concept in Czech law. The working time account is 
another way of unevenly distributing working time. It may be contained only in a collective 
agreement or internal regulation, with the prior consent of the individual employees. When 
applying working time accounts, employers are obliged to keep an employee’s working time 
account and wage account. Working time accounts are used mainly by those employers 
whose business involves seasonal work or work on one-off large-volume orders where the 
need for work is sporadic. 
2.6.  Transfer of Undertakings 
It is necessary to provide for the protection of employees in the event of a change of 
employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded. Some basic rules 
regarding the transfer of establishments (undertakings) have been established in the Council 
Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses. 
In particular, the Directive stipulates that: 
(i)  Member States may provide that, after the date of transfer, the transferor and the 
transferee shall be jointly and severally liable in respect of obligations which 
arose before the date of transfer from a contract of employment or an employment 
relationship existing on the date of the transfer. 
(ii)  Following the transfer, the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and 
conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the 
transferor under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry of the 
collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another collective 
agreement. Member States may limit the period for observing such terms and 
conditions with the provision that it shall not be less than one year. 
According to the Directive, the transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business should not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor 
or the transferee. At the same time, this provision should not stand in the way of dismissals 
that may take place for economic, technical or organizational reasons entailing changes in the 
workforce but common rules (e.g., entitlements, such as notice and severance pay) should be 
followed. A few examples follow. 
The Estonian new Employment Contracts Act from December 2008 transposed this Directive 
into the national legislation by validating the existing employment contracts in the event of 
transfer of enterprise in the following way: (i) employment contracts transfer to the acquirer 
of an enterprise unamended if the enterprise continues the same or similar economic 
activities; (ii) transferors and acquirers of enterprises are prohibited to cancel employment 
contracts due to the transfer of enterprises, except in case of the declaration of bankruptcy of 
employers. 24 
The Albanian labor law stipulates that in the case of transferring of enterprise or a part of it, 
the rights and obligations stemming from that, on the basis of a contract of employment will 
pass on to the person subject to the transferring of these right. The employee, even when 
refusing to change the employer, remains tied to the new employer until the termination of 
the legal notice deadline.  
It might be beneficial to add also in the labor law that after a change of ownership, the new 
employer is responsible for any outstanding benefits or entitlements owed to the employees 
at the time of the change of ownership. 25 
Chapter 3.  Minimum Wages 
As with most labor market policy measures, statutory minimum wages imply both benefits 
and costs. Effective minimum wages –  by providing a wage floor –  can reduce wage 
inequality in the bottom half of the wage distribution, limit low pay and reduce the gender 
pay gap. 
While minimum wages can boost the earnings of low-income employees, they can also lead 
to unemployment where the minimum wage is above the market-clearing level and where it 
is actually binding. Their effectiveness in bolstering incomes of low-paid workers will also 
depend on their interactions with other policies designed to support low-income households. 
The different views on minimum wage policies essentially hinge on the relative weight 
attached to these positive and negative effects.  
Until recently, in many CIS states, through minimum wage regulations, the linkage between 
income and labor market policies was provided. Being still formally the basis for the wage 
tariff schedule, the major role of the minimum wage has been not only as a nominal anchor 
for most social transfers (and even fees) but also as a foundation for the salary scales of state 
employees in the budgetary sector.
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A recent ILO study reports a reactivation of minimum wages around the world in recent 
years to reduce social tensions resulting from growing inequalities. Globally, over the period 
2001–2007, minimum wages were allowed to rise by an average of 5.7 percent per year in 
real terms – contrasting with some previous periods when the real value of the minimum 
wage had declined – and to increase in proportion to the average wage (ILO 2008). 
 
This section summarizes the legal solutions to establish minimum wages in ECA countries, 
and some of the key findings in the relevant literature. 
3.1.  Standards on Minimum Wages 
Several international documents refer to policy recommendations on minimum wages. In 
particular, the ILO Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131 (1970) states that the 
elements to be taken into consideration in determining the level of minimum wages shall, so 
far as possible and appropriate in relation to national practice and conditions, include:  
(a)  The needs of workers and their families, taking into account the general level of 
wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits, and the relative 
living standards of other social groups; and  
(b)  Economic factors, including the requirements of economic development, levels of 
productivity, and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high level of 
employment. 
                                                        
26 The unified Tariff Schedule of Wages and Salaries is still mandated in labor legislation of many CIS states. 26 
The Convention sets up the following other principles: (i) Once established, minimum wages 
have the force of law; (ii) Most workers should benefit from the protection of the minimum 
wage although exceptions are possible; (iii) Social partners should be fully consulted (not 
just informed); and (iv) Minimum wages should be adjusted from time to time. 
As regards to wages, the European Social Charter states the following: “All workers have the 
right to a fair remuneration sufficient for a decent standard of living for themselves and their 
families… With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to a fair remuneration, 
the Parties undertake: 
(i)  Recognize the right of workers to a remuneration that will give them and their 
families a decent standard of living;  
(ii)  Recognize the right of workers to an increased rate of remuneration for overtime 
work, subject to exceptions in particular cases;  
(iii)  Recognize the right of men and women workers to equal pay for work of equal 
value;  
(iv)  Permit deductions from wages only under conditions and to the extent prescribed 
by national laws or regulations or fixed by collective agreements or arbitration 
awards. 
The exercise of these rights shall be achieved by freely concluded collective agreements, by 
statutory wage-fixing machinery, or by other means appropriate to national conditions.” 
The Social Charter initially defined the decency threshold in the 1960s as 68 percent of 
average earnings within a national economy. The definition was modified to 60 percent of 
net earnings (as of July 2004) to allow for the difficulties experienced in taking into account 
initiatives such as redistributive tax systems when calculating adequate incomes. 
The OECD 1994 Jobs Strategy recommended making wages and labor costs more flexible by 
reassessing the role of statutory minimum wages and either switching to better-targeted 
redistributive instruments or minimizing their adverse employment effects by introducing 
sub-minima differentiated by age or region and/or indexing them to prices instead of average 
earnings. 
From the end of the 1990s, the focus has shifted from the low and inequitable pay to poverty 
reduction, preventing social exclusion, and promoting the quality of work. In 2000, the 
European Council in the Lisbon Summit launched a social exclusion strategy in response to 
the EU new objectives. The strategy stresses that the best way to fight against social 
exclusion is a job. The objectives of the strategy include a “guarantee that everyone has the 
resources necessary to live in accordance with human dignity” and ensuring that the take-up 
of employment results in increased income”. 
Minimum wage regulations have many dimensions: (i) the level set; (ii) coverage; (iii) 
differentiation in the level (e.g., by age, sector, or region); (iv) methods of adjusting levels to 
reflect inflation; (v) how the level is set (e.g., by government or by the social partners); (vi) 
whether it applies to the private and/or public sector; and (vii) sanctions for non-compliance. 27 
Most, but not all, ECA countries set minimum wages although with considerable variation in 
the details.  
3.2.  How Minimum Wages Are Set?
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There are two basic mechanisms for setting the minimum wage. First, a statutory minimum 
wage is set by the government, possibly involving consultations with trade unions and 
employers. Second, minimum wages are determined through collective (tripartite or bipartite) 
negotiations. Collective agreements can set national or sectoral (industry, occupational) 
minimum wages. In some countries, sectoral collective agreements are extended to 




In most ECA countries, minimum wages are set by the government after consultations with 
the social partners.  However, there are exceptions. In Slovenia, by legislation, the minimum 
wage is set by the minister responsible for labor after consulting with the social partners; in 
Serbia, by the tripartite Decision of the Social and Economic Council; in Ukraine, by the 
Supreme Council of Ukraine on the recommendation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 
after consultations with social partners; and in Tajikistan, by the President of the Republic of 
Tajikistan. In some countries, the level of minimum wages is determined by collective 
agreements, such as in Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, or Bosnia and Herzegovina. In many 
CIS states, the labor code stipulates that minimum wages are determined by law or 
legislation giving the government the discretion to set the level. 
    
There is no minimum wage in Georgia. In Montenegro and FYR Macedonia, currently the 
national minimum wage is binding only for public sector employees. 
In January 2009, 20 of the 27 Member States of the EU (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Greece, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the U.K.) and one 
candidate country (Turkey) had national legislation setting statutory minimum wages. 
Minimum wages varied widely, from 123 EUR per month in Bulgaria to 1,642 EUR per 
month in Luxembourg. Among the EU10 countries, the highest monthly minimum wage of 
589 EUR was in Slovenia followed by the Czech Republic, 306 EUR (Eurostat 2009). 
In some other EU Member States (e.g., Austria, Germany and Italy), despite the absence of 
country-level regulations, minimum wages de facto exist due to a widespread collective 
bargaining together with the regulations, which extend the coverage of wage agreements to 
non-organized workers. Although Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden,) have 
no formal system of extending collective agreements, in practice, collective agreements 
cover almost the entire workforce, making minimum wages mandatory to most of the 
employers there as well.  In EU15 countries that do not have the universal minimum wage set 
by law, the collective agreements defining contractual minima covers 95 percent of 
                                                        
27 On the minimum wage fixing machinery in the world see ILO 1992. 
28  Information about minimum wages in around 100 countries in the world see: 
http://www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/minimumwages. 28 
employees in Austria, 90 percent in Belgium and Finland, 80 percent in Denmark and Italy, 
and 68 percent in Germany (Boeri and van Ours 2008). 
In most EU countries, minimum wages are differentiated across workers. Apprentices and 
trainees are often exempted or only qualify for a reduced rate. Disabled workers are often 
excluded or come under separate regulations. In some cases, public servants are also not 
covered (for example, France, Greece, and Luxembourg), as their wages are regulated by 
some other legal act. 
Table 3:  Minimum Wage Differentiation in the EU Member States, 2005 
  Basis of Differentiation  Minimum Wage*  Country 
No minimum wage      Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, Sweden 
No differentiation      Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Slovenia 
Based on age and 
service period 
Under 16 years old  30-50%  Netherlands, Slovakia 
  Under 17-18 years old  70-95%  France, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta Slovakia 
  Under 22-23 years old  45-85%  Belgium, UK, Netherlands 
  During the first 6-24 
months of employment 














Casual workers and 
outworkers 
Casual workers and 
outworkers 












Position  Mandatory wage tariff 
of 12 elements 
  Czech Republic 
Service period and 
family status 
0-15 years of service, 
with spouse 
100-123%; +13%  Greece 
Hazardous job    115%  Latvia 
Note:  * - as a proportion of the general minimum wage level. 
Source: European Industrial Relations Review (2005). 
The law may establish different minimum rates of the minimum monthly wage (hourly pay) 
for different branches of economy, regions, or categories of employees. Collective 
agreements may establish higher rates of the minimum wage than those specified in the law. 
However, while multiple minimum wages are desirable to tailor the “fair” wages to a 
particular geographic area, skills level, or productivity level, they are only successful if an 
equally complex system of oversight accompanies them. For example, the Italian and 
German systems of multiple minimum wages allow for such complexity since they are 
monitored by the unions that negotiated the contracts.  29 
3.3.  Level of Minimum Wages and Coverage 
In setting minimum wages, governments or the bargaining parties need to reconcile two 
opposite considerations.  On the one hand, there are social consideration of workers needs, 
standards of living, and earnings inequality, which lead to pressure –usually from labor 
unions  –  to increase the minimum wage.  On the  other hand, there are economic 
considerations of productivity, competitiveness, and job creation, which result in the pressure 
– usually originating from employers’ organizations – to keep the minimum wage at a low 
level.
29
Countries where the labor movement is strong and societies are committed to the goal of 
equality tend to have higher minimum wages (relative to productivity) than countries where 
the labor movement is weaker and where economic inequalities are more widely accepted. 
Countries that still have economy-wide binding General Collective Agreements (e.g., Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Romania) tend to have higher unionization rates, and a 
stronger union influence on the wage determination process than countries where 
decentralized bargaining dominates. Also, comparison between countries is not valid without 
conditioning on the skill distribution. If a country has a large dispersion in its level of skills, 
then it would have a wide dispersion and a lower ratio of the minimum wage to the mean 
wage, and vice versa. 
  
In many ECA countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Slovakia, FYR 
Macedonia, and Montenegro), additional rules drive effective minimum wages further up. 
These rules are defined as mandatory wage coefficients that multiply the base minimum 
wage depending on the education level of employees. Especially problematic are minimum 
wage coefficients for vocational/secondary education. Vocational and high school education, 
as some of the studies show (Kotzeva et al. 2006; Krstic et al. 2007), yield very low returns 
because of their poor quality, skills mismatch, and general over-supply. Therefore, 
compulsory coefficients tend to aggravate employability problems of labor force members 
with vocational and secondary education.  This has been confirmed by the in-depth analysis 
for Montenegro (Krsmanovic and Walewski, 2006), showing that very high percentages of 
employees with vocational education earn exactly the coefficient-augmented minimum wage. 
In several ECA countries, minimum wages are differentiated according to job characteristics. 
In Hungary, on 28 November 2005, the tripartite Interest Reconciliation Council agreed on a 
new three-tier minimum wage system fixing different minimum wage rates according to the 
qualification requirements namely: (i) jobs not requiring a secondary school or vocational 
training qualification; (ii) jobs requiring a secondary school or vocational training 
qualification; and, (iii) jobs requiring a university-level education. 
Minimum wages can be set on either an hourly, daily, weekly, or monthly basis, which 
complicates cross-country comparisons of their levels.
30
                                                        
29 For an overview of the empirical literature on the employment effects of minimum wages, see Dolado et al 
1996; OECD 1998 and 2006; Brown 1999; Neumark and Wascher 1999; Neumark and Wascher 2007; Boeri 
and van Ours 2008. 
  In the EU, in Luxembourg and 
30 The mean wage is not a good benchmark for the minimum wage, due to outliers in the right tail of wage 
distribution. The median wage (which is the wage such that one-half of all workers earn less than it and one-half 30 
Malta, the minimum wage level is close to 50 percent of the average monthly gross earnings. 
In Bulgaria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, the monthly 
minimum wage ranges between 41 and 47 percent of the average gross monthly earnings 
(Eurostat 2008). Especially in some of the CIS states, the ratio of minimum wages to the 
average wages is very low, and virtually nobody receives wages at that level. These include 
Kyrgyzstan where the ratio is only 3 percent, Russia, 10 percent, Moldova, 11 percent, etc. 
(Annex Table A7). In addition to taking cross-country productivity differences into account, 
such a ratio also provides an indication of how many workers are likely to be affected by the 
minimum.
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As the chances of being employed informally are substantially higher for young workers, 
introducing a discounted minimum wage for youth or those with limited labor market 
experience, the minimum wage could reduce informal employment for this group and 
improve their job perspectives. Several ECA countries have legislated lower minimum wage 
levels for youth. The labor law in Serbia allows a trainee wage that is 80 percent of the 
regular minimum wage. In FYR Macedonia, the new Employment Relations Law from 2005 
stipulates that the employee–trainee is entitled to a salary determined by law and collective 
agreement, but not lower than 50 percent of the minimum salary of the job for which he has 
been trained, yet the 80 percent level is more commonly used by businesses. For those aged 
18-21 years old, Czech legislation permits 90 percent of the minimum wage rate to be paid 
for a six-month period as of the first day of employment. Employees younger than 18 years 
of age are entitled to 80 percent of the minimum wage rate. A lower minimum wage to 
facilitate the entering of young people in the labor market is also found in Albania, Bulgaria, 
and Poland. Similar options to introduce sub-minima wages for trainees have been explored 
in other countries in order to encourage employers to hire this age group, given their lack of 
experience. 
    
In Kyrgyzstan, the Labor Code stipulates that minimum wages are established by law and 
cannot be less than subsistence minimum. However, subsistence minimum is an instrument 
to measure living standards (cost of living) and poverty levels, and it depends on the 
composition of the minimum consumption basket and inflation. Minimum wages are 
primarily dependent on labor market factors, such as labor productivity, or labor supply and 
demand. Since the minimum wage in Kyrgyzstan is eightfold lower than the subsistence 
minimum and constitutes only 9 percent of the average wage in 2007, it indicates that the law 
with respect to minimum wages is not followed (Table 3.2). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
earn more) is a more relevant benchmark to assess the “bite” of the minimum wage. (Rutkowski 2003). Also 
because the minimum wage is generally exempted from income taxes, which are often progressive, it may also 
be preferable to use net wages as the denominator in computing ratios of minimum wages to average wages 
(earnings). 
31 In many ECA countries, such ratios of the minimum wage to the average  wage should be treated with 
precaution due to over-  or underestimation of the average wage by the official statistics. In Albania it is 
suggested that the official statistics overestimates average earnings by 25-30 percent while in Montenegro they 
are underestimated by 10 percent. (Arandarenko and Vukojevic 2007). 
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Table 4:  Minimum Wages, Average Wages, and the Official Minimum Subsistence Level  
In Some of the Countries of the CIS in 2007 (per Month; in National Currency) 
Country and Currency Unit  Minimum Wage, 
End-Year 
Average Wage  Subsistence 
Level 
Azerbaijan, manat  50  215.8  69.1 
Belarus, 1000’ Byelorussian rubles  188.4  694.0  184.3 
Kazakhstan, tenge  9800  52500  9653 
Kyrgyzstan, som  340  3970  2795.9 
Moldova, lei  400  2065  1099.4 
Russia, ruble  2300  13593  3847 
Ukraine, grivna  460  1351  532* 
Note:  * - IV quarter. 
Source: CIS STAT (2008). 
The importance of the minimum wage depends not only on its relation to the average wage, 
but also on the shape of the wage distribution.  If wage inequality and the incidence of low-
pay are high, the minimum wage has a larger effect than if wage inequality and the fraction 
of low-paid workers are low (Dolado et al. 1996). In many EU countries, although the 
minimum wage/average wage ratio is relatively high, the wage distribution is so compressed 
that nobody actually receives the minimum. 
Therefore, one of the factors determining the relevance of the minimum wage in the labor 
market is how many workers are directly influenced by this measure (i.e., earning minimum 
wages). In general, in most ECA countries, the minimum wage is unlikely to be binding since 
very few employees earn the minimum wage. Eurostat Labor Force Survey data show that 
only around 2 percent of full-time employees earned the minimum wage in 2007 in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and the Slovak Republic, compared with 9 percent in 
Latvia and 12 percent in Bulgaria. Among EU15 countries, between 1 percent of full-time 
employees in Spain and 2 percent in the United Kingdom and Malta, on the one side, and 11 
percent in Luxembourg and 13 percent in France, on the other, earned the minimum wage 
(Eurostat 2008c). The percentage of females earning the minimum wage is usually higher 
than males. 
The level of minimum wages in most CIS states, except perhaps Ukraine and Belarus, is 
moderately low to be binding that is, to affect wage and employment decisions (Annex Table 
A7). In Ukraine, which has the highest ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage 
among CIS states – 38 percent in 2006 – in case of financial difficulties of the enterprise, the 
minimum wage can be fixed by collective agreement at a lower level than the national 
minimum wage for a period not exceeding six months. On the other hand, in many other 
ECA countries, workers with earnings close to a minimum wage are likely to fall into 
poverty.  
In most ECA countries, minimum wages are adjusted on a yearly basis, with discretionary 
changes in others. The legislation usually provides for both social and economic criteria to be 
used to adjust the level of the minimum wage. Adjustments may be tied to inflation, GDP 
fluctuations, the poverty line, or market wages.  32 
In Ukraine, the minimum wage is adjusted in the course of approval of the state budget. In 
Poland, the minimum wage for the next year is negotiated within the Tripartite Commission 
by 15 July every year based on the proposal of the level and date of changing of minimum 
wage put forward by the government. The level of minimum wage grows together with 
projected average annual consumer price index. If the level of minimum wage in the year of 
negotiations is less than half of the level of average earnings, minimum wage increases 
according to two thirds of the projected real GDP growth rate. The determined level of the 
minimum wage is announced every year in the "Monitor Polski" before 15 September. In 
case that the Tripartite Commission does not reach a consensus, the government sets the 
minimum wage, although it cannot be less than the level included in the proposal presented 
to the Tripartite Commission. 
Some of the EU10 countries, such as, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, set 
multi-annual programs to ensure a sustained and constant increase of the minimum wage. 
The purpose being to reach a certain target level as compared to the national average wage in 
the medium term. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, the minimum wage was brought to about 
40 percent of the average wage in 2006. In Hungary, a medium term plan for monthly 
national minimum wage increases and pay policy guidelines were agreed by the government 
and the social partners for the period 2006-2008. In Poland, a new mechanism for setting the 
minimum wage was defined in 2005, increasing each year by the forecast inflation rate plus 
two thirds of the forecast GDP growth rate until it reaches 50 percent of the national average 
wage.  
In Russia and in several other CIS states, the national minimum wage rate applies to all 
unqualified employees performing simple work. However, a tariff system is also in place that 
sets a wage scale for categories of work depending on the complexity of work carried out and 
the employee's skill level. 
In EU15, only Belgium and Luxembourg appear to automatically index for price indexation, 
while in France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, both price and wage movements are either 
explicitly or implicitly taken into consideration in annual reviews of the minimum rate. 
In sum, the labor market impacts of minimum wages in ECA depend heavily on the level at 
which they are set and how well they are enforced. Setting the minimum wage at a lower 
level and enforcing it effectively is in general a more efficient and equitable approach than 
setting the minimum wage at a higher level but with weak or selective enforcement. The 
general trend towards declining real minimum wages, especially among CIS states, 
presumably has led to the weakening of its impacts on employment and earnings. 33 
Chapter 4.  Working Hours 
4.1.  Standards on Working Hours 
Adjustments in the labor market and the flexibility of labor have also taken the form of 
flexibility in the  amount of time worked (internal numerical flexibility of labor). Thus, 
working hours and working time arrangements are increasingly important issues in today’s 
labor markets, in particular with regard to their relation to productivity, labor market 
flexibility and quality of work (EC 2006b). Relevant laws should protect the health and well-
being of workers; facilitate a balance between work and family life; ensure that workers have 
adequate time to devote to their other responsibilities and interests; and prevent 
discrimination against part-time workers or other workers on flexible arrangements. 
Several international treaties deal with minimum standards regarding work time 
arrangements. The first ILO Hours of Work (Industry) Convention from 1919 was devoted to 
hours of work in industry. Article 2 of the Convention states, “Working hours … shall not 
exceed eight in the day and forty-eight in the week…”
32 The follow-up Forty-Hour Week 
Convention No. 47 from 1935 states that each country that ratifies the convention declares its 
approval of the principle of a forty-hour workweek.
33
The EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights promulgates, “Every worker has the right to 
limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual 
period of paid leave.” 
 
The European Social Charter suggests providing for reasonable daily and weekly working 
hours, and the working week to be progressively reduced to the extent that the increase of 
productivity and other relevant factors permit eliminating risks in inherently dangerous or 
unhealthy occupations. And, where it has not yet been possible to eliminate or reduce 
sufficiently these risks, to provide for either a reduction of working hours or additional paid 
holidays for workers engaged in such occupations. 
It is important to fix in labor legislation the principle of the 40-hour week (or shorter in some 
countries) as the length of the normal working week since overtime, including wage 
premiums, does not apply to this period. Basic definitions and minimum requirements for the 
organization of working time, in respect of periods of daily rest, breaks, weekly rest, 
maximum weekly working time, annual leave, and aspects of night work, shift work, and 
patterns of work are laid down in the Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organization of 
working time. 
                                                        
32 However, Article 4 of this Convention states that the limit of hours of work prescribed in Article 2 may  be 
exceeded in those processes which are required by reason of the nature of the process to be carried on 
continuously by a succession of shifts, subject to the condition that the working hours shall not exceed 56 in the 
week on the average. This convention was ratified by 52 ILO members and has interim status. 
33 This convention was ratified by only 14 ILO members and has interim status. 34 
In particular, the following definitions are applied: 
(i)  "Working time" means any period during which the worker is working, at the 
employer's disposal and carrying out his/her activity or duties, in accordance with 
national laws and/or practice; 
(ii)  "Rest period" means any period that is not working time; 
(iii)  "Night time" means any period of not less than seven hours, as defined by 
national law, and which must include, in any case, the period between midnight 
and 5:00 a.m.; 
(iv)  “Night worker” means: (a) any worker, who during night time works at least three 
hours of his/her daily working time as a normal course; and (b) any worker who is 
likely during night time to work a certain proportion of his/her annual working 
time, as defined at the choice of the Member State concerned…; 
(v)  "Shift work" means any method of organizing work in shifts whereby workers 
succeed each other at the same work stations according to a certain pattern, 
including a rotating pattern, and which may be continuous or discontinuous, 
entailing the need for workers to work at different times over a given period of 
days or weeks; 
(vi)  "Shift worker" means any worker whose work schedule is part of shift work. 
As far as daily rest is concerned, the Directive  indicates that  every worker in Member 
Countries should be entitled to a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-
hour period. Where the working day is longer than six hours, every worker is entitled to a 
rest break, the details of which, including duration and the terms on which it is granted, are 
laid down in collective agreements or agreements between the two sides of industry or, 
failing that, by national legislation. Per each seven-day period, every worker is entitled to a 
minimum uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours plus the 11 hours' daily rest referred to above. 
If objective, technical, or work organization conditions so justify, a minimum rest period of 
24 hours may be applied. 
Although in most ECA countries, a 40-hour workweek and 8-hour workday has been a norm 
for a long period of time: There were exceptions as well. In Poland, until 1995, a daily 8 hour 
norm and a weekly 46-hour norm were in force. The amendment of the Labor Code, which 
was introduced in 1996, shortened the weekly standard to 42 hours, and it was an average 
maximum during a three-month reference period. Further amendments associated with 
transposition of the EU labor law led to the shortening of the norm to 40 hours, and to the 
extension of the basic settlement period to four months. 
The Czech Republic also fulfilled the European Community’s requirements for working time 
and the maximum 40-hour week by amending its labor code. The previous limit for working 
time was 42.5 hours a week. However, work breaks, which were usually 30 minutes during 
each shift, were counted in working hours. The new legislation retained the employer’s 
obligation to provide work breaks, with the understanding that these were no longer included 
in working hours.  35 
In most EU15 countries, legislation sets normal weekly working hours. Thus, normal weekly 
working time is, for instance, 40 hours in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Spain, 
and Sweden. However, differences may exist for (sometimes large) categories of employees, 
and wide variations occur between countries. Moreover, principles of the Directive 
occasionally do not apply to all employees and are sometimes superseded by collective 
agreements that either increase or reduce the duration. In two countries, there are no general 
legal limits: the United Kingdom (apart from special groups, such  as miners and lorry 
drivers) and Denmark; in these countries the main source of regulating daily hours is 
collective bargaining. 
As for the duration of the workday is concerned, in most EU15 countries maximum daily 
normal working time is limited to 8 hours a day. There are however exceptions. In the 
Netherlands, the normal maximum working-time is fixed at 8.5 hours, in Portugal it is 7 
hours a day for white collar workers, in Spain 9 hours and in France 10 hours. In Italy, the 
daily limit is derived from the weekly limit of 48 hours: therefore it amounts to 9 hours a day 
without overtime pay. In Sweden, there is no statutory rule limiting daily working hours 
other than the provision that all employees should get time off for nightly rest. This period is 
defined as being between midnight and 5:00 a.m. 
4.2.  Part-Time Work 
A widely accepted definition of part-time work is that given by ILO: "Part-time work is 
regular, voluntary work carried out during working hours distinctly shorter than normal". 
"Voluntary" work in this sense does not mean work without pay, instead referring to 
individuals choosing to work. 
During the socialist era, part-time work, similarly to fixed-term employment, was an 
exceptional form of employment. It was a predominantly supplementary activity for 
pensioners, students, disabled persons, and only exceptionally the main source of income. 
Part-time employment is still not very common in the ECA region. Among EU10 countries, 
only between 2 percent of the employed in Bulgaria and Slovakia, and 10 percent in Romania 
work part-time compared to about 20 percent on average in EU15 countries. 36 
Table 5:  Part-Time Employment (% of Total Employment) by Country and Sex  
(2Q 2008) 
  Total  Men  Women  Hours Worked 
Per Week in 
Part-Time 
Work in 2007 
Bulgaria  2.4  1.9  2.9  20.8 
Czech R.  5.0  2.2  8.6  22.3 
Estonia  6.4  3.8  9.1  20.8 
Latvia  6.4  4.4  8.5  21.9 
Lithuania  6.5  4.6  8.4  22.7 
Hungary  4.5  3.2  6.0  23.7 
Poland  8.3  6.1  11.0  21.9 
Romania  10.1  9.1  11.3  25.7 
Slovakia  2.2  1.0  3.8  21.7 
Slovenia  9.0  7.2  11.3  19.4 
EU-27  18.2  7.9  31.0  20.0 
EU-15  19.8  7.7  35.0  19.8 
Note: The distinction between full-time and part-time work is made on the basis of a 
spontaneous answer given by the respondent. 
Source: Eurostat 2008b. 
In theory, the decision about part-time work is determined by labor supply and labor demand 
behavior. Part-time work provides flexibility to the worker that allows him to combine a paid 
job with care activities within the household (Boeri and van Ours 2008). At the same time, 
part-time work may have fewer fringe benefits and career possibilities than full-time jobs. 
In transition economies, the situation seems different. For example, LFS data from Bulgaria 
indicates that the main reason for working part-time is lack of work, or the unavailability of 
full-time jobs (World Bank 2007b). Employees also cannot afford to work part-time because 
of low wage levels in the region, and the associated costs in relation to earnings are too high 
(transport, meals, clothes, children care, etc.). 
The prevalence of low wages is indicated as the fundamental reason for the low incidence of 
part-time employment in Hungary as well (Lehoczky et al. 2005). To work for such low 
wages is only worthwhile for those who have a basic income from either a pension or a social 
benefit, which can be complemented by a part-time salary:  34 percent of employed 
pensioners, 43 percent of employees on disability assistance and 29 percent of employees 
eligible for the child care benefit worked part-time in 2002; 43 percent of all part-time 
employees were eligible for a pension or some kind of child care benefit. Part-time 
employees not eligible for a pension or social benefits only worked for higher wages: they 
worked 49 percent less but earned only 32 percent less, and their hourly wages were 35 
percent higher than their full-time counterparts. 
Also, the period of increasing the incidence of involuntary part-time employment may 
coincide with periods of economic recession: since fewer standard full-time jobs are 
available, workers are forced to take jobs with reduced working hours as “better-than-
unemployment” alternatives. During economic recovery, when more standard full-time jobs 
are created, indicators of involuntary part-time employment are expected to decline.  37 
Basic conditions for part-time work are emphasized in the ILO Part-Time Work Convention 
No. 175 and Part-Time Work Recommendation No. 182 from 1994. In particular, the 
relevant Convention emphasizes that measures shall be taken to ensure that part-time workers 
receive conditions equivalent to those of comparable full-time workers in the fields of: (a) 
maternity protection; (b) termination of employment; (c) paid annual leave and paid public 
holidays; and (d) sick leave. Statutory social security schemes that are based on occupational 
activity shall be adapted so that part-time workers enjoy conditions equivalent to those of 
comparable full-time workers; these conditions may be determined in proportion to hours of 
work, contributions or earnings, or through other methods consistent with national law and 
practice. However, exceptions are allowed: part-time workers whose hours of work or 
earnings are below specified thresholds may be excluded from the scope of any of the 
measures taken in the above-mentioned fields, except in regard to maternity protection 
measures other than those provided under statutory social security schemes and to 
employment injury benefits. 
Measures are called by ILO to be taken to overcome specific constraints on the access of 
part-time workers to training, career opportunities, and occupational mobility. In particular, 
where appropriate, employers should give consideration to: (a) requests by workers to 
transfer from full-time to part-time work that becomes available in the enterprise; and (b) 
requests by workers to transfer from part-time to full-time work that becomes available in the 
enterprise.  
Employers should also provide timely information to the workers on the availability of part-
time and full-time positions in the establishment, in order to facilitate transfers from full-time 
to part-time work or vice versa. A worker's refusal to transfer from full-time to part-time 
work or vice versa should not in itself constitute a valid reason for termination of 
employment, without prejudice to termination for other reasons such as those that may arise 
from the operational requirements of the establishment concerned. 
In the EU, part-time work is regulated by a Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 
1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work, which sets out the general 
principles and minimum requirements relating to part-time work. In respect to employment 
conditions, by the Directive, part-time workers should not be treated in a less favorable 
manner than comparable full-time workers solely because they work part time unless 
different treatment is justified on objective grounds. Where appropriate, the principle of pro 
rata temporis shall apply. 
In particular, the Council notes that European Union approach in this regard should be based 
on the following principles: 
(i)   Part-time work must be voluntary and open to both men and women. It must not 
be imposed on persons who wish to work full-time. Furthermore, particular care 
must be taken to ensure that part-time work is not limited to women or to 
relatively unskilled work; 
(ii)  Consideration should be given to the extent to which part-time work could be 
made more readily available to certain groups of workers, particularly parents of 
young children and older workers; 38 
(iii)  Part-time workers should as a rule have the same social rights and obligations as 
full-time workers, bearing in mind however the specific character of the work 
performed; 
(iv)  Part-time work should not be limited to half-time work; it could be on a daily, 
weekly, or monthly basis according to the needs of different groups of workers 
and to those of undertakings. 
In ECA countries, generally, the same regulations apply to part-time employees, as to full-
time employees. Certain pecuniary entitlements, such as social protection benefits, are 
determined in proportion to hours of work or earnings. Recent amendments to the labor 
legislation in some countries, for example, in 2003 in Poland, specially emphasize that 
concluding an employment contract that provides part-time employment cannot cause the 
determination of employee’s conditions of work and pay to be less favorable in comparison 
with employees, who provide the same or similar work full time. 
The Macedonian labor legislation stipulates additional protection for those with multiple 
contracts: When a worker has part-time contracts with several employers, the employers are 
obliged to assure that the worker can take simultaneously annual leave and other absences 
from work, unless it would cause damage to them. However, the Slovakian legislation offers 
simplified termination rules with regard to part-time workers: An employment relationship 
with hours of less than 20 per week can be terminated by notice by either employer or 
employee for any reason or without statement of reason. The notice period is also shorter - 15 
days. 
As far as EU15 countries are concerned, a statutory definition of part-time work is non-
existent in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK. 
Since there is no (legal) difference between part-time and full-time workers, part-time 
workers are entitled to the same statutory rights as full-time workers in these countries. Most 
statutory employment rights are now dependent on a part-timer being able to establish the 
fact that they have the status of employee, working under a contract of employment. 
However, in some EU15 countries, distinction is made between full-time and part-time 
employees in some entitlements. With regard to dismissal protection, in Denmark, in order to 
qualify for relevant benefits, the part-time worker must work at least 15 hours per week, in 
Germany 18 hours per week, in Spain 12 hours per week, in France and the Netherlands, 
there is no threshold and in Ireland the threshold is 12 hours per week, in Luxembourg 16 
hours per week, in Austria 12 hours per week, in Sweden 17 hours a week and in the United 
Kingdom the threshold is earnings of at least 57 pounds per week.
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Also in Germany, the disadvantageous treatment of part-time employees is prohibited. 
However, part-timers working less than 10 hours per week or 45 hours per month are not 
covered by the Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act with regard to unfair 
dismissal and are not covered by social security payments. The Dismissal Act only applies to 
firms with five or more employees working 10 or more hours per week. In Belgium, in order 
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to qualify for sickness benefit an employee must have worked for 120 hours over a 13-week 
period.  
In Greece, the right to paid holidays is granted to an employee who has performed a year of 
continuous service in the same company. In this country, to qualify for maternity allowance, 
the parent must have worked a minimum of 200 hours in the last two years. In France, to 
have any right to a paid annual vacation, employees must have been employed in the same 
enterprise during the year of reference for a minimum of one month of actual work. In 
Ireland part-time employees have a right to 14 weeks maternity leave but only after 13 weeks 
of employment. 
4.3.  Overtime 
The ILO Forty-Hour Week Convention No. 47 states that Each Member of the International 
Labor Organization that ratifies this Convention declares its approval of the principle of a 
forty-hour week applied in such a manner that the standard of living is not reduced in 
consequence.
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The European Social Charter suggests recognizing the right of workers to an increased rate of 
remuneration for overtime work, subject to exceptions in particular cases. As noted by the 
Charter, “...The exercise of this right shall be achieved by freely concluded collective 
agreements, by statutory wage-fixing machinery, or by other means appropriate to national 
conditions.” 
 Respectively, working hours above this threshold should be considered as 
overtime. 
Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time stipulates that in keeping with 
the need to protect the safety and health of workers: 
(a)  the period of weekly working time is limited by means of laws, regulations, or 
administrative provisions or by collective agreements or agreements between the 
two sides of industry; 
(b)  the average working time for each seven-day period, including overtime, does not 
exceed 48 hours. 
In many ECA countries, among hired employees overtime is still restricted, although it is 
very common especially among the self-employed and those employed in seasonal work. 
Overtime work is particularly common in Armenia: by the LFS data, 26 percent of the 
workforce works 51 or more hours per week (World Bank 2007). In contrast, in Hungary, the 
portion of employees for whom the number of hours actually worked exceeds the number of 
hours usually worked due to overtime was only 2.2 percent in 2005 (2.9 percent of males and 
1.6 percent of females) versus 5.7 percent of total employees in EU15 countries (EC 2007a).  
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Within the EU, some 12 million, or 9 percent of full-time employees usually work more than 
48 hours a week, which is the statutory maximum number of working hours per week in most 
EU Member States (EC 2006a). Overtime is more costly to employers due to wage premium 
but allows them to react quickly to temporary fluctuations in economic activity. 
Overall, two types of overtime work can be specified: (i) overtime that an employee 
generally can agree to work, and (ii) overtime that the company generally can require an 
employee to work. In around half of the ECA countries, the rules and time limits are the 
same but in the rest of the pool, substantial differences between the two categories exist. 
As far as overtime is concerned, the most restrictive rules are in Ukraine where an employee 
cannot even agree to overtime without exceptional circumstances (force majeure). The same 
is true for Tajikistan where, in addition, the employee must agree to it (For a summary of the 
rules on overtime, see Annex Table A8). In many countries, an employee’s consent or the 
consent of employee representatives is required if an employer asks the worker to perform 
overtime (i.e., Estonia, Georgia and Romania). Conversely, in Kazakhstan, there are no limits 
on overtime; and in Azerbaijan, the Labor Code does not specify any limits if overtime is 
initiated by an employee (as agreed upon with an employer).  
In other countries, limits on overtime are specified as daily, weekly, monthly and yearly. 
Poland and Slovakia have the most generous overtime limit, reaching or exceeding a total of 
400 hours per year. In Hungary, it may be extended from 200 hours per calendar year to 300 
hours by a collective agreement. In most CIS states, the limit is usually 120 overtime hours 
per year, as in the Soviet time. 
Wage premiums  for overtime work varies from 25 percent in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia to up to 100 percent in Latvia. In some countries, such as in Slovenia and 
Montenegro, wage premiums are determined by collective agreements. Furthermore, in some 
countries, compensation for overtime work can be replaced with time-off for each hour of 
overtime work (the Czech Republic and Slovakia). In Moldova, it is not permitted to replace 
compensation of overtime work with time-off. In Hungary, there is no wage supplement for 
public servants, and only additional free time is provided. In Armenia, there is no wage 
premium if the overtime is agreed between the parties. 
In order to limit overtime work, in several ECA countries, procedural inconveniences have 
been introduced. In Bulgaria, prior to introducing the increased working time, the employer 
is obliged to inform and consult the representatives of the employees and the trade union 
organizations in the enterprise. In the course of the consultations, the employer acquaints the 
representatives with the specific reasons that necessitate the introduction of increased 
working time and its length in the specific case, and hears out their opinions, proposals, etc. 
In addition, the employer is obliged to inform the Labor Inspectorate about the introduction 
of increased working time, specifying its length and the number of employees. 
In Croatia, a Labor Inspector must be notified of overtime work by a particular worker if it 
lasts more than four consecutive weeks or more than twelve weeks during one calendar year, 
or if overtime work by all workers of a certain employer exceeds 10 percent of the total 
working hours in a particular month. The Labor Inspector may limit or prohibit overtime 41 
hours if such work has harmful consequences on the worker's health and working ability or 
if, as a result of its excessive usage, the employment of unemployed persons is hindered. 
Labor legislation in many ECA countries sets up limits to perform overtime work by certain 
categories of workers. Typically a pregnant worker, a mother of a child less than three years 
of age and a single parent of a child under an age as defined in national legislation may work 
overtime only if he or she gives a written agreement to such work. Young workers are 
commonly prohibited from working overtime hours, as are persons studying in secondary 
and vocational schools without interrupting work – on study days, as well as in other cases 
established by law and the collective agreement. Disabled persons, as a rule, may be assigned 
to overtime work provided that this is not forbidden by medical conclusion. 
In EU15 countries, the maximum number of weekly overtime hours varies widely, from two 
in Spain to 15 in the Netherlands (Boeri and van Ours 2008). In many countries, there is no 
overtime premium, by law. In others, the overtime premium varies between 25 percent and 
100 percent (Table 4.2). 
Table 6:  Premium for Overtime Work in EU15 Countries in 2007/08 
  Premium for overtime work 
Austria  50% 
Belgium  50% but 100% on Sundays and holidays 
Denmark  None by law but 50%-100% by CA 
Finland  50% for first 2 hours; 100% thereafter. 
France  25% for first 8 hours; 50% after. Can be reduced to 10% by CA 
Germany  25% but determined in CA 
Greece  25% for up to 5 hours over  40 hours within the week; 50% for up to 
120 hours within the year 
Ireland  None by law 
Italy  None by law; set up in CA 
Luxembourg  25% for blue collar workers; 50% for white collar workers 
Netherlands  None by law 
Portugal  50% for 1st hour;75% 2nd hour; 100% following hours or any hour 
on a holiday or rest day 
Spain  0% 
Sweden  None by law; set up in CA 
United Kingdom  None by law 
Note: CA – collective agreements. 
Source: World Bank (2008); World Bank Doing Business 2009 database. 
In sum, on many occasions the workers themselves would like to work overtime in excess of 
a standard 40-hour week to earn extra income. On the other hand, overtime arrangements can 
also be abused by employers, especially on-season or during increases in the volume of work. 
Instead of hiring additional labor, the existing workers are requested to work overtime. Labor 
legislation, therefore, needs to find the optimal way to address both situations. 42 
4.4.  Night Work 
The human body is more sensitive at night to environmental disturbances and also to certain 
burdensome forms of work organization. Therefore, long periods of night work can be 
detrimental to the health of workers and can endanger safety at the workplace.  
Some of the night work arrangements are discussed in the ILO Night Work Convention No. 
171 from 1990.
36
(a)  The term night work means all work that is performed during a period of not less 
than seven consecutive hours, including the interval from midnight to 5 a.m., to 
be determined by the competent authority after consulting the most representative 
organizations of employers and workers or by collective agreements. 
  The following definitions are given in this Convention:  
(b)  The term night worker means an employed person whose work requires 
performance of a substantial number of hours of night work which exceeds a 
specified limit. This limit shall be fixed by the competent authority after 
consulting the most representative organizations of employers and workers or by 
collective agreements. 
Article 8 of the Convention states that compensation for night work shall “recognize the 
nature of night work.” Article 10 states that before introducing a night work schedule, the 
employer must consult the workers’ representatives concerned, and then continue to consult 
them on a regular basis. 
The European Social Charter also suggests the countries to ensure that workers performing 
night work benefit from measures that take account of the special nature of the work. 
Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time suggests: 
(i)  There is a need to limit the duration of periods of night work, including overtime.  
(ii)  It is important that night workers should be entitled to a free health assessment 
prior to their assignment and thereafter at regular intervals and that whenever 
possible they should be transferred to day work for which they are suited if they 
suffer from health problems. 
(iii)  The situation of night and shift workers requires that the level of safety and health 
protection should be adapted to the nature of their work. 
In more detail, the Directive sets up the following minimum requirements regarding night 
work: 
(a)  Normal hours of work for night workers do not exceed an average of eight hours 
in any 24-hour period. 
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(b)  Night workers whose work involves special hazards or heavy physical or mental 
strain do not work more than eight hours in any period of 24 hours during which 
they perform night work. 
As far as a health assessment and the transfer of night workers to day work is concerned, the 
Directive suggests that the Member States take the measures necessary to ensure that: (i) 
night workers are entitled to a free health assessment before their assignment and thereafter 
at regular intervals; and, (ii) night workers suffering from health problems recognized as 
being connected with the fact that they perform night work are transferred whenever possible 
to day work to which they are suited. 
In ECA countries, night workers are protected and/or stimulated in various ways. A pay 
premium has been established in most countries, varying from 15 percent in Hungary to 50 
percent in most CIS states. In many countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Latvia and most CIS states), the 
night shift has been reduced by one hour to seven hours. In Romania, night shift workers 
have to choose between the night shift reduced by one hour and the night bonus at 25 percent 
of wages as set by the collective agreement. Aside from Azerbaijan and Georgia, there are  
restrictions on night work region-wide (World Bank 2008). 
The health of night workers is specially protected in many countries. In Latvia, the labor 
legislation stipulates that a night worker is entitled to undergo a health examination before 
he/she is employed in night work and subsequently not less frequently than once every two 
years or once every year as from 50 years of age. Similarly, in Bulgaria, the law requires that 
the employees be medically examined in advance so that the employer is sure that the night 
work will not harm their health.   
In many countries, labor legislation prohibits night work for certain categories of workers. 
For example, in Belarus, night work is prohibited for pregnant women, women who are on 
postnatal leave and women who have children under the age of three. 
Among the EU15, there are no restrictions on night work in Denmark, France, Ireland and 
the  UK. However, in Denmark, under the collective agreement for members of the 
Confederation of Danish Industries, workers are entitled to special premiums for night time 
work, and the workweek is also limited to 34 hours. In Germany, night workers are entitled 
to a shorter shift. In Austria, additional rest periods are provided if the employee who works 
night hours for an average of more than eight hours per day, averaged on a 26-week basis.  
Night workers work for at least three hours between 10:00 pm and 5:00 am for 48 days per 
year, and have a statutory right to free medical checks. Furthermore, if their health is in 
danger or they have to take care of children up to 12 years of age, night workers have the 
right to relocate to a daytime job. In Spain, workers are entitled to a specific remuneration for 
night work, the amount being determined through collective bargaining agreements (World 
Bank 2008). 
4.5.  Work on Weekends and Public Holidays 
Employers may require employees to work on weekends and public holidays if this is 
necessary to provide services to the public, ensure uninterrupted production processes (the 44 
employer operates in continuous shifts) or perform temporary and urgent work in the case of 
need arising from force majeure. 
The European Social Charter suggests the signatories ensure a weekly rest period that, as far 
as possible, coincides with the day recognized by tradition or custom in the country or region 
concerned as a day of rest. 
In most countries, labor legislation allows work on Sundays and on legal holidays but 
additional remuneration or compensatory leave should be provided. In most countries, the 
wage premium for work is 100 percent but 26 percent in Serbia, and not more than 10 
percent in the Czech Republic. In Croatia and Montenegro, the wage premium is determined 
in the collective agreement or contract of employment. 
However, in Slovakia, work on public holidays can only be required exceptionally and upon 
prior negotiation with workers' representatives. In Tajikistan, work on weekends is prohibited 
unless it falls under one of the specified in the law exceptional circumstances (Annex Table 
A8). With the exception of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Serbia, all other ECA countries restrict, 
to varying degrees, work on weekends and public holidays (World Bank 2008). 
A country can establish 24 hours of weekly rest, but without naming a specific day, leaving it 
open to negotiation between an employer and employee according to their necessities. For 
example, in Denmark and the United Kingdom, the weekly holiday is flexible by law but in 
Denmark under the collective agreement for members of the Confederation of Danish 
Industries, workers are entitled to special premiums for work on Sundays. In the  UK, 
however, employees have the right to opt-out of working on Sunday with notice. 
In Germany, generally, no work is permitted on Sundays. In Austria, the employer has to 
provide a compensatory time off for work on Sundays, according to the Rest Periods Act. In 
Finland, employees can be required to work on a Sunday or a church holiday only when the 
work concerned is regularly carried out on the said days due to its nature or agreed upon in 
the employment contract, or with the separate consent of the employees. The wage payable 
for Sunday work performed as part of regular working hours is twice the regular wage.  45 
Chapter 5. Leave Policies 
5.1.  Annual Paid and Unpaid Leave 
Labor legislation in respect to annual leave regulates two basic elements: first, a period off 
work during the regular work schedule, and second, payment (i.e., the right to normal wages 
or equivalent compensation during the leave period although work is not performed). Various 
leave entitlements incur substantial costs to the employer, especially if the employee should 
be replaced for a prolonged period of time. On the other hand, flexible leave policies allow 
work time to be reconciled with family duties and recreational or social activities. Family 
leave entitlements especially have positive implications for the care of children, as well as for 
encouraging entry into the labor market and enabling people to remain at work. 
Basic principles of a paid annual  leave are laid down in the ILO Holidays with Pay 
Convention (Revised) No. 132 from 1970 which in particular states the following: 
(i)  Every person to whom this Convention applies shall be entitled to an annual paid 
holiday of a specified minimum length… The holiday shall in no case be less than 
three working weeks for one year of service;  
(ii)  A person whose length of service in any year is less than that required for the full 
entitlement shall be entitled in respect of that year to a holiday with pay 
proportionate to his length of service during that year; 
(iii)  A minimum period of service may be required for entitlement to any annual 
holiday with pay. The length of any such qualifying period shall not exceed six 
months; 
(iv)  Public and customary holidays, whether or not they fall during the annual holiday, 
shall not be counted as part of the minimum annual holiday with pay; 
(v)  Periods of incapacity for work resulting from sickness or injury may not be 
counted as part of the minimum annual holiday with pay; 
(vi)  Every person taking the holiday shall receive in respect of the full period of that 
holiday at least his normal or average remuneration (including the cash equivalent 
of any part of that remuneration which is paid in kind and which is not a 
permanent benefit continuing whether or not the person concerned is on holiday); 
(vii)  The division of the annual holiday with pay into parts may be authorized by the 
competent authority or through the appropriate machinery in each country… One 
of the parts shall consist of at least two uninterrupted working weeks; 
(viii)  An employed person who has completed a minimum period of service shall 
receive, upon termination of employment, a holiday with pay proportionate to the 46 
length of service for which he has not received such a holiday, or compensation in 
lieu thereof, or the equivalent holiday credit; and 
(ix)  Agreements to relinquish the right to the minimum annual holiday with pay to 
forgo such a holiday, for compensation or otherwise, shall, as appropriate to 
national conditions, be null and void or be prohibited.  
The ILO Convention No. 132 has been ratified by only 35 countries, including 12 countries 
in ECA, although all of these principles have not been transposed into the national legislation 
in the region. 
The European Social Charter declares that signatory countries have to provide for a 
minimum of four weeks’ annual holiday with pay. 
Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time lays down minimum 
requirements in respect of annual leave as well and stipulates the following: (i) Member 
States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to paid annual 
leave of at least four weeks, and (ii) the minimum period of paid annual leave may not be 
replaced by an allowance in lieu, except where the employment relationship is terminated. 
The countries in the ECA region have a wide variation of legal solutions with respect to 
annual leave. Typically it is calculated in working days or weeks but in most CIS states 
(except Georgia and Uzbekistan), it is still calculated in calendar days (See Annex Table A9). 
The shortest minimum paid annual leave is the 15 working days in Uzbekistan and the 18 
calendar days in Kazakhstan, and the lengthiest is found in Hungary where workers over 45 
years of age receive 30 working days. 
Some countries regulate a minimum period of service required for entitlement to an annual 
holiday with pay. In Tajikistan, the length of such a qualifying period is eleven months but 
exceptions are made to nine categories of employees, including women with small children, 
minors and war veterans. 
In many countries, the minimum annual leave is differentiated for various criteria. Typically 
state and local government employees as well as pedagogic and academic employees have 
lengthier leaves. In Hungary, annual leave is dependent on the age of a worker: from 20 
working days at age less than 25 to, as noted, up to 30 working days for older workers. It 
might create an additional disincentive not to hire the workers at older age. In some countries 
(Poland and Slovakia), the duration of the minimum annual leave is dependent on the length 
of services of the worker. Moreover, in Poland, it includes the job tenure with the previous 
employer(s). 
Labor legislation in ECA envisages various other supplementary leave entitlements. While in 
some countries, the nature of work is taken into consideration, in others, social considerations 
prevail. In the Czech Republic, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania and a few  other countries, 
employees who are engaged in work that poses a health hazard are entitled to supplementary 
leave. In many countries, minors and/or disabled persons are entitled to additional days of 
leave. In Belarus and Russia, employees with open-ended working hours can have extra 
leave. In Hungary, single parents and parents with three and more children under 16 years of 47 
age are entitled to a supplementary leave.  In Slovenia, the workers are entitled to one 
additional day for every child under the age of 15. 
Moreover, especially in SEE countries but also in Lithuania, the labor legislation envisages 
additional days of a family leave for various family events. In many EU15 countries, workers 
are entitled to time off from work, in accordance with national legislation, collective 
agreements and/or practice, on grounds of force majeure for urgent family reasons in cases of 
sickness or accident, making the immediate presence of the worker indispensable.
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In Lithuania, an employee is entitled to at least three calendar days of extra leave for a 
wedding and at least three days of unpaid leave for the funeral of a family member. In the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other side of the spectrum, the labor law 
entitles the worker to up to seven working days of paid leave in one calendar year in the case 
of marriage, wife's confinement, serious disease or death of a close family or household 
member, and up to four days to meet religious/traditional needs of which two days with 
salary compensation.   
 In some 
countries, the employers have to bear the costs; in some others, remuneration is determined 
in the collective agreement or is additional unpaid leave. 
While the coverage of such costs can be negotiated in a collective or individual labor 
agreement, if the law obliges the employer to bear such personal costs, it could be especially 
burdensome to small firms. In most other transition countries, employees may be granted 
leave without pay for such family events. If necessary, a fallback would only include 
marriage, birth of a child (for male parent only) and death of an immediate relative. 
Unpaid leave is regulated in different ways across the ECA region although, in general, it is 
carried out upon request of the employee with the consent of the employer. In many 
countries, the rules for unpaid leave are determined by a collective agreement, and legislation 
in some countries establishes strict limits on how many days of unpaid leave the employee 
can take in a single year. In Bulgaria, it is up to 30 working days for one calendar year; in 
Ukraine, up to 15 calendar days; in Azerbaijan, up to 14 calendar days; and in Georgia, not 
less than 15 calendar days. In some other countries, social criteria determine the right to 
unpaid leave. For example, in Lithuania, employees raising a child under 14 years of age are 
entitled to additional unpaid leave upon request for up to 14 calendar days; employees raising 
a child  with disabilities before he/she has reached sixteen years, for up to 30 calendar days; 
and disabled persons, for up to 30 calendar days. In most CIS states, war veterans are entitled 
to additional unpaid leave, up to 35 calendar days in Russia (Annex Table A9). 
In the EU15 states, mandatory paid annual leave after 20 years of continuous employment in 
a  private sector firm varies from 20 working days in Belgium, Ireland,  Italy,  and the 
Netherlands to 25 working days in most other countries (See Table 7). 
                                                        
37 See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0358:FIN:EN:PDF. 48 
Table 7:  Annual Leave Entitlements in EU15 Countries in 2007/08 
  Mandatory paid annual vacation (in working days) after 20 
years of continuous employment 
Austria  25 
Belgium  20 (24 working days in a  6 day/week working regime) 
Denmark  25 
Finland  30 working days, including Saturdays 
France  30 working days, including Saturdays 
Germany  24 working days on a 6 day workweek basis and 20 working 
days on a 5 day workweek basis 
Greece  25 (30 working days in a  6 day/week working regime) 
Ireland  20 
Italy  4 calendar weeks by law 
Luxembourg  25 
Netherlands  20 
Portugal  22 
Spain  30 calendar days (equivalent to 22 working days) 
Sweden  25 
United Kingdom  24 
Note: CA – collective agreements. 
Source: World Bank (2008): World Bank Doing Business 2009 database. 
5.2.  Maternity Leave 
In the socialist era, families with children were heavily protected by the state in different 
ways: through a system of family allowances, a heavily subsidized network of pre-school and 
school institutions, and other subsidized services and commodities for children, or by special 
housing programs. Women with small children and pregnant women  also  had strong 
employment guarantees. Employment rates of females were relatively high, and their jobs 
and salary levels were held for them while they were out on maternity or parental leave.  
In the transition period, the employment guarantees for pregnant women or women with 
small children disappeared to a large degree. After being on maternity or parental leave, 
mothers discovered that not only had their job disappeared but the entire enterprise that 
employed them had gone bankrupt or changed ownership and/or profile. In addition, small 
private businesses are now hesitant to employ young women with children. 
Families, especially women with small children, are indeed the most vulnerable in the labor 
market. By law, the employer is still obligated to give the female employee the same job 
when she returns from maternity or parental leave and to compensate any salary difference 
caused by inflation. Given the breaks in service, women lose experience and often are less 
eager to be retrained or to travel on lengthy business trips  whereas employers must 
temporarily fill the vacancies. These considerations often limit a woman’s opportunities for 
employment, especially in the emerging private sector.  
As a reflection of these and other difficulties, birth rates have dropped sharply, to as low as 
1.18 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 1.20 in Moldova. At the same time, enrollment rates of 
children in preschool institutions have dropped significantly during the transition (Table 5.2). 49 
Low birth rates and concerns about the low employment rates of females, as well as the 
status of women with small children, have triggered additional protective measures in the 
labor laws of many ECA countries. 
Table 8:  Total Fertility Rate, and Children at Preschool Institutions 
  Total Fertility Rate*  Children In Early 
Childhood Care, 





0) Education (%) 
  1989  2006  2006/07  2006/07 
Czech Republic  1.87  1.33  6.3  79.4 
Hungary  1.78  1.35  10.7  83.9 
Poland  2.05  1.27  -  58.5 
Slovakia  2.08  1.24  6.7***  73.7*** 
Slovenia  1.52  1.31  26.8  79.5 
Estonia  2.22  1.55  21.9  86.0 
Latvia  2.04  1.35  15.8  81.8 
Lithuania  1.98  1.31  23.5  69.2 
Bulgaria  1.90  1.38  11.9  73.9 
Romania  2.20  1.31  2.4  75.0 
Albania  2.96  1.40  -  50.2 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1.70  1.18  -  7.8 
Croatia  1.63  1.38  14.0  55.3 
Montenegro  -  1.64  11.7  33.4 
Serbia   -  -  10.2  49.1 
FYR Macedonia  2.09  1.46  5.4  39.6 
Belarus  2.03  1.29  16.9  88.9 
Moldova  2.46  1.20  13.1  68.5 
Russian 
Federation 
2.01  1.30  21.5  70.0 
Ukraine  1.90  1.30  15.2  71.1 
Armenia  2.61  1.35  6.6  26.3 
Azerbaijan  2.79  2.33  0.3  22.9 
Georgia  2.13  1.40  6.1  38.2 
Kazakhstan  2.84  2.36  2.8  20.0 
Kyrgyzstan  3.80  2.70  2.6  12.4 
Tajikistan  5.08  3.27  2.1  7.0 
Uzbekistan  4.07**  2.60  8.3  21.2 
Note:  * - live births per woman aged 15-49.  ** - 1990.  *** - 2005/05. 
Source: UNICEF TransMONEE (2008). 
Basic standards regarding maternity leave entitlements are laid down in the ILO Maternity 
Protection Convention No. 183 from 2000, and Maternity Protection Recommendation No. 
191 from the same year. In particular, the Convention calls for: 
(i)  Each Member shall, after consulting the representative organizations of employers 
and workers, adopt appropriate measures to ensure that pregnant or breastfeeding 
women are not obliged to perform work which has been determined by the 50 
competent authority to be prejudicial to the health of the mother or the child, or 
where an assessment has established a significant risk to the mother's health or 
that of her child; 
(ii)  On production of a medical certificate or other appropriate certification, as 
determined by national law and practice, stating the presumed date of childbirth, a 
woman to whom this Convention applies shall be entitled to a period of maternity 
leave of not less than 14 weeks. Maternity leave shall include a period of six 
weeks' compulsory leave after childbirth, unless otherwise agreed at the national 
level by the government and the representative organizations of employers and 
workers; 
(iii)  The prenatal portion of maternity leave shall be extended by any period elapsing 
between the presumed date of childbirth and the actual date of childbirth, without 
reduction in any compulsory portion of postnatal leave; 
(iv)  On production of a medical certificate, leave shall be provided before or after the 
maternity leave period  in the case of illness, complications or risk of 
complications arising out of pregnancy or childbirth; 
(v)  Cash benefits shall be provided at a level which ensures that the woman can 
maintain herself and her child in proper conditions of health and with a suitable 
standard of living. The amount of such benefits shall not be less than two-thirds of 
the woman's previous earnings or of such of those earnings as are taken into 
account for the purpose of computing benefits.  
(vi)  In order to protect the situation of women in the labor market, benefits in respect 
of the leave shall be provided through compulsory social insurance or public 
funds, or in a manner determined by national law and practice. An employer shall 
not be individually liable for the direct cost of any such monetary benefit to a 
woman employed by him or her without that employer's specific agreement. 
(vii)  It shall be unlawful for an employer to terminate the employment of a woman 
during her pregnancy or absence on leave or during a period following her return 
to work to be prescribed by national laws or regulations, except on grounds 
unrelated to the pregnancy or birth of the child and its consequences or nursing. 
The burden of proving that the reasons for dismissal are unrelated to pregnancy or 
childbirth and its consequences or nursing shall rest on the employer.  
(viii)  A woman is guaranteed the right to return to the same position or an equivalent 
position paid at the same rate at the end of her maternity leave. 
(ix)  A woman shall be provided with the right to one or more daily breaks or a daily 
reduction of hours of work to breastfeed her child.  
Recommendation No. 191 adds the following: (i) Provision should be made for an extension 
of the maternity leave in the event of multiple births; (ii) To the extent possible, measures 
should be taken to ensure that the woman is entitled to choose freely the time at which she 
takes any non-compulsory portion of her maternity leave, before or after childbirth; and (iii) 51 
A woman should be entitled to return to her former position or an equivalent position paid at 
the same rate at the end of her leave. The period of leave should be considered as a period of 
service for the determination of her rights. 
With regard to maternity, the European Social Charter assigned special protections to 
employed women. In particular, the signatories are obliged (i) to provide either by paid leave, 
by adequate social security benefits or by benefits from public funds for employed women to 
take leave before and after childbirth up to a total of at least fourteen weeks; (ii) to consider it 
as unlawful for an employer to give a woman notice of dismissal during the period from the 
time she notifies her employer that she is pregnant until the end of her maternity leave, or to 
give her notice of dismissal at such a time that the notice would expire during such a period; 
(iii) to provide that mothers who are nursing their infants shall be entitled to sufficient time 
off for this purpose; (iv) to regulate the employment in night work of pregnant women, 
women who have recently given birth and women nursing their infants; (v) to prohibit the 
employment of pregnant women, women who have recently given birth or who are nursing 
their infants in underground mining and all other work which is unsuitable by reason of its 
dangerous, unhealthy or arduous nature and to take appropriate measures to protect the 
employment rights of these women. 
Maternity leave is an important public policy measure to protect the health of the mother and 
child during the final months of pregnancy and the first few months after delivery. However, 
extended maternity leave can potentially affect women’s labor market participation 
adversely. A long period of leave may reduce the attachment of women to the labor market 
and can lead to an actual or perceived erosion of skills. Employers may be reluctant to hire or 
promote women of child-bearing age due to the associated indirect costs (e.g., replacement 
workers) of maternity leave, particularly for extended leave. Extended leave entitlement, 
especially if accompanied by a decline in the number of childcare centers, may also enforce 
the notion of women as second earners and diminish their economic and social roles in favor 
of their maternal functions.  
Lengthy maternity and family leaves, and other transfer-based pronatalist policies, seem to 
have been inadequate in  raising fertility significantly and reversing demographic trends 
(Kurilo et al. 2007; World Bank 2007a). For such policies to be more effective, they need to 
be combined with a set of policy measures in various areas that would counteract the actual 
factors that contribute to the reluctance of couples to have more children. According to the 
UN study of demographic policy in Russia (UN 2008), an effective fertility policy should be 
able to: (1) assist young families to acquire housing; (2) improve social support and benefits 
system to families with children; (3) enable parents to combine work with parenthood; (4) 
increase access to preschool services; (5) strengthen family values, particularly the social 
prestige associated with raising multiple children; (6) reduce abortion rates by building 
awareness about family planning; and, (7) protect and improve reproductive health. 
The shortest paid maternity leave of normal duration in the ECA region is found in Slovenia, 
105 days and in Latvia, 112 days. The lengthiest maternity leave entitlement is provided in 
Albania, Croatia and Serbia, 365 days, and in Montenegro in which it can exceed one year. In 
particular, in the latter, an employed woman may start to use the maternity leave 45 days 
before the childbirth, but no later than 28 days before the childbirth, until the child turns one 
year of age. Extended duration of maternity leave is established, as a rule, for multiple births, 52 
or for complicated confinement. In some countries, the leave is differentiated according to 
the order of birth. For example, in Serbia, the leave period for the third and each successive 
child is paid for two years (Annex Table A10). 
Labor laws in many countries also regulate the number of days a pregnant woman can start 
her maternity leave, or must be used before the estimated date of delivery, upon submission 
to the employer of a medical certificate. It varies from two weeks in Poland to up to 70 days 
of prenatal leave in Estonia, Lithuania and most CIS states. 
Pregnant women are entitled to a supplementary protection. As an example, in Belarus, night 
work is prohibited for pregnant women, women who are on postnatal leave and women with 
children under the age of three. Overtime work and night work are not permitted for pregnant 
women, for women who are on postnatal leave and women with children under the age of 
three. Dismissal of pregnant women, women with children under the age of three, single 
women with children under the age of fourteen (children with disabilities - under eighteen) is 
forbidden, except in the case of enterprise liquidation. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, after expiry of maternity leave, a woman with a child of up to 
one year of age is entitled to work half time. This right may also be used by the employed 
father of the baby, if the woman works full work hours in that period.  
In all EU15 countries, pregnant employees and mothers are entitled to a period of rest before 
and after confinement but as a rule, the duration is much shorter than in ECA countries. The 
duration and the character of the rest before and after the confinement differ from country to 
country. Currently the duration of paid maternity leave is less than 100 days in Germany, 
Ireland and Portugal. In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands the expectant mother is 
entitled to six weeks of leave before confinement, and in Austria and Greece to eight weeks. 
In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, eight  weeks of  this rest is optional for the 
employee following confinement. In Greece and Luxembourg, the rest period following 
confinement is eight weeks. 
5.3.  Parental and Paternity Leave 
The possibility of a parental leave is also an important guarantee for combining work and 
family life. Many transition countries have established a partially paid parental (child care) 
leave of up to two to three years, usually a flat rate benefit paid from the state or a few cases 
from the social insurance budget. This is much less burdensome to the employers compared 
to lengthy maternity leave entitlements, if they are paying for the benefit through higher 
labor taxes and can avoid discrimination of female labor in the formal labor market.  
During the parental leave, the working contract as such is not interrupted and is being 
continued but the employee’s obligation to work and the employer’s obligation to pay salary 
is suspended. Although the employer does not bear direct costs for parental leave, it does 
cause inconveniences associated with the need to find a replacement for the worker, or to 
secure a workplace upon the worker’s return. Due to direct and indirect costs to employers, 
an extensive usage of such entitlements may lead to restrictions in the hiring of parents, 
current or potential, of young children. 53 
In most ECA countries, parental leave can also be granted, if so requested, to the mother or 
the father until the child reaches three years of age. However, in Latvia, the leave can be used 
for a period not exceeding 1.5 years up to the day the child reaches the age of eight years and 
is partially financed by the state social insurance. In Bulgaria, parental leave is differentiated: 
for the first, second and third child, until the child reaches two years of age, and six months 
for each subsequent child if not placed in a childcare establishment (Annex Table A10). 
Minimum requirements designed to facilitate the reconciliation of parental and professional 
responsibilities for working parents are laid down in the Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 
June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave. According to the Directive: 
(i)  Men and women workers have an individual right to parental leave on the 
grounds of the birth or adoption of a child to enable them to take care of that 
child, for at least three months, until a given age up to eight years to be defined by 
Member States and/or management and labor; 
(ii)  In order to ensure that workers can exercise their right to parental leave, Member 
States and/or management and labor shall take the necessary measures to protect 
workers against dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, 
parental leave in accordance with national law, collective agreements or practices; 
(iii)  At the end of parental leave, workers shall have the right to return to the same job 
or, if that is not possible, to an equivalent or similar job consistent with their 
employment contract or employment relationship; 
(iv)  Rights acquired or in the process of being acquired by the worker on the date on 
which parental leave starts shall be maintained as they stand until the end of 
parental leave. 
(v)  Member States and/or management and labor shall take the necessary measures to 
entitle workers to time off from work, in accordance with national legislation, 
collective agreements and/or practice, on grounds of force majeure for urgent 
family reasons in cases of sickness or accident making the immediate presence of 
the worker indispensable. 
All EU15 Member States provide parental leave for both natural and adopted children.
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For example, in Austria, the maximum age of the child where entitlement to leave arises on 
birth and, in general, on adoption is, as a rule, two years if taken as a block and four years if 
taken part-time. Variations apply depending on the private or public sector. For federal civil 
 To 
promote equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women, and to encourage 
fathers to assume an equal share of family responsibilities, the right to parental leave should, 
in principle, be granted on a nontransferable basis. Member States themselves and/or 
management and labor may decide whether parental leave is granted on a full- or part-time 
basis, in a piecemeal way or in the form of a time-credit system. 
                                                        
38 See Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3rd June 1996 on 
the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0358:FIN:EN:PDF. 54 
servants and federal contractual employees, additional leave can be granted until the child 
enters school. In Belgium, the maximum age of the child for an unpaid scheme is four years 
in the private sector (eight years if the child is seriously disabled) and ten years in the public 
sector. The period to notify the employer in order to take leave ranges from 10 days in 
Portugal to four months in Luxembourg. 
In Germany, each parent is entitled to three years of leave (e.g., up to the third birthday of the 
child). Parents who decide to take full-time parental leave, that is, to have one parent taking 
the whole period and the other working the entire time, are not prevented from doing so. 
However, if parents decide to take part-time leave, both have to take some leave in order to 
use the full entitlement. Full-time parental leave is thus in fact transferable. Parents do not 
lose any leave if the mother takes up all the leave herself. 
The Directive allows employers to postpone the granting of parental leave for justifiable 
reasons and allows special arrangements to meet the operational and organizational 
requirements of small firms (defined in each country individually). For example, in Belgium, 
small firms (defined as those with fewer than 50 employees) can make special arrangements 
for parental leave, and requests to take parental leave part-time must be agreed with 
employer. In Luxembourg, for firms with less than 15 employees, and in relation to seasonal 
work, the employer can delay granting parental leave for up to six months. 
Typically parental leave can be used by one of the parents or a relative who is taking care of 
the child. For example, in Armenia, parental leave can be granted before the child is three 
years of age at the choice of the family to the mother (step-mother), father (the step-father), 
grandmother, grandfather or any other relative, who is actually raising the child, as well as to 
an employee who is the guardian of the child. The leave may be taken as a single period or 
distributed in portions. During the period of leave,  the employee retains  his/her  job  or 
position, except when the enterprise is liquidated or the employer is bankrupt.  
In many ECA countries, in addition, a special paid paternity leave has been established for 
fathers to support the family in the most critical days. Slovenia has the most generous 
paternity leave, 90 days of which at least 15 days must be used during the maternity leave 
and the remaining 75 days – until the child is eight years old. Paternity leave is 14 calendar 
days in Azerbaijan and Estonia. In Poland, paternity leave is two weeks for a maternity leave 
of 16 weeks maternity (e.g., first child in the family), and four weeks if the mother is entitled 
to 18 weeks of maternity leave (e.g., second child and all following children). Only birthright 
fathers and legal guardians can benefit from the paternity leave. In Romania, male employees 
are entitled to five days of paid leave within the first eight weeks from the date of birth 
(Annex Table A10). 
In order to better combine work and family life, the creation of a flexible and widespread 
network of childcare options is integral to ensuring equal opportunities for women in the 
market economy and relieving an unsustainable financial burden on the government related 
to maternity leave transfers (UNICEF 1999). The Council Decision of 15 July 2008 
(2008/618/EC) on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States in the 
context of the European Employment Strategy, sets the following targets and benchmarks in 
provision of childcare by 2010; (i) to at least 90 percent of children between three years old 
and the mandatory school age and at least 33 percent of children under three years of age.  55 
According to the 2006 data for the provision of early childhood care to children aged 0-2, 
most EU10 countries were not even close to the target. The highest enrollment was found to 
be 27 percent in Slovenia and 24 percent in Lithuania, as compared to 2 percent in Romania. 
Enrollment in pre-primary education of children three to six years old (ISCED 0) is quite 
close to the target in Estonia at 86 percent of children but only 59 percent in Poland. In most 
other ECA countries, enrollment ratios were much lower (Table 5.2). 
5.4.  Administrative Leaves 
An important aspect of labor market flexibility is adjustments to be made in working time 
and/or wages if an enterprise experiences financial difficulties due to low demand, seasonal 
factors and so on. It reflects, in part, the use of internal flexibility (flexible working-time 
arrangements, short-time working, temporary suspension of production, etc.), which appears 
to have prevented significant labor reductions, especially in manufacturing, by allowing 
firms to use various means of internal adjustment rather than reduce their workforce. In the 
case of production stoppages or reduction in output, wage flexibility could also be an 
alternative to layoffs.  
In most ECA countries,  the employers can use administrative leave, paid or unpaid, 
temporary transfer of workers to another internal or external job, or forced part-time work to 
offset the costs and to adjust to current economic difficulties. For political and social reasons, 
especially in CIS states, local authorities may put pressure on the enterprises and public 
employment services  to avoid massive layoffs, thus delaying the  restructuring of the 
enterprises. Only a portion of the workers receive compensation from the firms. In some 
other transition countries, such as in Albania, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro, there are no 
legal provisions in the labor law for employers to adjust wages or working time in the case of 
work stoppages (Annex Table A11).  
In Russia, forced administrative leave reached mammoth proportions. In the mid-1990s in the 
textile industry, the share of workers in part-time jobs or on administrative leave reached a 
level of 50 percent of total employment, including 37 percent in the manufacturing sector 
(GOSKOMSTAT of Russia 1996). In 2002, approximately two million workers were still on 
such leave (excluding small firms for which the data are not available). Until recently, the 
number of workers on administrative leave tended to decline. In 2006, in Russia, 567,000 
individuals were on administrative leave and in Ukraine, 137,000 persons (Table 5.3).
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39 In February 2009, in Russia, 247,000 workers were on administrative leave. 
 In 
relative terms, the highest share of workers on administrative leave during the year was 
observed in Moldova, 4.8 percent, and in Azerbaijan, 3.4 percent. 56 
Table 9:  Administrative Leaves in CIS States (2002 and 2006) 
  Persons on Administrative Leave by Administration’s Initiative 





























Armenia  25.1  6.2  23.7  3.7  1.2  1.9 
Azerbaijan  36.3  3.4  32.2  45.5  3.4  45.0 
Belarus  231.0  6.4  106.4  70.3  2.0  29.3 
Kazakhstan  69.7  2.6  63.5  25.4  0.8  22.8 
Kyrgyzstan  33.5  6.4  …       
Moldova  72.8  10.6  …  31.1  4.8  25.0 
Russia  1891.0  4.7  540.0  566.9  1.5  … 
Tajikistan  48.7  4.6  43.8  20.1  1.9  17.7 
Ukraine  621.9  5.1  …  137.2  1.2  … 
Note:  Data are not available for Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Source: CIS STAT (2004, 2007). 
According to statistics, between 40 percent in Belarus and almost all the workers in 
Azerbaijan on administrative leave received no compensation.
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In the case of work stoppage (idle time) due to a lack of necessary organizational or technical 
conditions,  force majeure  or other circumstances, the labor legislation or collective 
agreements in the ECA region offer the following options: temporary transfer to another 
position with the same pay as the former position; or employees may be granted a partially 
paid holiday by agreement of the parties. In many cases,  the maximum duration of 
administrative leave is limited to between one month (Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Ukraine) and 
three months (Estonia and Moldova); yet, in most countries with relevant entitlements, this 
time period is not limited. A few examples follow. 
  Another form of adjustment 
to the economic shocks has been reduced work hours imposed by an employer, affecting 
577,000 Russian workers alone in February 2009. 
The Estonian Employment Contracts Act provides that upon a temporary decrease in work 
volume or orders, an employer has the right, with the consent of a labor inspector and the 
employee, to establish part-time working time for an employee or to send the employee on a 
holiday with partial pay for up to three months per year. An employer is required to give an 
employee at least two weeks’ advance notice in writing of the application of part-time 
working time or sending him or her on a holiday with partial pay. The duration of part-time 
working time must not be less than 60 percent of the standard working time prescribed in the 
employment contract, and the holiday pay payable during holidays with partial pay must not 
be less than 60 percent of the minimum wage. 
The Armenian Labor Code allows paying for idle time not by the fault of the employee at the 
rate of at least two thirds of the average hourly rate for each idle hour, however, not less than 
                                                        
40 An employee, as a rule, does not receive work remuneration for idle time due to the fault of the employee. 57 
the minimal hourly rate established by the legislation. The employee may be offered another 
job at the enterprise, according to his/her profession, specialty and qualifications, in which 
he/she could work without causing harm to his/her health and should be paid at least two 
thirds of the average monthly wage for each idle hour that was used before the idle time. If 
the employee refuses the offered temporary job, compensatory wage should be not less than 
30 percent of the minimum hourly rate. 
On many occasions in ECA countries, idle workers may stay on the payroll of firms for a 
long period of time even if not paid. They may benefit from pension insurance (while still 
accumulating service years) or health insurance entitlements, perhaps for the whole family, 
while working informally, including in his/her own workplace for personal gain. 58 
Chapter 6.  Contract Termination 
6.1.  Minimum Requirements 
Corporate restructuring is an important element of change. This requires striking the right 
balance between flexibility for businesses and security for workers - which is necessary to 
maintain human capital and employability. This is especially true for transition economies. 
High levels of labor hoarding and the need to restructure the whole enterprise sector as well 
as the public sector led to a mass retrenchment of labor as one of the most urgent tasks in 
further enhancing reforms. 
At the initial stage of the transition reforms, governments were constrained by budget deficits 
and could provide only limited benefits to redundant workers. An appealing alternative to 
raising government benefits was to require employers, at that time predominantly state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), to provide the bulk of social guarantees, including cash payments 
to workers they dismiss.  
Social guarantees associated with separations and redundancies, including the amount of 
severance pay –  and even the obligation to pay the benefit,  usually depends on the 
circumstances of the separation from the company. Typical to ECA countries, formally 
voluntary resignations remain the most common reason for leaving a job. According to the 
data from CIS states, voluntary resignation in which the workers are not entitled to most, if 
any, of the benefits represents a major part of all job separations, including in 2006, three 
fourths of separations in Russia and up to 90 percent in Tajikistan. The share of separations 
in connection with staff reductions is “only” 2 percent in Belarus and Moldova, 7 percent in 
Kyrgyzstan, and 11 percent in Uzbekistan (Table 6.1). However, the term “voluntary” is 
misleading.  
Table 10:  Labor Turnover in CIS States in 2006 (Except Small Firms) 
  As Percentage of Total Employed 
  Hired  Left Enterprises  Of Which: 
      By Own Will  Connected to Staff Reduction 
Armenia  17.8  16.4  12.2  0.9 
Azerbaijan  10.4  8.6  5.7  0.5 
Belarus  25.5  24.5  19.6  0.4 
Kazakhstan  33.1  29.7  24.7  1.1 
Kyrgyzstan  20.8  19.6  16.0  1.3 
Moldova  25.3  26.8  23.5  0.6 
Russia  30.5  30.9  23.7  1.5 
Tajikistan  5.0  4.8  4.2  0.3 
Ukraine  28.2  29.9  25.8  1.2 
Uzbekistan*  13.8  16.2  12.3  1.8 
Note:  Data are not available for Georgia and Turkmenistan.  * - 1999. 
Source: CIS STAT (2007). 59 
There is a clear correlation between the rates and levels of voluntary resignation from sectors 
and firms, and the level of wages and wage growth: the lower the  wages, the higher 
“voluntary” resignation from jobs.
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In many cases, the firms have no funds for severance payment, thus forcing workers to leave 
“voluntarily”. For example, the following has been reported in the Ukraine as a widely 
accepted practice: When a newly hired employee signs a labor agreement, he/she also signs a 
written application for voluntary termination of the labor agreement without specified date as 
a precondition for hiring. All such applications from all employees are kept by the employer 
or the manager to be used when the needs arise to downsize the workforce without paying 
any severance (Kupets and Leshchenko 2008). Unfortunately, relevant institutions to 
effectively protect the interests of workers in such circumstances  are weak or even 
nonexistent in most ECA countries.
 Enterprises themselves have kept employment levels 
artificially high by placing workers on administrative leave or part-time work or by cutting 
wages. Sooner or later, many of these workers, having no future with the firm and no sources 
of income, are forced to quit on their own. 
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The same situation is reported among countries in the region. Only around 11 percent of job 
separations  have been reported as  dismissals  in Serbia (OECD 2008b). Evidence  from 
Hungary indicates that under random selection of redundancy and full compliance, the 
existing regulations would imply an eligibility ratio of 75 percent and an average severance 
pay exceeding two months’ wages. However, a survey of 2001 indicated  that only 5.7 
percent of those made redundant were paid severance amounting, on average, to 0.4 of a 
month’s wage. Therefore, payment receipt is limited by a strong bias towards redundancies 
for groups ineligible for severance rather than non-compliance with the regulations (Köllö 
and Nacsa 2007). 
 Often induced retirements and disciplinary layoffs are 
also registered as voluntary. Sometimes, attachment to the firm, in addition to pension and 
health insurance entitlements, allows the worker to use the enterprise’s tools and equipment 
for minor jobs and gainfully earn small amounts, or to consume enterprise-related social 
services by staying on the enterprise list, such as on administrative leave even without pay, 
for a certain period of time. 
Contract termination is discussed in the ILO Termination of Employment Convention No. 
158 from 1982.
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41 By surveys of VCIOM, in Russia in the 1990s, in about two thirds of cases, the major motive for voluntary 
resignation was low or unpaid wages (Khakhulina 1996). 
 As far as justification for termination is concerned, the Convention states 
that the employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for 
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the 
operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service. The employment of a 
worker shall not be terminated for reasons related to the worker's conduct or performance 
before he/she is provided an opportunity to defend against the allegations made, unless the 
employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide this opportunity. A worker whose 
employment is to be terminated shall be entitled to a reasonable period of notice or 
compensation in lieu thereof unless guilty of serious misconduct, that is, misconduct of such 
42 For example, the Labor Inspectorate was recently closed in Georgia. Labor disputes should be resolved in 
courts which is not a viable option for workers in many instances, for example, due to financial costs incurred. 
43 This Convention was ratified by 34 countries. 60 
a nature that it would be unreasonable to require the employer to continue employment 
during the notice period.  
A worker whose employment has been terminated shall be entitled, in accordance with 
national law and practice, to (a) a severance allowance or other separation benefits, the 
amount of which shall be based inter alia on length of service and the level of wages, and 
paid directly by the employer or by a fund constituted by employers' contributions; or (b) 
benefits from unemployment insurance or assistance or other forms of social security, such as 
old-age or invalidity benefits, under the normal conditions to which such benefits are subject; 
or (c) a combination of such allowance and benefits.  
Respectively, the ILO Convention No. 158 does not require both severance pay and 
unemployment benefits.  Indeed, it specifically states that a worker who does not fulfill the 
qualifying conditions for unemployment insurance or assistance under a scheme of general 
scope need not be paid any severance allowance or separation benefit solely because he/she 
is not receiving an unemployment benefit.  
As far as consultation of workers’ representatives is concerned, the Convention suggests that 
when the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, 
structural or similar nature, the employer shall:  
(a)  provide the workers' representatives concerned in good time with relevant 
information including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number 
and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which the 
terminations are intended to be carried out;  
(b)  give, in accordance with national law and practice, the workers' representatives 
concerned, as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on measures to be 
taken to avert or to minimize the terminations and measures to mitigate the 
adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned such as finding 
alternative employment.  
However, the Convention also states that applicability of consultations may be limited to 
cases in which the number of workers whose termination of employment is contemplated is 
at least a specified number or percentage of the workforce (e.g., to group redundancies). 
The European Social Charter stipulates that all workers have the right to protection in cases 
of termination of employment, including if the employment is terminated without a valid 
reason, to adequate compensation or other appropriate relief.
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Collective redundancies are reflected in the Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies that 
will be discussed below. The most relevant directive regarding employers’ obligations 
 A worker who considers that 
his employment has been terminated without a valid reason shall have the right to appeal to 
an impartial body. Also according to the Charter, all workers should have the right to be 
informed and consulted in collective redundancy procedures.  
                                                        
44 The terms "termination of employment" and "terminated" mean termination of employment at the initiative of 
the employer. 61 
associated with individual dismissals is the Directive 2002/74/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 80/987/EEC relating 
to the protection of employees in the event of their employer’s insolvency. Article 3 of that 
Directive requires member states to establish relevant institutions guaranteeing payment of 
workers’ claims against insolvent employers. The Directive specifically mentions “severance 
pay on termination of employment relationships,” but requires a guarantee of severance pay 
only “where [severance pay is] provided for by national law.” In other words, the EU 
Directive allows member states the choice of whether to mandate severance pay (Schwab 
2004).  
The ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation No 166 (1982) suggests a package 
of measures that should be considered with a view to averting or minimizing terminations of 
employment for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature. These 
might include, inter alia, restriction of hiring, spreading the workforce reduction over a 
certain period of time to permit natural reduction of the workforce, internal transfers, training 
and retraining, voluntary early retirement with appropriate income protection, restriction of 
overtime and reduction of normal hours of work. Also,  where it is considered that a 
temporary reduction of normal hours of work would be likely to avert or minimize 
terminations of employment due to temporary economic difficulties, consideration should be 
given to partial compensation for loss of wages for the normal hours not worked, financed by 
appropriate methods under national law and practice. 
In order to assess the job protection of workers with regular contracts, several main areas 
should be considered: (i) difficulty of dismissal, that is legislative provisions setting 
conditions under which a dismissal is “justified” or “fair”; (ii) procedural inconveniences that 
the employer may face when starting the dismissal process; (iii) advance notice;  (iv) 
severance pay provisions; and  (v) special provisions governing collective redundancies, 
which will be discussed below. 
Regular employment contracts do not generally specify any duration for the employment 
relationship. Part of the role of the EPL is thus to define “just causes” or “serious reasons” 
for the termination of an employment relationship and the sanctions applicable to the 
employer in case of non-respect of this principle of just cause termination. The most 
comprehensive list of “just causes” for contract termination can be found in the Estonian 
Employment Contracts Act 1992 (as amended) as follows. 
An employer may terminate an employment contract entered into for an unspecified or fixed 
term prior to expiry of the term of the contract: 
(i)  Upon liquidation of the enterprise, agency or other organization; 
(ii)  Upon the declaration of bankruptcy of the employer; 
(iii)  Upon layoff of employees; 
(iv)  Upon unsuitability of an employee for his or her office or the work to be 
performed due to professional skills or for reasons of health; 
(v)  Due to unsatisfactory results of a probationary period; 62 
(vi)  Upon breach of duties an employee; 
(vii)  Upon loss of trust in an employee; 
(viii)  Due to an indecent act by an employee; 
(ix)  Due to the long-term incapacity for work of an employee; 
(x)  When the employee reaches a certain age; 
(xi)  Upon hiring an employee for whom the position is a principal job; 
(xii)  Due to an act of corruption of an employee. 
Some other causes for contract termination can be found in labor legislation from other ECA 
countries.  
In most of the above-listed causes for contract termination, the employer has little control. 
Therefore, the key policy issue here concerns how difficult and/or costly it is for employers 
to terminate employees for economic or business-related reasons (e.g., at the initiative of the 
employer), which will be discussed in more detail.
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6.2.  Procedural Inconveniences 
 
The termination of workers due to redundancy is legally authorized in all ECA countries. In 
some countries, the employer is obliged to notify a third party (typically workers’ 
representatives) before terminating one redundant worker (Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Slovakia and Tajikistan) but 
no approval is required in any of the countries.
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Labor laws in many ECA countries stipulate restricted rights to terminate the employment of 
specially protected workers. Dual criteria enter the decision-making process for retaining or 
releasing workers.  In the case of  redundancies,  professional qualities like  the worker’s 
professional education and/or qualification for work and the necessary additional skills and 
capacities, work experience, job performance, or years of service may serve as the criteria (in 
this case, the Slovenian Employment Relationships Act). For the follow-up list of individuals 
with preferential rights to protection of the employment contract, the focus may be based on 
social criteria, such as new entrants within the term of one year, seniority-based criteria or 
advanced career workers completing the minimum conditions to collect an old-age pension 
  
                                                        
45  “Economic” reasons include business-related causes for termination (e.g., declining demand, shrinking 
markets, increasing competitiveness, etc.) or technological and organizational changes in the business entity. 
This class of terminations stands in contrast to dismissals for “non-economic” reasons.  
46 No approval for dismissal is required in EU15 countries with two exceptions: (1) in Germany, approval is 
requested when dismissing an employee with special protection: works council members (from Works Council), 
a severely disabled person (from Integration Office), and an employee on maternity/parental leave (from Labor 
Inspectorate); and, (2) also under the Dutch Labor Law, the employer needs the approval of the Centre for Work 
and Income (CWI) when dismissing one or more redundant employees (World Bank Doing Business 2009 
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unless the right to the unemployment benefit has been ensured. In the Moldovan Labor Code, 
the list of protected employees includes 12 categories of individuals, in the Latvian Labor 
Law, ten categories, and in the Ukrainian Labor Code, nine categories (Annex Table A12). 
Among the protected categories in Latvia are individuals whose family members do not have 
a regular income, even though employers have no means to objectively verify the income 
status of the families of their employees.  
Furthermore, a common group of protected categories of workers is a pregnant employee, a 
female employee on maternity leave, a female or male employee on parental leave, a single 
female or male employee caring for a child younger than three years of age, or an employee 
who personally cares for a close relative with severe disability (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, etc.). Older workers (within two to five years from pension entitlement depending 
on the country) are protected by an added burden on the employer to justify the dismissal: a 
particularly warranted reason has to be the ground of such dismissals.  
Elected trade union officials have also been a traditionally protected category: their ordinary 
dismissal requires the consent of the superior trade union organ. In fact, the Kyrgyz Labor 
Code stipulates that even the dismissal of workers – members of trade union organizations – 
is not allowed without the consent of the worker’s organization if the dismissal is associated 
with staff reduction due to reorganization of the firm, insufficient qualification of the worker 
or for disciplinary reasons. While advance notification of terminations is an appropriate 
option by the standards of industrialized countries, the possibility of a trade union veto is a 
substantial and unusual restriction on the right of the employer to adjust workforce size. 
Where similar entitlements exist, and especially noted in CIS states, it is known that prior to 
expected redundancies, as few as two workers in  a  firm  can form a new trade union 
organization and de facto  block any redundancies in the company (in Kyrgyzstan, three 
workers would be sufficient to form a new trade unions organization). 
In the ECA region, priority rules applying to redundancies are stipulated in labor laws in the 
Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan FYR Macedonia and Serbia. In the EU15, priority rules apply to redundancy 
dismissals or layoffs in seven countries. 
In the end, the employer especially in SMEs may have no other choice than to keep the 
protected individuals on the job and perhaps let some of the best professionals go. Employers 
must be reasonably free to choose the most suitable employees without state direction or 
interference. These priority rules for dismissals may conflict with the economic needs of the 
company.   
In  the  labor laws of several ECA countries, restrictions or obligations on rehiring are 
stipulated. In Croatia, the law states that the employer who has given notice to a worker for 
economic, technological or organizational reasons must not employ another worker in the 
same job for the following six months. In Macedonia, if the employer terminates the 
employment contract due to business reasons, the employer may not employ a worker to 
perform the same job with the same professional training and occupation within one year 
from the date of termination of the labor relation. If prior to the expiration of the period a 
need occurs to carry out the same work, the employee who was previously terminated shall 
have the priority to conclude the employment contract. 64 
Overall, priority rules  applying to re-employment are valid in Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia,  FYR Macedonia, Poland,  Romania,  Slovenia, Serbia and 
Ukraine (World Bank 2008). 
Seven out of the EU15 countries have legal provisions on priority rules for re-employment as 
well. For example, in Finland,  if the employer within nine months after a  collective 
termination needs manpower for similar work, the employer should inquire at the local labor 
office as to whether any such former employees are seeking work. In Italy, with regards to 
collective dismissals, the former employees have a priority right within a period of six 
months from the dismissal. In the Netherlands, the government agency that issues a dismissal 
permit ("CWI") may impose the condition on the issuance of its permit - only in case of a 
dismissal based on business economic reasons - that the employer may not hire someone else 
for the same activities of the dismissed employee within 26 weeks after issuing the dismissal 
permit, before the employer has offered such position to the dismissed employee. Although 
in Germany and Spain there is no obligation for re-hiring in general, some collective 
agreements do have provisions. 
Labor laws may discourage employers from dismissing workers when it would be socially 
preferable to redeploy them within the firm, thereby bringing the profitability criterion into 
closer correspondence with social efficiency. However, doing so may result in significant 
implicit costs, such as the costs of keeping non-productive workers or of remaining 
overstaffed for significant periods of time following reductions in demand (OECD 2004). In 
some ECA countries, such as in Ukraine, concurrently with the warning of disengagement 
due to changes in the organization of production and labor, the employer is obliged to first 
offer the employee a different job at the same enterprise, organization or institution; where 
another job is not available, the employer may dismiss the employee. According to the World 
Bank Doing Business 2009 database, only Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Georgia and Hungary have no retraining or reassignment obligation before an employer can 
make a worker redundant. 
A retraining or reassignment obligation is stipulated in the labor law of most EU15 countries 
as well, namely in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, the obligation is not established by statute but in 
case law, and the government agency that issues the dismissal permit (CWI) will generally 
check for such possibilities. The United Kingdom has a similar situation  whereby  the 
employer, though not obliged, does have to consider suitable alternative employment. 
As a rule, the employer is also not allowed to terminate a contract of employment during an 
employee’s leave, including annual, maternity, parental, sick leave, unpaid or other leave, or 
during other justified absences from work. The employees themselves can manipulate this by 
taking a lengthy leave of absence while contract termination seems imminent. 
Overall, enterprise restrictions on terminations in many ECA countries are considerable. The 
countries should consider eliminating or limiting some of these restrictions. Such a reform 
would give employers greater flexibility in responding to market fluctuations through their 
workforce. Employers must have reasonable freedom to dismiss employees.  If not, they will 
be reluctant to hire them and will be more inclined to operate in the informal sector. 65 
6.3.  Advance Notice 
Advance notice is a means to give workers ample warning of future layoffs and thus facilitate 
job search. While the employee has no obligation to give a reason for notice of termination, 
the employer has to justify the cause for contract termination according to the law. If an 
employer wants a rapid reduction in its workforce, then both severance pay and notice pay 
for period must be paid. In that case, notice payments look much like severance payments. 
The ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation No. 166 from 1982 suggests that: (i) 
the employer should notify a worker in writing of a decision to terminate his employment, 
and that (ii) a worker who has been notified of termination of employment or whose 
employment has been terminated should be entitled to receive, on request, a written 
statement from his employer of the reason or reasons for the termination.  
While severance pay can serve to smooth the income of workers in the face of labor market 
risks, notice periods have more comprehensive insurance properties (Pissarides 2001).  When 
jobs are threatened by a negative productivity shock and become unprofitable, the existence 
of a notice period de facto extends their duration. The period of notice is obviously a cost-
factor for employers, especially when multiple employees have to be dismissed.  
Most labor laws in the ECA region (except Georgia and Serbia) require employers to give 
advance notice before terminating workers and to pay workers dismissed without adequate 
notice the salary that they would have received in the notice period. Different legal solutions, 
however, address  the  advance notice provisions  in  the various countries. In seven ECA 
countries (e.g.,  Hungary, Poland  and  Slovakia), the length of notice has been made 
conditional on the period spent with the same employer, from one month up to 60 days in 
Hungary and from two weeks up to three months in Poland and Croatia (Annex Table A13). 
In most countries, the notice period is fixed with no regard to job tenure at the particular 
employer. Bosnia and Herzegovina allot not less than 14 days and in Romania, 15 days; 
Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Montenegro, allocate one month; and in the rest of the 
countries, it is two months. 
In some countries, the advance notice period is differentiated according to social criteria. In 
Lithuania, it is typically two months but four months if the redundant worker is entitled to the 
full old-age pension in not more than five years, and also for persons less than 18 years of 
age, disabled persons and employees raising children under 14 years of age. In Croatia, given 
the difficulties in finding a new job for older workers, the notice period is extended by two 
weeks if the worker has reached 50 years of age and by one month if the worker has reached 
55 years of age. Furthermore, notice due to business or personal reasons is allowed in Croatia 
only if the employer cannot train or qualify the worker for work at another job, or if the 
circumstances are such that it is not reasonable to expect the employer to train or qualify the 
worker for work at another job. 
In FYR Macedonia, the notice period is extended in case of mass redundancies:  where more 
than 150 employees, or alternatively, not less than five percent of the total number of 
employees with the employer prior to termination of the labor relation, have experienced 
termination of contracts the duration is extended from one to two months. 66 
The ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation No. 166 suggests that the worker 
should, for the purpose of seeking other employment, be entitled to a reasonable amount of 
time off without loss of pay, taken at times that are convenient to both parties. This is the 
practice in many ECA countries. In Poland, within a minimum two week period of notice, the 
worker has the right to take two to three days leave from work for the purpose of seeking 
new employment depending on the duration of the notice period. In Lithuania, this length of 
time should not be less than ten percent of the employee’s rate of working time during the 
term of notice. Time off from work shall be granted in accordance with the procedure agreed 
between the employee and the employer. In the Republika Srpska, during the notice period, 
the employer shall enable the worker to take a day off a week to seek another job. In Croatia 
and Montenegro, during the notice period, the worker has the right to be absent from work 
not less than four hours per week with salary compensation, for the purpose of seeking new 
employment. 
The  EU15 countries have quite different practices regarding advance notice but most 
countries have more generous entitlements in this regard. For example, a worker with 20 
years of service at the employer can receive a notice varying from 30 calendar days in Spain, 
eight weeks in Ireland, and two months in Portugal and France but up to six months in 
Finland, Germany and Sweden. In several countries, a different notice period is used for 
white collar and blue collar workers: In Austria, it is four months for white collar worker but 
only two weeks for blue collar worker, and in Belgium, 65 weeks for white-collars, and 16 
weeks for blue-collars (for 20 years of service). In Greece, for a blue-collar worker paid on a 
daily basis, it is possible to dismiss without a notice but with a severance of 120 days, or with 
notice of 120 days plus 60 days severance. For a white-collar worker, it is possible to dismiss 
without a notice (with a severance of 16 months) or with a notice of 16 months plus 8 months 
severance pay (Table 6.2). 
Table 11:  Mandated Notice Period and Severance Pay for Redundancy Dismissal after 20 
Years of Continuous Employment in EU15 Countries (2007/08) 
  Notice period for redundancy 
dismissal after 20 years of 
continuous employment 
Severance pay for redundancy 
dismissal after 20 years of 
continuous employment (wages 
for) 
Austria  2 weeks  N/A 
Belgium  16 weeks  N/A 
Denmark  N/A  N/A 
Finland  6 months  N/A 
France  2 months  5.3 months 
Germany  6 months  10 months 
Greece  N/A  120 business days 
Ireland  8 weeks  16.4 weeks 
Italy  2.5 months  N/A 
Luxembourg  6 months  3 months 
Netherlands  4 months  N/A 
Portugal  60 calendar days  20 months 
Spain  30 calendar days  12 months 
Sweden  6 months  N/A 
United Kingdom  12 weeks  2.3 months 
Note: firm and worker characteristics by Doing Business criteria. 67 
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2009 database 
 
In some EU15 countries, the notice period is differentiated according to job tenure. In the 
United Kingdom, notice period is one week for each year of service, with a cap of 12 weeks. 
In Germany, the notice period equals one month if employment in the business or the 
company has persisted for two years, to up to seven months if employment has persisted over 
20 years. Overall, for the cost of a notice period not to affect the hiring behavior of firms, 
especially if job search activates are to be paid, employees may have to accept lower wages. 
6.4.  Severance Pay 
High severance pay and a lengthy notice period makes layoffs more costly and the process 
more difficult for employers. Enterprise management should thus be forced to look for 
alternative solutions to dismissals, such as the enhancement of the functional flexibility of 
personnel through better human development policy and stronger motivation of workers in 
the framework of, for example, enterprise restructuring, technological upgrading and 
improved marketing. 
By discouraging firing, employment protection legislation (EPL) may slow down adjustment 
to shocks and impede the reallocation of labor, with potentially negative implications for 
productivity growth and adaptation to technological change. At the same time,  generous 
severance pay imposes additional costs on employers and thus hinders job creation, and leads 
to informality in developing countries. On the other hand, countries with stringent dismissal 
regulations tend to have more durable or stable jobs (Young 2003). 
Studies also show that high severance pay contributes to part-time employment, self-
employment and informality. There is also mounting evidence that severance pay reduces 
inflows to and outflows from unemployment. By doing so, it contributes to longer 
unemployment spells that is, a stagnant unemployment pool (For a summary of discussions, 
see OECD 2004 and 1999).
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In all EU15 countries, the state assumes a large part of the risk through income support in the 
case of unemployment (unemployment benefits) and measures to help workers find a new 
job (active labor market policies). In most ECA countries, however, the state pays very little 
unemployment benefits, placing income support on the employer through high severance 
payments. By the available data, on average in the region only one fifth of the unemployed 
receive unemployment benefits.  (Brusentsev and Vroman 2008). In June 2009, in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 2 percent of the registered unemployed received 
unemployment benefits; in Kazakhstan, 3 percent (March 2009; in Kazakhstan, in addition, 
around 20,000 registered unemployed, or one-fourth of the total, receive targeted social 
assistance); in Azerbaijan, 7 percent; in Moldova, 16 percent; and in Armenia, 23 percent. In 
Tajikistan in August 2009, only 385 registered unemployed out of 45,000 received the 
benefit.  The reason is that long-term unemployed dominate among the registered 
unemployed who have exhausted their entitlement, or many first-time job seekers do not 
 
                                                        
47 See also Addison and Teixeira (2003) for a review of both theoretical and empirical effects of potential 
efficiency gains and losses associated with severance pay. 68 
have a sufficient insurance record to claim the benefit.  There is no unemployment benefit 
system in Georgia. 
State unemployment benefits are pooled resources that are a form of social insurance, 
generally financed by payroll taxes. They reduce the burden for firms in bad times.  By 
provisioning a fund, resources are accumulated in good times and made available in bad 
times. Mandatory severance pay comes from a single employer and therefore has no 
insurance pooling. 
While transition countries all mandate severance pay, the countries differ in important 
details. These include the extent of coverage, eligibility conditions, generosity of benefits and 
whether benefits should vary with seniority.
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Some countries require minimum years of seniority before a worker is entitled to severance 




A distinguishing feature of severance-pay laws is whether the benefits do or do not vary with 
the seniority of the terminated worker. Ten countries in the region use a sliding scale 
connected to years of employment, and 15 countries use flat benefits in the amount from one 
to up to six monthly wages (Annex Table A13). By design, a sliding-scale country is more 
generous to its more senior workers than its less senior workers. In general, however, sliding-
scale countries mandate more generous benefits overall than do fixed-benefit countries.  Also 
workers with shorter tenure (young, females) are cheaper to dismiss and are expected to 
suffer higher dismissal probabilities in downturns (Boeri et al. 2008). 
 A few countries in the region—including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia—also explicitly state that severance pay is not required when employment relations 
transfer to a new employer. 
The most generous seniority-related benefit is in Albania where longevity of service reaps 
rewards: the severance formula is 15 days of wages for each complete service year. Besides, 
Albania is among the ECA countries with the lengthiest duration of unemployment benefits – 
up to 12 months depending on the service record. 
The most generous flat rate severance pay in the region is in Montenegro where  each 
redundant worker is entitled to six months of pay with no regard to job tenure. Moreover, the 
Labor Law stipulates that the employer is obliged to pay severance to a disabled employee 
who is proclaimed redundant: a minimum of 24 average wages if the disability is caused by 
injury outside the workplace or illness, and a minimum of 36 average wages if the disability 
is caused by injury at work or an illness stemming from the profession. 
By making the  dismissal of disabled employees for economic reasons more difficult or 
costly, these employment protection rules are intended to increase job security.
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48 Severance payments in the late 1990s/early 2000s in 18 ECA countries are also discussed by Schwab 2004. 
  However, 
49 The Czech Republic and Slovakia are among only seven OECD countries that have severance pay for 
workers with less than one year of service (two months’ pay in the Slovak Republic and three months’ pay in 
the Czech Republic (OECD 2008a). 
50 It is estimated that there are around 12,000 disabled workers in the formal sector, or around 11 percent of 
workforce in Montenegro. 69 
the tradeoff is that employers may be reluctant to hire – especially older workers with a 
higher risk of becoming disabled due to illness – if constraints inhibit future dismissal for 
reasons related to business. As a result, we can expect that these measures will lengthen job 
tenure and reduce turnover of this group of workers but will have a negative effect on new 
hiring of regular employees at risk of disability. The very high rate of inactivity for older 
workers (55-64 years of age) of 68.6 percent, according to the 2005 LFS, reflects the fact that 
early retirement has been chosen as an instrument to remove older workers from the labor 
market. 
Alternatively, supplementary severance payments to this group of workers can be covered 
from the unemployment insurance fund, or from special budgetary allocations. Also, the 
government may consider other strategies for developing efficient activation programs for 
groups with limited work capacity, such as improving their job-search skills, vocational 
rehabilitation, subsidies to private employment, sheltered employment or adaptation of the 
workplace and post-employment counseling. 
In several countries, workers are also entitled to severance pay for a variety of other 
dismissals.  These other dismissals are generally for individual reasons, such as when the 
worker proves incompetent for the position or is disabled by health reasons—reasons perhaps 
due more to the worker than the employer.  Other dismissals can arise for a variety of reasons 
spelled out in the statutes, including reinstating a previous worker in the position or the 
worker quitting for military service.  Countries mandating severance pay in these situations 
include Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine.
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In the Czech Republic, the regular severance pay of three months can be extended to 12 
months if the redundant individual is not allowed to work due to an industrial injury or 
occupational disease. In Poland, only the employee who is eligible for disability or an old-
age pension, and whose employment relationship expired as a result of  retirement or 
pensioning, is entitled to severance pay in the amount of one monthly remuneration. In 
Romania, severance pay is negotiated through the collective labor contracts and varies across 
the industries. 
 
In three of these countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Kazakhstan), workers get the same level of 
severance pay regardless of the reason of dismissal.  In the other five countries, however, the 
severance pay varies with the type of dismissal. For example, Russia mandates only two 
weeks of severance pay for dismissals for personal reasons while severance associated with 
layoffs varies from one to three monthly wages (Schwab 2004). 
In most CIS states, the duration of severance pay is conditional to finding a new job and/or 
registration at the employment service within a certain period of time. For example, in 
Russia, typically severance pay equals one average monthly wages. However, his or her 
average monthly wages are preserved for the period of taking up a job but not more than for 
two months from the date of dismissal (considering also a dismissal allowance). In 
exceptional cases, the average monthly wages are preserved for the employee during the third 
month from the date of dismissal on the basis of the decision made by the employment 
agency providing that the employee applied to the employment agency within two weeks 
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after dismissal but was not placed in a job. In Kyrgyzstan, the pay is normally not less than 
two monthly wages but can be extended for the period of up to three months if he or she is 
still looking for another job and in 10 days after contract termination the person registers 
himself at the state employment service. 
According the World Bank Doing Business 2009 database employment indicators, severance 
pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of employment is the most generous in Albania, 
42.9 weeks of pay, followed by 28.9 weeks of pay in Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The lowest severance is in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine one month 
of pay. As noted, there is no mandatory severance in Poland and in Romania where it is 
established by collective agreements. 
The EU15 countries offer various experiences in regard to severance pay. In practice, seven 
EU15 countries require employers to make severance payments to eligible dismissed 
workers, and eight countries leave this to collective agreements and private contracting.  
Countries without mandatory severance pay include Austria, Belgium, Denmark (blue-collar 
workers), Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. In many of these countries, 
though, employers customarily give severance pay to dismissed workers even when not 
required to do so by law. In the Netherlands, courts may grant severance pay. 
In Germany, there is no compulsory severance payment. However, a voluntary severance 
offer  by the  employer,  in order to avoid a  claim  being filed in the  labor court by the 
employee, must be calculated on the basis of a half-month salary per each year of service. In 
the case of a mass redundancy, the severance arrangements must be negotiated with the 
Works Council of the company under codetermination provisions in the law. The size of 
severance allotments is not established by law; yet, it is normally between 40 percent and 150 
percent of the employee’s last monthly gross compensation per year of employment. 
In Austria, workers who started their jobs before the beginning of 2003 had two options: (i) a 
system where the employer makes a 1.53 percent contribution to a fund from which they may 
withdraw if made redundant after employment of at least 36 months; (ii) standard severance 
pay; the mandated amount for a worker, for example, with 20 years of service being nine 
months of pay. Workers who started their jobs after the beginning of 2003 no longer have the 
second option. 
In Italy, under the provisions of the Civil Code, employers must deposit the equivalent of the 
employee's salary divided by 13.5 in a special fund (called the TFR) on an ongoing basis 
over the course of the employee's employment.  The amount accumulated is payable to the 
employee in the event of redundancy dismissal.  The employer does not have to pay any 
additional severance payment at the time of redundancy dismissal. 
Several EU15 countries also use sliding scale. In France, severance is one fifth of monthly 
wages for each of first 10 years of service, and one third of monthly wages for each year 
beyond 10 years of service. In Ireland, it is one week of salary plus two weeks of salary for 
each year of service. A week's pay is capped at €600.  The employer is eligible for a rebate of 
60 percent of the required payment from the state redundancy fund. 71 
In sum, although mandatory severance payments in most ECA countries are relatively 
modest, severance obligations may still be a major problem in the sense that many firms that 
need to restructure may be cash strapped and have no funds for severance payments. 
6.5.  Special Funds for Severance Pay 
In order to ease the burden of individual employers associated with enterprise restructuring 
and downsizing, several ECA countries have established special funds or set aside allocations 
from the existing funds to finance dismissal costs. A few examples follow. 
In Estonia, according to the Unemployment Insurance Act, upon collective termination of 
employment contracts, an employee has the right to receive a benefit from the unemployment 
fund as follows: (i) one month’s average wages of the employee, if the employee has been 
continuously employed by or in the service of the employer for up to 5 years; (ii) 1.5 times 
one month’s average wages of the employee, if the employee has been continuously 
employed by or in the service of the employer for 5 to 10 years; and (iii) in the amount of 
two months’ average wages of the employee, if the employee has been continuously 
employed by or in the service of the employer for over 10 years. A benefit upon termination 
of an employment contract that  is paid by the employer pursuant to the Employment 
Contracts Act or a benefit upon release from service that is paid pursuant to the Public 
Service Act should be reduced by the amount of the benefit paid from the unemployment 
fund. 
In Romania, the establishment of a guarantee fund for the payment of wage debts was 
introduced into the Labor Code of 2003. The guarantee fund is supported mainly by   
employer contributions. All employers are obliged to contribute to the guarantee fund by 
paying a monthly contribution of 0.25 percent of the payroll. The guarantee fund is used for 
paying wage debts owed by the employer in case of insolvency –  unpaid salaries, 
compensations for paid leave the employees did not take, compensations owed to the 
employees according to the individual employment contracts and collective labor agreements 
in case of termination of employment relationships, in case of occurrence of work accidents 
or professional diseases, and other indemnities the employers are obliged to pay to the 
employees in case of temporary interruption of activity. The total amount paid from the 
guarantee fund shall not exceed three average monthly gross salaries at the national level in 
case of each employee. Where the insolvency procedure is closed due to the fact that an 
employer’s activity has been restored to normality, the employer is obliged to reimburse the 
guarantee fund the amounts paid to the employees within six months. The guarantee fund is 
administrated by the National Employment Agency. 
A similar wage guarantee fund was established in Hungary already in 1994. The relevant act 
stipulates that the support provided for the firm, taking into account the average payroll of all 
employees in the firm, cannot be more than the five times the average gross monthly salary 
of the second preceding year. Importantly, the fund provides only loans to the firms for 
relevant payments. The Wage Guarantee Fund is a part of the Labor Market Fund. 72 
Transition reforms are associated with mass privatization, restructuring, downsizing or 
closure of a number of enterprises. In the short term,  this process entails major labor 
displacement. These reforms require sufficient public resources to provide a safety net that 
offers adequate protection against temporary and permanent reduction in income of laid-off 
workers and their families. Potential investors are generally reluctant to bid for companies 
where they would face the prospect of laying off large parts of the workforce in order to 
become profitable. Therefore, the government may become involved in designing, financing 
and administering the divestiture process prior to and during privatization and restructuring.
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Governments in several ECA countries have established special funds to support labor 
redeployment in particular sectors, such as the coal mining sector in Poland, or nationwide. 
The most elaborate government Social Program for the employed whose employment 
terminates in the process of restructuring of enterprises and preparation for privatization, 
bankruptcy and liquidation was adopted in Serbia in March 2002.
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In July 2005, the government adopted a revised version of the social program. The adjusted 
program slightly changed the benefit formula for extended severance payments, and basically 
offered three options to redundant workers:
 Between 2002 and 2006 
alone, the Social Program provided support in financing redundancy costs to around 155,000 
redundant workers in 320 enterprises.  
54
•  Remuneration amounting to 10 average gross wages in the industry sector for 
employees with more than 10 years of insurance record; 
 
•  Remuneration amounting to Euro 100 per year of service in Dinar equivalent; or 
•  Severance pay according to the Labor Law. 
Redundant workers and employees are entitled to additional services provided by the 
National Employment Service or former enterprise, such as training and retraining programs, 
self-employment assistance, counseling and training for business start-ups, reassignment to 
other jobs, etc. 
As part of the World Bank/DFID-sponsored Employment Promotion Project, in 2004-2006 
three waves of tracer surveys of redundant workers were conducted in four locations in 
Serbia that provided important insights to the government social program and labor aspects 
of enterprise restructuring in general. Most former employees used severance to pay off debts 
and cover consumption needs: 84 percent of the funds received was spent on consumption 
expenditures (of which 13 percent for purchases of durable goods), followed by investments, 
                                                        
52 There are basically three options for labor redeployment: (a) let the new investor deal with them; (b) have the 
government assist prior to the sale; or (c) combine both approaches.  All have their advantages and 
disadvantages, both in terms of the financial gains to the government and in terms of the process of labor 
shedding and its social mitigation. 
53  Officially the Program for Resolving Redundancy in the Process of Rationalization Restructuring and 
Preparation for Privatization. 
54 The benefits offered through the social program in Serbia are in line with relevant entitlements in many other 
countries in the region with specially designed severance programs for particular groups of workers.  For the 
programs with additional training benefits and severance payment for each redundant worker,  the Czech 
Republic spent US$2000 per beneficiary, US$2500 in Hungary and US$3700 in Poland (DFID 2002). 73 
11 percent, and savings, 5  percent. Given that many workers had low wages prior to 
redundancy, expenditures of received monies on daily consumption might be the first 
priority. Only 10 percent of investment expenditures were spent on education and training, 
and among younger workers, 20 percent of relevant spending. Highly educated employees 
and workers invested more on education thus enhancing their competitive edge in the labor 
market. 
As for the current labor market status, the largest number of displaced workers who were 
surveyed during the third wave (e.g., two to three years after being made redundant) and who 
were beneficiaries of the social program remained unemployed (64 percent). A number of 
them (5 percent) have remained out of the labor market, whereas 31 percent found new 
employment. By their job profile, most displaced workers were blue-collar workers with 
narrowly specialized skills. This makes their redeployment a more challenging task. 
Unemployment rates are also especially high in Serbia, and the number of vacancies is 
limited. Nevertheless, albeit smoothing consumption and supporting family incomes, these 
extended severance payments were not particularly effective in facilitating job placement of 
redundant workers. 
6.6.  Collective Redundancies 
According to the ILO Termination of Employment Convention No. 158, when the employer 
contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar 
nature, the employer shall provide the workers' representatives concerned in good time with 
relevant information including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number and 
categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations are 
intended to be carried out. The Convention specifically states that the applicability of this 
paragraph may be limited to cases in which the number of workers whose termination of 
employment is contemplated is at least a specified number or percentage of the workforce. 
Also the workers' representatives concerned, as early as possible, should be given an 
opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken to avert or to minimize the terminations 
and measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned 
such as finding alternative employment. 
Social guarantees associated with collective redundancies are reflected in the Council 
Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies. The Directive restricts the employer’s right to dismiss its 
employees in order to assure adequate preparation and participation for those affected. 
The Directive determines the criteria for collective redundancy as follows: “Collective 
redundancies” means dismissals effected by an employer for one or more reasons not related 
to the individual workers concerned where, according to the choice of the Member States, the 
number of redundancies is either, over a period of 30 days: 
•  at least 10 in establishments normally employing more than 20 and less than 100 
workers; 74 
•  at least 10 percent of the number of workers in establishments normally employing at 
least 100 but less than 300 workers; 
•  at least 30 in establishments normally employing 300 workers or more; 
•  or, over a period of 90 days, at least 20, whatever the number of workers normally 
employed in the establishments in question. 
By the Directive, where an employer is contemplating collective redundancies, consultations 
with the workers' representatives should begin in good time with a view to reaching an 
agreement. These consultations should, at least, cover ways and means of avoiding collective 
redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected, and of mitigating the 
consequences by recourse to accompanying social measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for 
redeploying or retraining workers made redundant. To enable workers' representatives to 
make constructive proposals, the employers should in good time during the course of the 
consultations submit detailed information about the upcoming redundancies. Employers 
should also notify the competent public authority in writing of any projected collective 
redundancies. 
Criteria for collective redundancies are important since these thresholds instigate special 
procedures associated with mass layoffs. However, employers in some countries attempt to 
carry out foreseeable redundancies in such a way that the applicable provisions governing 
collective redundancies can be avoided. In general, this is accomplished by discharging a 
correspondingly smaller number of employees over a longer period of time for economic 
reasons. The shorter the period for counting the redundancies to be reckoned as collective 
redundancy, the easier this becomes. 
The factors, such as “number of redundancies”, “size of the enterprise” and the time period in 
which the redundancies are named as criteria in all ECA countries. While EU10 countries 
have largely transposed the Council Directive 98/59/EC21 into the national legislation, most 
other countries have utilized their own definitions. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which has relatively few large enterprises, considers collective redundancy if an employer 
employing over 15 employees has an intention to cancel employment contracts over a six 
month period to at least 5 employees. In Croatia, layoffs are considered collective if at least 
20 labor contracts are being terminated in the period of 90 days (Annex Table A14). 
In EU15 countries, the lowest values are in Portugal where more than two redundancies 
within three months in smaller enterprises with up to 50 employees are already considered as 
collective redundancies.
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55  Implementation arrangements regarding collective redundancies in EU15 countries see: 
  The numerical thresholds are significantly higher in other 
countries. A distinction is usually made in the three segments small, medium and large 
enterprises (establishments). There are often no regulations governing collective 
redundancies in establishments with less than 20 employees. The time period for  the 
redundancies also differs significantly. A 30 day rule applies in most countries (Austria, 
Denmark,  Germany  and  Ireland,), but the period is considerably longer in others. Some 
specify a period of 90 days (Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and other countries go 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/labour_law/docs/01_collectivereds_implreport_en.pdf. 75 
even further, like Italy, for example, where a period of 120 days is decisive for one type of 
collective redundancy. 
When the employer plans to execute collective dismissals from work, he/she is obliged to 
inform a third party, typically the employees’ organization recognized as the representative 
of the employees. According to the World Bank Doing Business 2009 database, there is no 
such requirement before terminating a group of 25 redundant but nonunionized workers 
except in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. However, in Azerbaijan, the advice and prior 
agreement by trade unions is required if the dismissed worker is a member of the trade union. 
In all EU15 countries, the companies must inform the responsible state labor institutions 
before notifying dismissals. In several countries, relevant authorities should not only be 
notified but also consulted, such as in Austria, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal.  
These entities are the labor administrations in most cases. But the rights of state entities to be 
included in the consultation process are weak everywhere. By their very nature, the state 
entities have the task of monitoring compliance with the rules for restructuring processes in 
the respective country and also the subsequent pertaining sanction rights. 
Approval of the collective redundancy by the third party is required only in Greece, the 
Netherlands and Spain. For example, in Greece the employer and the employees' 
representatives must meet in order to reach an agreement. If this is not successful within 20 
days, the consultation can be extended for 20 more days by decision of the Prefect or the 
Minister of Labor and Employment. In case a common solution is not reached, it is up to the 
Prefect or the Minister of Labor to accept or reject the demand for collective dismissals 
within ten days.  
In many ECA countries, such as in Romania and also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in addition 
to notification and consultations, the employer is obliged to prepare a program of measures 
aimed at mitigating the impact of mass layoffs and to  discuss this with employees’ 
representatives. In Croatia, a redundancy social security plan must state: 
•  Reasons why the redundancies occurred; 
•  Possibility of introducing changes in technology and organization of work in order to 
provide work for redundant employees; 
•  Possibility of assigning the worker to another job; 
•  Possibility of finding employment with other employers; 
•  Possibility of retraining or additional training for workers;  
•  Possibility of reducing working hours. 
In addition, labor laws in several ECA countries stipulate re-employment guarantees to 
employees made redundant as a result of mass layoffs. In Romania, the employer who 
initiated collective dismissals cannot employ new people for the positions of the employees 
dismissed for a period of 12 months from the date of their dismissal. Also by the labor law in 
Republica Srpska, if within a year after the termination of employment contract to former 76 
employees, the employer intends to conclude contracts of employment with a number of 
employees that are required to have qualifications similar to the former employees, the jobs 
shall be offered to the former employees first. 
Overall, these provisions become especially acute at times of an economic depression when 
mass layoffs become a reality for many. 77 
Conclusion 
This study focuses  on internationally accepted labor standards and norms governing the 
individual employment contract, and practices in labor legislation in ECA countries. Despite 
similar origin of country labor laws, current set of regulations in the region provides a wide 
array of legal solutions. The minimum content of the employment contract in most ECA 
countries coincides, and even goes beyond, the requirements of the ILO Conventions, the 
European Social Charter, or EU Directives even in the non-signatories countries of relevant 
treaties. 
In this decade of the 2000s, the second generation of reforms in labor legislation are being 
carried out in many ECA countries. Ten countries became a member of the European Union, 
which demanded the effort of transposing the whole acquis communautaire into the national 
labor law. Other countries are making adjustments in regulatory framework that reduce and 
eliminate unnecessary rigidities in order to ensure that the benefits to enterprises entering the 
formal sector outweigh the costs of working within the rules of the formal economy. Overall, 
reform of national employment protection legislation in the region in the last two decades has 
focused on easing existing regulation to facilitate more contractual diversity. 
Best practices indicate that employment protection legislation could be restricted to focus on 
core and enforceable labor standards and provide a greater role for trade unions and 
employers’ associations to determine employment relations through collective bargaining 
with the aim to find the balance between flexibility and security. On the other hand, the role 
of labor legislation as a safeguard for workers is much more essential in ECA than, for 
example, in EU15 countries where the majority of workers are somehow covered by 
collective arrangements. 
Recent changes in the world of work have created a demand for a wider variety of 
employment contracts. Fixed-term contracts, part-time contracts, on-call contracts, zero-hour 
contracts, contracts for workers hired through temporary employment agencies, freelance 
contracts, etc., have become an established feature of modern labor markets. Not 
surprisingly, recent reforms in labor legislation in the region are also largely associated with 
easing the recourse to temporary forms of employment while leaving existing provisions for 
regular or permanent contracts practically unaltered. 
Atypical work can provide considerable economic and social benefits. It opens up the labor 
market to people for whom full-time employment is unfeasible or unattractive. It also 
provides more flexibility, mobility and dynamism to the labor market, which in turn may 
contribute to an innovative culture, improved economic performance and efficiency. 
Despite the fact that part-time work provides flexibility to the worker that allows him or her 
to combine a paid job with care activities within the household and those legal provisions 
exist, sometimes even the same regulations applying to part-time employees, as to full-time 
employees, in the ECA region relevant work arrangements are not so common. The main 
reason for working part-time is lack of work, or the unavailability of full-time jobs. 78 
Employees also cannot afford to work part-time because of low wage levels in the region, 
and because associated costs in relation to earnings are too high. 
One of the commonly used indicators of flexible arrangements in labor relations is also 
regulation of overtime work. The labor law in all countries establishes standard working time 
duration as not exceeding 40 hours per week, but overtime provisions and pay premiums 
vary significantly. While in Ukraine, an employee cannot even agree to overtime without 
exceptional circumstances, in Azerbaijan the law does not regulate overtime at all. 
As far as minimum wage policies are concerned, international evidence demonstrates that if 
the minimum wage is set at a moderate level then it is not likely to entail substantial 
employment losses.  At the same time, minimum wages tend to have only a limited and often 
transitory impact on the earnings of low wage workers. However, if minimum wages (in 
relation to the average wage) are set too high, they can be counterproductive. Higher 
minimum wages can have a non-negligible adverse impact on employment in low wage 
sectors. An important consideration in setting the level of the minimum wage is how it 
interacts with the tax system, since there is evidence that a high minimum wage magnifies 
the negative impact of the labor tax wedge on employment. 
The effect of minimum wages on poverty reduction is relatively weak. The main reason for 
this is that poverty is predominantly associated with non-employment (including 
unemployment), rather than with low wages. Many poor families have no one working and 
many minimum wage workers live in households with above-average incomes.  The effect on 
poverty is larger in those countries where minimum wages in the formal sector have a 
signaling effect for wages in the informal sector. 
If labor market conditions and productivity vary considerably across sectors of the economy 
and regions, a differentiation of the minimum wage can be an effective policy tool. For 
example, in economically depressed regions with high unemployment, the regional minimum 
wage can then be lower than in regions with more buoyant labor markets. Having 
differentiated minimum wages, including lower levels for youth, can possibly reduce the 
negative employment consequences of too high national minimum wages.  
It would also be preferable for the countries in the ECA region to set the minimum wage at a 
lower level and enforce it effectively. This is a more efficient and equitable approach than 
setting the minimum wage at a higher level but with weak or selective enforcement. 
Low birth rates and other factors have triggered additional protective measures in labor laws 
of many ECA countries. In particular, various family leave entitlements have been introduced 
or extended in a number of countries; thus, having positive implications for the care of 
children, as well as for encouraging entry into the labor market and enabling people to 
remain at work. 
However, extended maternity and other family leave entitlements can potentially adversely 
affect women’s but also men’s labor market participation if the father decides to take a 
lengthy parental leave that may reduce their labor market attachment and can lead to actual 
or perceived erosion of skills. In particular, employers may be reluctant to hire or promote 
women of child-bearing age since the employers may associate indirect costs (e.g., 79 
replacement workers) with maternity leave, particularly if the leave is long. Such measures 
should be combined with better access to childcare facilities. 
An important aspect of labor market flexibility is adjustments to be made in working time 
and/or wages if an enterprise experiences financial difficulties due to low demand, seasonal 
factors and so on. It reflects in part a use of internal flexibility (e.g., flexible working-time 
arrangements, short-time working and temporary suspension of production), which appears 
to have prevented significant labor reductions, especially in manufacturing, by allowing 
firms to use various means of internal adjustment rather than reduce their workforce. In the 
case of production stoppages or reduction in output, wage flexibility could also be an 
alternative to layoffs.  
In most ECA countries the employers can use administrative leaves, paid or unpaid, 
temporary internal or external transfer of workers to another job or forced part-time work to 
offset the costs and to adjust to economic difficulties. Especially in  times of economic 
downturn, these provisions may limit mass redundancies in the economy. 
It is important that employers have the right to adjust their workforces to economic and 
technological realities but labor laws usually limit excessive termination conditions. Various 
policy instruments in this area are utilized in this regard, including regulations governing: (i) 
difficulty of dismissal, that is legislative provisions setting conditions under which a 
dismissal is “justified” or “fair”; (ii) procedural inconveniences that the employer may face 
when starting the dismissal process; (iii) advance notice; (iv) severance pay provisions; and 
(v) special provisions governing collective redundancies.  
The countries may consider shifting the focus of employment protection from protecting jobs 
to protecting workers in case of unemployment. Many ECA countries have relatively 
generous severance obligations (which tend to discourage formal employment) while 
counting on an unemployment insurance system that offers limited support for unemployed 
workers because of fairly strict eligibility requirements and relatively low benefit levels. The 
job security provided by employment protection legislation can only partly compensate for 
the weak employability policies in the region. 
In order to make labor legislation more business friendly, the countries may consider 
adopting a lifecycle approach to work,  which may require shifting from the concern to 
protect particular jobs to a framework of support for employment security, including social 
support and active measures to assist workers during periods of transition. 
Overall, labor law in ECA countries tends to be more onerous, particularly with regard to 
dismissal.  Yet,  in only a small portion of cases are contract terminations associated  to 
business decisions. 80 
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ANNEX 
Table A 1:  Main Labor Market Indicators in ECA Countries; Statutory Pensionable Age and Minimum Age of Entry into Employment 
  Employment rate 
(aged 15-59, %), 
2006 
Unemployment 





Statutory pensionable age 
in 2008 
Minimum age of entry 
into employment 
contract** 
         Men  Women   
Czech Republic  72.2  7.1  0.9  61.8  56.3  15 
Hungary  61.7  7.5  1.3  62  61  15 
Poland  58.7  12.2  3.4  65  60  16 
Slovakia  63.4  13.3  3.5  62  56.75  15 
Slovenia  74.1  5.9  2.9  62.5  56  15 
Estonia  76.0  5.9  5.8  63  60.5  15 
Latvia  74.6  6.8  6.1  62  61.5  15 
Lithuania  69.7  5.6  3.8  62.5  60  16 
Bulgaria  63.8  8.9  8.3  63  59.5  16 
Romania  66.1  7.3  0.4  63.25  58.25  16 
Albania  47.4  -  -2.2  65  60  16 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  -  -  -  65  65  15 
Croatia  58.7  10.5  2.5  65  60  15 
Montenegro  45.3  29.6  -  63.5  58.5  15 
Serbia   57.0  20.9  -8.2  63.5  58.5  15 
FYR Macedonia  42.8  36.0  -0.5  64  62  15 
Belarus  67.6  -  -1.7  60  55  16 
Moldova  51.3  7.4  -12.7  62  57  16 
Russian Federation  70.9  7.2  0.2  60  55  16 
Ukraine  68.1  6.8  0.1  60  55  16 
Armenia  50.8  28.1  -4.8  63*  60.5*  16 
Azerbaijan  69.8  6.8  -3.1  62*  57*  15 
Georgia  61.9  13.6  -7.7  65*  60*  16 
Kazakhstan  -  7.8  -  63*  58*  16 
Kyrgyzstan  64.9  8.3  3.1  62*  57.8*  16 92 
Tajikistan  52.7  -  -0.6  63  58  16 
Uzbekistan  63.7  -  -0.2  60*  55*  16 
Note:  * - 2006;   ** - persons who have not reached their legal age for entry into employment contract may work under exceptional circumstances under  a labor contract 
with the consent of one of the parents, adopter or guardian. 
Source: U.S. Social Security Department 2006 and 2008; UNICEF 2008; national authorities. 
Table A 2:  Number of Ratified ILO Conventions, Accepted Paragraphs of European Social Charter, Rank in Employing Workers Index 
 
No. of ratified ILO 
Conventions 
Signed or ratified 
European Social Charter 
Including No. of accepted 
paragraphs* 
Doing Business 2009 rank in 
Employing Workers index**** 
Czech Republic  62  Ratified 1999  52**  59 
Hungary  58  Ratified 1999  41**  84 
Poland  81  Ratified 1997  58**  82 
Slovakia  62  Ratified 1998  60**  83 
Slovenia  73  Ratified 1999  95  158 
Estonia  32  Ratified 2000  79  163 
Latvia  47  Ratified 2002  25**  103 
Lithuania  40  Ratified 2001  86  131 
Bulgaria  82  Ratified 2000  62  60 
Romania  48  Ratified 2000  66  143 
Albania  42  Ratified 2002  64   
Bosnia and Herzegovina  69  Ratified 2008  53  117 
Croatia  57  Ratified 2003  40**  146 
Montenegro  68  Signed 2005***  -  104 
Serbia   69  Signed 2005  -  91 
FYR Macedonia  69  Ratified 2005  41**  125 
Belarus  42  -  -  49 
Moldova  38  Ratified 2001  64  119 
Russian Federation  53  Signed 2000  -  101 
Ukraine  55  Ratified 2006  74  100 
Armenia  29  Ratified 2004  67  54 
Azerbaijan  54  Ratified 2004  47  15 
Georgia  16  Ratified 2005  63  5 93 
Kazakhstan  17  -  -  29 
Kyrgyzstan  53  -  -  81 
Tajikistan  46  -  -  128 
Uzbekistan  12  -  -  76 
Note:   * - out of the revised Charter’s 98 paragraphs.  ** - out of the Charter’s 72 paragraphs.  *** - following to the declaration of independence of 3 June 2006, 
Montenegro declared that it considers itself bound by all the relevant conventions and protocols to which the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro had previously been 
a Party.  **** - rank among 181 countries in the world . 
Source: ILO at  http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm;  Council of Europe at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp; World Bank at http://www.doingbusiness.org. 
Table A 3:   List of the Reviewed National Labor Laws in ECA Countries 
  Title of the law  Adopted  Amended as of 
Czech Republic  Labor Code  2006   
Hungary  Labor Code  1992  2003 
Poland  Labor Code  June 26, 1974  January 2004 
Slovakia  Labor Code  2001  June 2007 
Slovenia  Employment Relationships Act  April 24, 2002   
Estonia  Employment Contracts Act  December 17, 2008   
Latvia  Labor Law  June 20, 2001  September 2006 
Lithuania  Labor Code  June 4, 2002  December 2005 
Bulgaria  Labor Code  April 1, 1986  June 2004 
Romania  Labor Code  February 5, 2003   
Albania  Code of Labor  July 12, 1995  2004 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
Federation of B&H 
Labor Law  1999  July 2000 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
Republica Srbska 
Law on Labor  October 24, 2000  November 2000 
Croatia  Labor  Act  1995  September 2004 
Montenegro  Labor Law  2008   
Serbia   Labor Law  March 2005  June 2005 
FYR Macedonia  Employment Relations Law  July 22, 2005  July 2008 
Belarus  Labor Code  July 26, 1999  December 2007 
Moldova  Labor Code  March 28, 2003   
Russian Federation  Labor Code  December 31, 2001   
Ukraine  Labor Code  December 10, 1971  April 2008 94 
Armenia  Labor Code  November 9, 2004   
Azerbaijan  Labor Code  February 1, 1999  May 2008 
Georgia  Labor Code  May 25, 2006   
Kazakhstan  Labor Law  December 10, 1999   
Kyrgyzstan  Labor Code  August 4, 2004  March 2009 
Tajikistan  Labor Code  May 15, 1997  May 2004 
Uzbekistan  Labor Code  December 21, 1995  September 2005 
Table A 4:  List of ILO Conventions and Recommendations, and EU Legislation Discussed in the Paper 
ILO Conventions and Recommendations  Page 
Employment Relationship Recommendation No. 198, 2006  21 
Minimum Age Convention No. 138, 1973  24 
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention No. 182, 1999  24 
Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131, 1970  39 
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention No. 1, 1919   52 
Forty-Hour Week Convention No. 47, 1935  52, 58 
Part-Time Work Convention No. 175, 1994   56 
Part-Time Work Recommendation No. 182, 1994  56 
Night Work Convention No. 171, 1990  61 
Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) No. 132, 1970  65 
Maternity Protection Convention No. 183, 2000  70 
Maternity Protection Recommendation No. 191, 2000  70 
Termination of Employment Convention No. 158, 1982  80, 95 
Termination of Employment Recommendation No. 166, 1982  82, 86 
EU legislation   
Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing 
and consulting employees in the European Community - Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
on employee representation 
21 
Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer's obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the 
contract or employment relationship 
22 
Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work  25 
82/857/EEC: Council Recommendation of 10 December 1982 on the principles of a Community policy with regard to retirement age  27 
Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and 
CEEP 
29 95 
Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses 
37 
Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organization 
of working time 
52, 58, 
62, 66 
Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP 
and the ETUC  
56 
Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC  73 
Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies   82, 95 
Directive 2002/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 80/987/EEC on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer 
82 
Source: ILO on-line at: http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/lang--en/index.htm;  EU on-line at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/RECH_legislation.do. 
Table A 5:  Characteristics of Employing Workers Indices in ECA Countries 
  Czech R.  Hungary 
A. Difficulty of Hiring Index  33  30 
1. Are fixed-term contracts prohibited for permanent tasks?  No  No 
2. Maximum duration of fixed-term contracts (incl. renewals; in months)  24  60 
3. Ratio of mandated minimum wage to the average value added per worker  0.22  0.25 
B. Rigidity of Hours Index  40  80 
4. Can the work week extend to 50 hours (including overtime) for 2 months per year to respond to a seasonal increase 
in production? 
Yes  Yes 
5. Maximum number of working days per week  6  5 
6. Are there restrictions on night work?  Yes  Yes 
7. Are there restrictions on “weekly holiday” work?  Yes  Yes 
8. Paid annual vacation (in working days) for an employee with 20 years of service  20  28 
C. Difficulty of Firing Index  10  10 
9. Is the termination of workers due to redundancy legally authorized?  Yes  Yes 
10. Must the employer notify a third party before terminating one redundant worker?  No  No 
11. Does the employer need the approval of a third party to terminate one redundant worker?  No  No 
12. Must the employer notify a third party before terminating a group of 25 redundant workers?  Yes  Yes 
13. Does the employer need the approval of a third party to terminate a group of 25 redundant workers?  No  No 
14. Is there a retraining or reassignment obligation before an employer can make a worker redundant?  No  No 96 
15. Are there priority rules applying to redundancies?  No  No 
16. Are there priority rules applying to re-employment?  No  No 
D. Firing costs (weeks of salary)  21.7  34.5 
17. Notice period for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment (weeks)  8.7  12.9 
18. Severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of employment (weeks of salary)  13.0  21.7 
19. Legally mandated penalty for redundancy dismissal (weeks of salary)  0  0 
E. Rigidity of Employment Index  28  30 
Source:  World Bank Doing Business 2009 database. 
 
  Poland  Slovakia  Slovenia  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania  Bulgaria  Romania  Albania 
A.   11  17  78  33  50  33  29  67  44 
1.  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
2.  No limit  36  24  120  36  60  36  24  No limit 
3.  0.26  0.21  0.30  0.21  0.22  0.24  0.25  0.23  0.36 
B.  60  60  60  80  40  80  60  80  40 
4.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
5.  6  6  6  5  6  6  5  5  6 
6.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
7.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
8  26  25  24  24  20  25  20  21  20 
C.  40  30  40  60  40  30  10  40  20 
9  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
10.  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
11.  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
12  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
13  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
14  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
15  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
16  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
D.  13.0  13.0  37.5  34.7  17.3  30.3  8.6  8.3  55.9 
17  13.0  0  8.6  17.3  4.3.  8.7  4.3  4.0  13.0 
18  0  13.0  28.9  17.3  13.0  21.7  4.3  4.3  42.9 
19.  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 







Croatia  Montenegro  Serbia  FYR 
Macedonia 
Belarus  Moldova  Russia   Ukraine 
A.   67  61  33  67  50  27  44  33  44 
1.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2.  24  36  60  12  48  No limit  No limit  60  No limit 
3.  1.02  0.33  0.10  0.24  0.24  0.16  0.47  0.09  0.29 
B.  40  40  40  20  60  40  40  60  60 
4.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
5.  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6 
6.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
7.  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
8  18  18  21  20  26  15  20  22  18 
C.  30  50  40  30  30  40  40  40  30 
9  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
10.  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
11.  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
12  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
13  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
14  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
15  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
16  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
D.  30.9  39.0  39.0  25.3  26.0  21.7  37.3  17.3  13.0 
17  2.0  13.0  13.0  0  4.3  8.7  8.7  8.7  8.7 
18  28.9  26.0  26.0  25.3  21.7  13.0  28.7  8.7  4.3 
19.  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
E.  46  50  38  39  47  27  41  44  45 
 
 
  Armenia  Azerbaijan  Georgia  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan   Uzbekistan 
A.   33  0  0  0  33  33  33 
1.  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2.  60  No limit  No limit  No limit  60  120  60 
3.  0.19  0.19  0  0.12  0.11  0.07  0.15 
B.  40  0  20  40  40  80  40  
98 
98 
4.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
5.  6  6  7  6  6  6  6 
6.  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
7.  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
8  20  20  24  18  20  28  15 
C.  200  10  0  30  40  40  30 
9  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
10.  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
11.  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
12  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
13  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
14  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
15  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
16  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
D.  13.0  21.7  4.3  8.7  17.3  21.7  21.7 
17  8.7  8.7  0  4.3  4.3  8.7  8.7 
18  4.3  13.0  4.3  4.3  13.0  13.0  13.0 
19.  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
E.  31  3  7  23  38  51  34 
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2009 database  at: http://www.doingbusiness.org. 
 
 
Table A 6:  Probationary (Trial) Period, and Conditions for Fixed-Term Contracts in Labor Legislation in ECA 
Countries 
 
  Probationary (trial) 
period 
Regulation of fixed-term contracts 
Valid cases  Maximum number of 
successive contracts 
Maximum duration 
for a single fixed-




duration of successive 
contracts 
Czech Republic  Up to 3 months  No restrictions  No limit specified  2 years  2 years 
Hungary  30 days; a shorter or 
longer trial period, not 
No restrictions  No limit  provided the 
aggregate if term does 
5 years  5 years subject to the 
derogation for the  
99 
99 
to exceed three 
months, may be 
stipulated in the 
collective agreement, 
or agreed upon by the 
parties 
not exceed 5 years   case of official 
approval 
Poland  Up to 3 months  No restrictions  No limit; 2 renewals 
allowed beyond 
original term  
No limit  No limit 
 
Slovakia  Up to 3 months  No restrictions  No renewal beyond 3 
years without specific 
justification  
3 years  3 years 
Slovenia  Up to 6 months  For work which by its 
nature is of limited 
duration; replacing a 
temporarily absent 
worker, temporarily 
increased volume of 
work; managerial 
staff; seasonal work, 
etc. (12 cases listed in 
the law) 
 
No limit specified  2 years  2 years 
Estonia  Up to 4 months; not 
applied to minors, and  




positions which are 
prescribed for them 
For completion of a 
specific task; for 
replacement of an 
employee who is 
temporarily absent;      
for a temporary 
increase in work 
volume; for 
performance of 
seasonal work, and 
May be renewed only 
once if contract is for 
the completion of a 
specific task or a 
temporary increase in 
work  volume.  
Otherwise, no limit on 
renewals  
5 years  10 years if contract is 
for the completion of 
a specific task or a 
temporary increase in 
work volume; in other 
cases, no limit  
100 
100 
few other cases 
Latvia  Up to 3 months  For seasonal work; 
replacement of an 
employee; casual 
work; emergency 
work, etc. (7 cases 
listed) 
No renewal beyond 3 
years 
 
3 years  3 years 
Lithuania  Up to 3 months; not 
applied to minors; 
employed to a post by 
competition or 
elections, as well as 
those who have 
passed qualification 
examinations for a 
post, and few other 
cases 
Prohibited if work is 
of a permanent nature 
No renewal beyond 5 
years 
5 years  5 years 
Bulgaria  Up to 6 months  Until completion of 
some specified work; 
for substitution for an 
employee who is 
absent from work,, 
and few other cases 
No renewal beyond 3 
years  
 
3 years  3 years 
Romania  Up to 5 working days 
for unskilled workers; 
up to 30 calendar days 
for executive 
positions; up to 50 
calendar days when 
employing disabled 
persons; up to 90 
calendar days for 
management 
Replacement of an 
employee; a 
temporary increase in 
an employer’s activity; 
seasonal activities, 
and few other cases 
2 renewals within the 
maximum term of 2 
years 
2 years  2 years  
101 
101 
positions, and 3-6 
months for hiring 
higher-educated 
graduates 
Albania  Not regulated  Temporary nature of 
the assignment 





Up to 3 months  Seasonal jobs; 
replacement of a 
temporarily absent 
employee;  
engagement on a 
specific project; 
temporary expansion 
in the volume of jobs, 
and  
other cases as 
determined by the 
collective agreement 
No renewal beyond 2 
years 





Up to 3 months; 
exceptionally and with 
consent of both the 
employer and the 
employee  -  may be 
extended for 
additional 3 months 
No limit  No renewal beyond 2 
years 
 
2 years  2 years 
Croatia  Up to 6 months  Work determined by a 
specific time limit, 
performance of a 
specific task or 
occurrence of a 
specific event 
 
No renewal beyond 3 
years 
 
3 years  3 years 
Montenegro  Up to 6 months  No limits  No limit specified  No limit  No limit  
102 
102 
Serbia   Up to 6 months  Seasonal jobs, work 
on a specific project, 
increase of volume of 
work for a definite 
period of time and the 
like 
No renewal beyond 
12 months.  The 
worker can conclude 
new fixed-term 
contracts only if he 
has been unemployed 
more than 30 days 
between contracts 
12 months  12 months 
FYR Macedonia  Up to 6 months  No restrictions  No limit specified  5 years  5 years 
Belarus  Up to 3 months; not 
applied to minors, 
graduates; upon hiring 
disabled persons; in 
case of temporary and 
seasonal employment, 
and few other cases 
Work which by its 
nature is of limited 
duration 
No limit specified  5 years  No limit 
Moldova  Up to 3 months; 15 
calendar days for 
unqualified workers 
For performing 
temporary work; with 
the persons studying 
or have retired; with 
scientific workers, etc. 
(13 cases listed) 
No limit specified  5 years  No limit 
Russian 
Federation 
Up to 3 months but up 
to 6 months for 
executives and 
managers; not applied 
to minors, graduates, 
pregnant women, 
employed after a 
competition and few 
other cases 
For replacing a 
temporarily absent 
employee; performing 
temporary or seasonal 
work; with persons 
enrolling in SMEs as 
well as working for 
individual employers, 
etc. (in total 18 cases 
listed) 
No renewal beyond 5 
years 
 
5 years  5 years 
Ukraine  For workers up to 1  When labor relations  No limit specified.  As agreed by the  As agreed by the  
103 
103 
months; otherwise up 
to 3 months, and up to 
6 months in certain 
cases if agreed upon 
with trade unions 
cannot be established 
for an indefinite 
period in view of the 
category of the 
pending  work or 
conditions of its 
fulfillment, or the 
interests of the 
employee and in other 
cases 
(However the court 
may consider a fixed-
term contract being 
renewed at least once 
to be concluded for an 
indefinite term.) 
parties  parties 
Armenia  As a rule, up to 3 
months but up to 6 
months in the cases 
specified in legislation; 
not applied to minors; 
accepted to work by 
election or for those 
passing qualification 
exam, and in few other 
cases 
Work which by its 
nature is of limited 
duration,  such  as  
personal services; in-
house workers; 
seasonal work; a 
temporary job (with a 
term of up to two 
months)  
 
No limit specified  5 years  No limit 
Azerbaijan  Up to 1 month  No limit  No limit specified  5 years  No limit 
Georgia  Up to 6 months  No limit  No limit specified  No limit  No limit 
Kazakhstan  Up to 3 months  No limit  No renewals allowed. 
Any renewal beyond 
the original term will 
cause the contract to 
become indefinite 
term 
No limit  No limit 
Kyrgyzstan  Up to 3 months; 6 
months for managerial 
positions; not applied 
to minors, graduates, 
seasonal workers and 
Work which by its 
nature is of limited 
duration, and with 
employees in small 
enterprises (less than 
No renewal beyond 5 
years 
5 years  5 years  
104 
104 
few other cases  15 employees) for 1 
year; with managers, 
scientists, 
pedagogues, etc. (in 
total 17 cases listed) 
Tajikistan  Up to 3 months; not 
applied to minors, 
graduates and few 
other cases 
No limit  1 renewal is allowed   5 years  10 years 
Uzbekistan  Up to 3 months; not 
applied to pregnant 
women, women with 
children up to 3 years 
of age; in case of 
temporary 
employment up to 6 
months 
Work which by its 
nature is of limited 
duration; with 
managers, and in 
other cases stipulated 
in law 
No limit specified  5 years  5 years 











Table A 7:  Minimum Wages in ECA Countries 
 










































0.22  7200 CZK  33.2  2.2  Government based on 
negotiations with the 
tripartite Council of 
Economic and Social 
Agreement. In 
addition, the 
government sets 12 







Hungary  0.24  69000 HUF  37.3  2.1  Government based on 
recommendations of 




Monthly  Labor 
Inspection 
Poland  0.25  900.80 PLN  33.7  2.3  Government based on 
negotiations with the 
Tripartite Commission 
Once or 





Monthly   
Slovakia  0.22  8100 SKK/  40.2  1.6  Based upon the  Yearly  Monthly,  National Labor  
106 
106 
238 EUR  coefficient of 
adjustment 
determined by 
agreement of the State, 
representatives of 
employers  and 
representatives of  
employees acting 
within the Council of 
Economic and Social 
Concertation. Only if 
there is no agreement 
on the coefficient of 
adjustment, 
unilaterally by the 
government  
hourly  Inspectorate 
Slovenia  0.30  566.53 EUR  40.8  3.4  The minister 
responsible for labor 
after consulting the 
social partners 
Yearly  Monthly  Labor 
Inspectorate 
Estonia  0.21  4350 EEK  38.8  4.8  Government following 
the conclusion of a 
bipartite agreement 
between the workers' 
and employers' 
organizations 




Latvia  0.22  160 LVL  40.2  9.2  Government; the 
National Tripartite Co-
operation Council 
must be consulted 




Lithuania  0.23  800 LTL  44.4  7.0  Government following 
recommendations by 
the Tripartite Council 




Bulgaria  0.24  220 BGN  51.0  12.4  Government following 
consultations within 
the National Council 
for Tripartite 
Partnership 
Not fixed  Monthly  General Labor 
Inspectorate 
Romania  0.27  500 RON  35.7  1.8  By the government 
following consultation 




Monthly  Specialized 
supervisory 





Albania  0.37  14000 LEK  51.2    Council of Ministers; 
tripartite National 









1.07  680 BAM 
a) 
102.7    Collective agreement 
and rulebook 
     
Croatia  0.34  2747 
Kuna*** 
36.4    Law  Annually  Monthly   





     
Serbia   0.24  56 Dinars 
per hour b) 
24.7    Decision of the Social 
and Economic Council 
     
FYR 
Macedonia 
0.27  5005 
Denars c) 
20.7    Law and collective 
agreement 
 
     
Belarus  0.21  188,400 
Bel. Rbl. 
27.1    Legislation        
108 
108 
Moldova  0.12  400 Lei  19.3    By the State       
Russian 
Federation 
0.06  2300 RUR  16.9    Federal government 
following consultation 




Monthly  Labor 
inspectors and 
trade unions 
Ukraine  0.34  460 UAH  34.0    Supreme Council of 
Ukraine on the 
recommendation of 
the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine, 
after consultations 
with social partners 
As a rule, 
















Armenia  0.20  20,000 
AMD 
27.7    By law       
Azerbaijan  0.25  50 AZN  23.2    By the State       
Georgia  -  -  -    No minimum wage       
Kazakhstan  0.17  9,800 
Tenge 
18.7    By law       
Kyrgyzstan  0.12  340 Soms  8.5    By law; should not be 
less than subsistence 
minimum for able 
bodied person 
     
Tajikistan  0.11  20 Somoni  12.2    President of the 
Republic of Tajikistan 
     
Uzbekistan  0.13  18,630 
Soums 
…    By legislation       
Notes: a) 400 BAM/net, corresponding to 680 BAM/month gross (gross = approx 1.7x net); b) 80% of the national minimum wage (trainee wage); c) Minimum wages 
are determined for individual industries by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy; 50% is established as the minimum in the labor code; 80% is more commonly used 
by businesses;   * World Bank Doing Business 2009 database; Due to a lack of consistent cross-country data on average earnings, by the Doing Business methodology, the 
minimum wage level is expressed as a share of average GNI per capita that is used as a proxy for average earnings. The ratio is adjusted to percentage of population in 
working age to total population.   ** - CIS states: minimum wages at the end of 2007 to average wages in 2007.  *** - 2008. 
Source: National labor legislation; ILO at http://www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/minimumwages; CIS STAT 2008; Eurostat on-line.  
109 
109 
Table A 8:  Overtime Limits and Wage Premium for Overtime, Night and Weekend Work 
  Overtime an 
employee generally 
can agree to work 
Overtime  the 
company 








Pay premium for 
night work 
Pay premium for 




8 hours per week 
and 150 hours per 
year; in excess of 
the 15 hour limit is 
permissible with 
the consent of the 
employee, but 
must not exceed 8 
hours per week.  
 
 
  25%; instead of 
the premium the 
worker may be 
granted a 
compensatory 
time off for the 
hours she/he 
worked overtime  
May not perform 
more than 8 
hours within 24 
consecutive 
hours. Where this 






hours so that the 
average length of 
a shift does not 




  At least 10% of his 
average earnings 
for work on 
Saturday and/or 
Sunday; work on 
public holidays: 
the worker is 
entitled to normal 
wage plus 
compensatory 
time off or 100 per 
cent additional 
pay for work 
performed on 
public holidays. 
Hungary  200 hours per 
calendar year, may 
be extended to 300 
hours per calendar 
year by a collective 
agreement 
Same  50%; 100% on 
rest days and on 





  15%; 
 
 
100% but 50% if 
the employee 
receives another 





Poland  150 hours in a 
calendar year but 
only 8 hours a 
week on  the 
average in 
reference period; 
the annual limit 
can be increased 
up to 416 hours 
Same  50%;  100%  on  
Sundays and 
holidays 
    100% premium if 
no time off in lieu 
is granted 
Slovakia  8 hours/week 
averaged over a 








plus an additional 
250 hours/year for 





averaged over a 
















25% (35% for 
dangerous work); 
an employee can 
take time-off in 
compensation for 
overtime work, 
the employee is 
entitled to an hour 
of time-off for 
each hour of 
overtime work. In 
this case, he or she 






hour shift per day 
averaged over a 
4-month period 
At least 20%   Work on public 







Slovenia  8 hours per week, 
20 hours per 
month and 180 
hours per year  
  Determined by 
collective 
agreements 
      
111 
111 
Estonia  Employers and 
employees may 
agree on a longer 
working time not 
to exceed, on 
average, 52 hours 
per seven days 
over a calculation 
period of 4 months.  




50%    25%  100% 
Latvia  144 hours within a 




100%  7 hours shift    100%. Work on 
Saturdays has to 
end earlier. 
Lithuania  4 hours over a two 
day period and 120 
hours per year; an 
annual limit of 
more than 120 
hours may be 
established by 
collective 
agreement up to 
180 hours per year. 
Same  50%   7 hours shift 




the night work or 
in case of 
continuous 
manufacture 
At least 50%  100%, or should 
be compensated 
for by granting to 
the worker 
another rest day 
during the month 
or by adding that 
day to his/her 
annual leave. 
Bulgaria  150 hours per year, 
not exceeding: 30 
day hours or 20 
night hours per 
month; 6 day hours 
or 4 night hours 
per week;   
3 day hours or 2 
night hours over 2 
consecutive days; 
the workweek 
Same  50% for 
weekdays;   
75%  for 
weekends; 
100% increase  for 
public holidays 




advance in order 
that the employer 
is sure that the 
night work may 
not harm their 
health 
Premium rate 
agreed  upon by 
the parties, but 
not less than the 
amount set by 
Ministerial Order. 
In addition to an 
increased pay for 
such work, also to 
an uninterrupted 
weekly rest period 
of not less than 24 
hours during the 
succeeding 
working week  
112 
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cannot be longer 
than 48 hours (full-
time workers) and 
40 hours (part-
time workers). 
These hours can be 
worked in 60 
working days per 
calendar year but 
not for more than 
20 consecutive 
working days 








off within the next 
30 days or 
payment of a 
premium for 
overtime work 
amounting to at 
least 100% of the 
base salary, 







have their work 
duration reduced 




base salary or 
receive a night 
bonus amounting 
to minimum 15% 




the amount of the 
night bonus at 
25% of the base 
salary) 




at the National 
level Collective 
Agreement 
Albania  10 hours per week  Same   25%, 50% on 
weekly and public 




holidays  leave 25% higher 






























           
Croatia  10 hours per week; 
must be notified to 
a Labor Inspector if 
by a particular 
worker it lasts 
more than four 
consecutive weeks 
or more than 
twelve weeks 
during one 
calendar year, or if 
overtime work by 
all workers of a 
certain employer 
exceeds 10 percent 
of the total 
working hours in a 
particular month 
Same  Overtime rates are 











may not perform 
consecutive night 
work for more 
than one week.  
A worker has the 
right to an 
increased salary 
for night work 
A worker has the 
right to an 
increased salary 
for work on 
holidays and other 
days that are not 
working days 
according to the 
law. Salary 
compensation is 







Montenegro  May last only  Same  Determined in the    Determined in  Determined in the  
114 
114 
during the time 
necessary to 
remove the causes 
due to which it has 
been introduced, 
but no longer than 














Serbia   None, overtime 
work is not 
allowed for a 
seasonal increase 
in work that the 
employer knows 
about ahead of 
time.   
4 hours/day, 8 
hours/week, but 
only for cases of 
force majeure, 
unexpected 
increase of the 
volume of work 
and in other 
instances when 
it is necessary to 
finish unplanned 
work by a set 
deadline 
26%  Before 
introducing night 
work, employer 
must ask advice 




re: night work. If 
shift work, need 
employee's 
consent to have 
employee do 
more than 1 
consecutive week 
of night work 
26%  26% 
FYR 
Macedonia 
10 hours per week 
and 190 hours per 
year 
Same  Workers who 
perform more 
than 150 overtime 
hours during a 
year and are not 
absent for more 
than 21 days are 
entitled to one 
extra month's 




Belarus  4 hours per 2 
working days, 120 
hours per year 
Same   100%       
Moldova  Workday 12 hours 
in total (including 
overtime); 120 
hours per calendar 
year for overtime 
that is required by 
the employer. The 
duration of 
overtime work can 
be increased with 
the consent of the 
representatives of 
employees up two 
240 hours per 
calendar year 





overtime work in 
the form of time-
off is not 
permitted 
7 hour shift  50%   
Russian 
Federation 
4 hours per day, 
but not more than 
1/2 of the regular 
monthly work time 
(the average 20 
hours per week) (if 
the overtime  is 
initiated by the 




more than 120 
hours per year 
No more than 4 
hours per two 
consecutive days 
and no more 
than 120 hours 
per year 









Generally 7 hour 
shift 
  Consent of the 
worker required 








Ukraine  None.  Employee 





None  50% first 2 hours; 
100% after 
7 hour shift  20%  100%; the 
employee may 
request for a 
compensatory 
time off for 
holiday work 




4 hours per 2 
consecutive 
days; 8 hours 
per week; 120 
hours per year 
50%; 0% if the 
overtime is agreed 
between the 
parties 
Yes. Articles 148 
and 184 (shorter 
time shifts and 
special premiums 
for night work) 
  Pay premium but 
not defined 
Azerbaijan  Not specified by 
law 
Over a period of 
2  consecutive 
working days an 
employee may 
not be required 
to work more 




the heavy and 
hazardous 
conditions - may 
not be required 
to work more 
than 2 hours 
overtime 
For fixed salary 
employees:  50%.  
For employees 
working on an 
hourly basis: 
100% 
7 hour shift only 
in work places 
with hard or 
hazardous labor 
conditions 
   
Georgia  Terms are defined 






consent of the 
parties  
 
In general, it is left 
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  required to avert 
natural disasters 
or deal with their 
results 
Kazakhstan  2 hours per day, 12 
hours per month, 
120 hours per year 
None.  Overtime 
work without 
the consent of 





defined by law 
50%     50%  Work on public 
holiday requires 
the written 
consent of the 
worker. 100% pay 
increase or the 
worker can take a 
day off rest 
Kyrgyzstan  None  None  50% for the first 2 
hours; 100% for 
hours beyond 2 
hours 
7 hour shift  50%  Employee’s 
consent needed 
Tajikistan  None, employee 





agree to it 
Same   100%  7 hour shift  100%  Work on 
weekends is 
prohibited (unless 




100 % pay 
premium for 
weekend work or 
compensatory rest 
Uzbekistan  4 hours in 2 
successive days, 






100% (minimum)    50%  Allowed only 







and employees, or 
on the basis of 
agreement of 
employer with 
trade union; 100% 
pay premium, or 
compensatory rest 
Source: National labor legislation. 
 
Table A 9:  Annual Paid and Unpaid Leave, and Family Leave 
  Minimum annual leave  Supplementary leave  Family leave  Unpaid leave 
Czech Republic   4 weeks; state and local 
government employees – 5 
weeks; pedagogical and 
academic employees –  8 
weeks 
Workers engaged in hard 
or harmful work –  one 
twelfth for every 21 days 
of work done in such areas 
   
Hungary  20 working days but 21 
days for employees over 
25; 22 days for employees 
over 28; 23 days for 
employees over   31; 24 
days for employees over 
33; 25 days for employees 
over 25; 26 days for 
employees over 37; 27 
days for employees over 
39; 28 days for employees 
over 41; 29 days for 
employees over 43; 30 
Minors – 5 extra days; 
single parent - a) two days 
a year for one child, b) four 
days a year for two 
children, 
c) a total of seven days a 
year for more than two 
children  under sixteen 
years of age; blind 
employees – 5 extra days 
    
119 
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days for employees over 
45 
years of age. 
 
Poland  20 days if the employee 
has been employed for less 
than 10 years; 
26 days if the employee 
has been employed for at 
least 10 years (including 
previous employment) 
    Upon a written request of 
the employee 
Slovakia  4 weeks; 5 weeks if have 
worked at least 15 years 
after the age of 18 
     
Slovenia  4 weeks  An older worker, a 
disabled person, a worker 
with at least 60 % physical 
impairment, and a worker, 
who takes care of a 
physically  or mentally 
handicapped child -  at 
least 3 additional days; one 
additional day for every 
child under the age of 15 
   
Estonia  28 calendar days  Minors, disabled  persons, 
and state officials and local 
government officials, in 
total 35 calendar days; an 
employee receiving 
incapacity pension or 
national pension based on 
incapacity for work -  35 
calendar days; teachers 
  At the request of an 
employee, for taking the 
state examinations , or in 
other cases prescribed by 
law, a collective agreement 




and academic staff –  56 
calendar days 
Latvia  4 weeks  3 days to employees with 3 
or more children under the 
age of 16 years or a 
disabled child, and to 
employees exposed to 
special risk 
   
Lithuania  28 calendar days  Minors, disabled persons 
and  single parents raising 
a child before he has 
reached the age of 14 (16 if 
disabled child); employees 
whose work involves 
greater emotional and 
intellectual strain and 
professional risk 
For a wedding – at least 3 
calendar days, and for a 
funeral of a family member 
– at least 3 days of unpaid 
leave 
Employees raising a child 
under 14 years of age - for 
up to 14 calendar days; 2) 
employees raising a child  
with disabilities before he 
has reached sixteen years - 
for up to 30 calendar days; 
disabled persons –  for  up 
to 30 calendar days 
Bulgaria  20 work days  Categories specified by the 
Council of Ministers; for 
work under unhealthy or 
special conditions, and for 
work on open-ended 
working hours  – not less 
than 5 working days 
For a wedding – at least 2 
working days, and for a 
funeral of a family member 
– at least 2 working days of 
leave (remuneration as 
provided  for in the 
collective agreement or as 
agreed between the 
employee and the 
employer) 
Upon the request of the 
employee; up to 30 
working days for one 
calendar year 
Romania  20 working days  The employees who work 
under difficult, 
dangerous, or harmful 
conditions, disabled 
persons, and minors under 
18  -  additional holiday of 
Paid days off for special 
family events as 
determined by the law, the 
collective labor contract, 
or the company’s rules and 
regulations 
According to rules and 
regulations established by 
the collective agreement or 




at least 3 working days 
 
Albania  4 weeks    In the case of the marriage 
or death of any of  the 
spouses, of his/her direct 
predecessors and 
descendants  -  5 days of 
paid leave; in the case of 




is certified by medical 








18 working days  Work which poses a health 
hazard  –  at least 30 
working days 
Up to 7 working days in 
one calendar year -  paid 
leave in the case of 
marriage, wife's 
confinement, serious 
disease or death of a close 
family or household 
member; up to 4days to 
meet religious/traditional 
needs of which 2 days with 
salary compensation  
 






18 working days  Minors  –  at least 24 
working days; work which 
poses a health hazard – at 
least 30 working days 
Up to 3 working days in 
one calendar year –  leave 
with pay in case of: 
wedding, wife’s birth-
giving, serious disease or 




death of a close family 
member and in other cases 
provided under the 
collective agreement and 
rule book; up to 3 working 
days of unpaid leave for 
religious or national and 
traditional purposes  
Croatia  18 working days  Minors  –  at least 24 
working days; work which 
poses a health hazard – at 
least 30 working days 
Paid leave for a maximum 
of 7 working days for 
important personal needs -  
marriage, childbirth, 
serious illness or death of a 
member of the immediate 
family 
Upon request of the 
employee 
Montenegro  18 working days  Minors – not less than 24 
working days 
up  to 7 working days in 
case of: matrimony, 
childbirth, death of an 
immediate family member, 
moving, passing 
examination and in other 
cases defined in the 
collective agreement 
As defined by the collective 
agreement 
Serbia   20 working days    Up to 7 working days in 
cases of getting married, 
spouse's childbirth, 
serious illness of a 
member of immediate 
family, and in other cases 
as determined in the 
collective agreement and 
the employment contract; 
in addition, 5 working days 
An employer may grant to 
an employee a leave 
without compensation  
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due to death of an 
immediate family member 
FYR Macedonia  20 working days  An older employee, a 
disabled employee, an 
employee with at least 
60% of physical 
impairment, and employee 
who takes care of a 
physically or mentally 
handicapped child - 
additional 3 working days; 
minors  –  additional 7 
working days 
Up to 7 working days of 
paid leave due to personal 
or family circumstances -  
marriage, childbirth (only 
for the father) and/or 
death of immediate family 
member 
In cases and under 
conditions determined by 
collective agreement, but 
not exceeding three 
months in one calendar 
year 
Belarus  24 calendar days  for work on open-ended 
working hours  –  up to 7 
working days; for work 
which poses a health 
hazard as determined by 
the government 
  Up to 14 days to women 
with children up to 14 
years of age (16 years if 
the child is disabled); 
veterans of the Great 
Patriotic War, disabled 
workers, for taking care of 
sick family member, and in 
other cases as determined 
by law, a collective 
agreement or employment 
contract 
Moldova  28 calendar days  Employees working in 
harmful conditions, blind 
persons and minors – 
additional leave not less 
than  4 calendar days 
  On family circumstances 
and other valid reasons the 
employee  -  with the 
consent of the employer - 
up to 60 calendar days; 
women having two or 
more children under the 
age of fourteen (or a child -  
124 
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invalid under the 
age of sixteen), single 




28 calendar days  Employees working in 
harmful conditions, for 
work on open-ended 
working hours, employees 
working in the Far North 
regions – as defined by the 
government, collective 
agreement or by local acts   
  Upon request of the 
employee, including 
participants of the Great 
Patriotic War –  up to 35 
calendar days; working 
pensioners  –  1 days; 
working disabled persons 
– up to 60 days; employees 
in cases of a childbirth, 
wedding, death of close 
relatives  -  up to five 
calendar days 
Ukraine  24 calendar days  Minors – 31 calendar days    Upon request of the 
employee but not more 
than 15 calendar days 
Armenia  28 calendar days  Employees working in 
harmful and stressful 
conditions - in total up to 
35 calendar days (the list 
of employees is 
determined by the 
government) 
  Upon the request of an 
employee  to the disabled 
employee or to the 
employee taking care of a 
sick family member – up to 
30 calendar days; marriage 
–  3 calendar days; for 
funerals of a family 
member  –  at  least 3 
calendar days 
Azerbaijan  21 calendar days  Agricultural employees, 
public  officials,  scientific  
personnel, pedagogical and 
medical staff and some 
  Upon the request of an 
employee for family and 
personal reasons up to 14 
calendar days  
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other categories – in total 
not less than 30 days; 
employees engaged in 
underground work or in 
hazardous or arduous 
work, with increased 
mental and physical stress  
-  additional 6 calendar 
days as determined by the 
relevant authority; 
depending on seniority: 5-
10 years of work –  2 
additional calendar days; 
10-15 years – 4 additional 
days, over 15 years –  6 
additional calendar days; 
working women with 2 
children under the age of 
14 – 2 additional calendar 
days, and if 3 or more 
children of this age (16 
years of age with a 
disabled child) –  5 
additional calendar  days 
Georgia  24 working days      Upon the request of an 
employee  –  not less than 
15 calendar days; also not 
less than two weeks for 
childcare before the child 
turns 5 
Kazakhstan  18 calendar days  Employees working in 
harmful and stressful 
conditions as determined 




by the competent public 
authority 
Kyrgyzstan  28 calendar days  State employees, minors – 
30 calendar days; 
employees working in 
harmful and stressful 
conditions as determined 
by the government 
  Upon the request of the 
employee and by 
agreement between the 
parties; participants of the 
Great Patriotic War, 
disabled war veterans – up 
to 14 calendar days; 
disabled workers –  up to 
60 calendar days; 
marriage, childbirth, death 
of an immediate family 
member – up to 5 calendar 
days;  
Tajikistan  24 calendar days  In total 10 privileged 
groups with lengthier 
minimum annual leave, 
including minors – 30 
calendar days, and 
disabled persons – 35-42 
calendar days 
 
Up to 7 working days of 
unpaid leave due to 
personal or family 
circumstances -  marriage, 
childbirth (only for the 
father) and/or death of 
immediate family member 
Upon the request of the 
employee and by 
agreement between the 
parties; participants of the 
Great Patriotic War, 
disabled war veterans, 
working pensioners –  up 
to 14 calendar days; 
disabled workers –  up to 
60 calendar days 
Uzbekistan  15 working days   Minors, and disabled 
persons  -  30 calendar 
days; employees working 
in harmful and stressful 
conditions as determined 
by the government or in 
the employment contract 
  Upon the request of an 
employee; participants of 
the Great Patriotic War 
and other war veterans, 
disabled workers, and for 
women with a child 
between 2 and 3 years of 
age, or with 2 and more  
127 
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children at age 12 years - 
up to 14 calendar days 
Source: National labor legislation.  
 
 
Table A 10:  Paid Maternity Leave, Parental Leave and Paternity Leave in ECA Countries 
  Paid maternity leave: normal duration  Duration of parental 
leave 
Duration of paternity 
leave    Total duration  Including must be used 
before giving birth 
Czech Republic  28 weeks    Granted if so requested to 
the mother or the father 
but no longer than the 
child reaches the age of 3 
years 
 
Hungary  4 weeks before and 20 
weeks after the expected 
date  of childbirth or for 
24 weeks after the 
expected date of 
childbirth, depending on 
the mother’s choice 
 
  Leave of absence without 
pay a) until the child 
reaches the age of three, 
in order to care for the 
child at home; b) until the 
child reaches the age of 
ten, during the period of 
eligibility for child-care 
allowance, provided that 
the employee cares for 
the child at home; c) in 
order - in the event of the 
child's illness - to provide 
home care 
Five days which the 
employer shall allocate 
within the two-month 
period following the date 
of birth on the days 
requested by the father 
Poland  16 weeks in case of first 
delivery; 18 weeks with   
each next delivery 
2 weeks  Maximum 3 years before 
the child has reached the 
age of 4; can be taken by 
Only own fathers and 
legal carers; 2 weeks in 
case of 16 weeks  
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both parents or legal 
carers 
maternity leave; 4 weeks 
if 18 weeks maternity 
leave 
Slovakia  28 weeks (may not be 
shorter than 14 weeks) 
6 weeks  A mother or father shall 
be granted parental paid 
leave for raising a child 
up to 3 years of age; 
 
Slovenia  105 days  28 days  After the expiration of 
maternity leave, one of 
the parents have the right 
to paternity leave for a 
period of up to 260 days 
paid by Parental Leave 
Insurance Fund 
Total  period of 90 days; 
at least 15 days must be 
used during the 
maternity leave, and the 
remaining 75 days – until 
the child is 8 years old 
Estonia  140 days  A woman has the right to 
commence leave up to 70 
days before the estimated 
date of delivery 
A mother or father shall 
be granted parental leave 
for raising a child up to 3 
years of age; additional 
paid child care leave of 3 
calendar days if one or 
two children under 14 
years of age, and 6 
calendar days if 3 or 
more children under 14 
years of age or at least 
one child under 3 years of 
age; additional unpaid 
leave up to 10 working 
days 
A father has the right   to 
an up to ten working days 
of paternity leave during 
the two months before 
the estimated birth date 
and during the two 
months after the birth of 
the child. 
 
Latvia  112 calendar days  Prenatal leave 56 
calendar days 
For a period not 
exceeding 1.5 years up to 
the day the child reaches 
the age of 8 years 
10 calendar days but not 
later than within a two-
month period from the 
birth of the child. It is  
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financed by state social 
insurance 
financed by the state 
social insurance. 
Lithuania  126  days  Entitled to 70 days  Before the child has 
reached the age of 3 paid 
by state social insurance 
 
Bulgaria  135 days  45 days  For 1st, 2nd  and 3rd  child 
until they reach 2 years of 
age, and 6 months for 
each subsequent child if 
not placed  in a child-care 
establishment; benefit 
paid by social insurance 
 
Romania  126 days  Granted for 63 days 
before childbirth 
Can be used by one of the 
parents or other relative 
until the child reaches the 
age of 2 years paid by the 
state social insurance 
fund 
 
Albania  365 days  35 days  Paid leave no longer than 
15 days when child is sick 
(children up to  3 years of 
age); additional unpaid 
leave of absence up to 30 






365 days (but not shorter 
than 42 days following 
the birth of the child) 
28 days  Until the child reaches 
the age of 3 years 
Paid absence up to 7 
working days in the case 




       
Croatia  6 months (mandatory 
maternity leave); 
28 days  Until the child reaches 
the age of 3 years 
Up to 7 working days of 
paid leave for personal  
130 
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maximum 365 days. After 
6 months of mandatory 
leave,  the right to leave 
can be exercised by the 
child’s father 
needs, for example 
childbirth 
Montenegro  an employed woman may 
start to use the maternity 
leave 45 days before the 
childbirth, but no later 
than 28 days before the 
childbirth. 
until the child turns one 
year of age. 
 
45 days before the 
childbirth, but no later 
than 28 days 
One of the parents shall 
be entitled to be absent 
from work until the child 
turns  three years of age 
An employee shall be 
entitled to absence from 
work, with wage 
compensation (paid 
absence), in case of: 
getting married, his wife 
giving birth, serious 
illness of an immediate 
family member, taking a 
professional examination 
and in other cases 
duration determined by 
the collective agreement 
and contract of 
employment.  
 
Serbia   For the first and second 
child begins 28 days 
before the expected date 
of childbirth and is paid 
for 
365 days. The leave 
period for the third and 
each successive child is 
paid for 2 years 
 
     
FYR Macedonia  9 months  28 days    Up to 7 working days. 
Paid absence from work  
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determined by collective 
agreement 
Belarus  126  days  70 days  Until the child reaches 
the age of 3 years paid by 
the state social insurance 
fund  
 
Moldova  126 days  Prenatal leave 70 days  Can be used by the 
mother, the father or any 
relative who takes care of 
the child until the child 
reaches the age of  3 





140 days  Can be granted 70 days 
before childbirth 
Upon the request of a 
female worker, she is 
granted a child care leave 
until the child reaches the 
age of  3 years paid by the 
state social insurance; 
can be granted also to 
father or other relative 
 
Ukraine  126 days       
Armenia  140 days (70 days before 
and 70 days after the 
expected date of 
childbirth) 
 
     
Azerbaijan  126 days  70 days  A single parent or 
another family member 
who is caring for a child 
until the age of 3 can take 
a social leave partially 
paid by social protection 
Unpaid leave for up to 14 
calendar days for men 
whose wives are on 




Georgia  126 days    In total 477 days for the 
reason of pregnancy, 
childbirth and childcare 
 
Kazakhstan  126 days       
Kyrgyzstan  126 days       
Tajikistan  140 days    Can be used by the 
mother, the father or any 
relative who takes care of 
the child until the child 
reaches the age of  18 
months paid by the state 
social insurance; 
additional unpaid leave 
can be requested until the 
child reaches 3 years of 
age 
 
Uzbekistan  126 days  Can be granted 70 days 
before childbirth 
Can be used by the 
mother, the father or any 
relative who takes care of 
the child until the child 
reaches the age of   2 
years paid by the state 
social insurance; 
additional unpaid leave 
can be requested until the 
child reaches 3 years of 
age 
 
Source: US Social Security Administration at: 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2008-2009/europe/ssptw08euro.pdf. 




Table A 11:  Administrative Leave Arrangements in ECA Countries 
 
Payment in case of idle time, and other conditions 
Czech Republic  As a rule, compensatory wage of average earnings: at least 50 % of his/her average earnings if an employee is 
unable to perform work due to adverse effects of weather; if an employer outlined in a written agreement with 
employees’ representatives substantive operational reasons that prevent the employer from designating an 
employee work, this shall constitute an obstacle on the part of the employer for which an employee shall be 
entitled to wage compensation in the amount stipulated in the agreement, being a minimum of 60 % of average 
earnings. 
Hungary  If the employer temporarily reduces the working time stipulated in the employment contract of an employee on 
account of economic reasons, the employee shall be entitled to his/her personal basic wage for such time lost, 
unless provisions pertaining to labor relations provide otherwise. 
Poland  If the employee is ready to perform work but he or she is prevented from it for reasons attributable to the 
employer, he or she shall be entitled to remuneration for the period not worked in accordance with his or her 
individual rate of pay expressed as an hourly or monthly rate, and if such component of the remuneration is not 
specified in the conditions of remuneration – in the amount of 60% of the remuneration. In any case, such 
remuneration shall not be less than the minimum remuneration for work established pursuant to separate 
regulations. 
Slovakia  Compensatory wage of average earnings: 60% of average earnings if a written agreement with employees’ 
representatives; 50% of average earnings if unable to perform work due to adverse effects of weather. 
Slovenia  If the worker cannot work due to force majeure, he shall be entitled to half of the payment he would have 
received if he was working but not less than 70% of the minimum wage.. 
Estonia  In case of work stoppage due to a lack of necessary organisational or technical conditions, force majeure or other 
circumstances: temporary transfer to other position, and he or she is paid remuneration according to the 
position, but not less than at the rate of hourly wages in the former position; upon a temporary decrease in the 
volume of work or orders, employees may be granted a partially paid holiday for up to three months by 
agreement of the parties and with the approval of the labor inspector of the employer’s location (residence), and 
the employees shall be notified thereof in writing at least two months in advance; partial pay shall not be less 
than 60 per cent of the minimum salary rate. 
Latvia  If an employer does not provide work to an employee: compensatory wage of average earnings for the whole  
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period of idle time. 
Lithuania  Idle time without any fault on the part of an employee: he or she can be transferred to another work with 
written consent of an employee for the period of idle time with compensatory wage of average earnings; if not 
transferred, at least one-third of the average monthly wage but not less than the minimum hourly pay. Where 
the employee refuses in writing the offered job according to his profession, speciality, and qualifications, in 
which he could work without causing harm to his health, he shall be paid at least 30 percent of the hourly pay 
established by the Government for each idle hour. 
Bulgaria  Part-time work can be introduced by the employer as a means of having the employees’ share the burden of the 
unfavorable current situation. 
Romania  At least gross national minimum basic wages shall be guaranteed if the employee is present for work, according 
to the schedule, but he/she cannot carry out his/her activity due to reasons not imputable to him/her, except 
for strikes. 











Croatia  A worker has the right to salary compensation during a period of time when work is interrupted due to the fault 
of the employer or due to other circumstances for which the worker is not responsible. 
Montenegro  The employee shall be entitled to wage compensation in the amount determined by the  collective agreement 
and labor contract during the time of work interruption without the employee’s fault. 
Serbia   During an interruption of work which occurred without employee's fault: at least 60% of the average earnings 
for the period not exceeding 45 workdays in a calendar year. 
FYR Macedonia  The employee shall be entitled to salary compensation in cases when he does not carry out the work due to 
reasons on the side of the employer.  
Belarus  Earnings  determined by mutual consent between the employer and employee if not fixed in the collective 
agreement or employment contract. 






Compensatory wage of not less than two-thirds of average earnings. The worker can be transferred to another 
job for not more than one month in a year, and wages must be paid basing on the new job position, but should 
not be less than average wages on the previous position. Employee can be transferred to a job position that 
requires lower qualification with his written consent.     
Ukraine  In case of the idle time, employees may be transferred to another position at the same enterprise, institution or 
organization for the whole duration of the idle time or to another enterprise, institution or organization in the 
same locality for a period up to one month subject to their consent and taking into account their specialty and 
qualification. 
Armenia  For idle time not by employee’s fault: compensatory wage of not less than two-thirds of average hourly rate for 
every idle hour but not less than the minimum hourly rate if offered another job; if the employee  refuses the 
offered temporary job, compensatory wage not less than 30% of the minimum hourly rate 
Azerbaijan  An employee may be temporarily transferred to another job without his consent for up to one month for 
business reasons and to prevent idle time. An employee may not be transferred to a job, which has a negative 
effect on his health or to a job with a lower skill rating. While on the other job, the employee shall be 
compensated on the basis of work performed, but no less than his previous monthly wage. 
Georgia  Unless otherwise addressed by the employment agreement, in case of coercive suspension of the employee for 
the reason of the employer, the employee is entitled to receive full amount of labor compensation. 
Kazakhstan  In the event of production necessity the employer shall be entitled to transfer the worker without his consent 
for a period of up to one month to another post not stipulated in the individual contract of employment in the 
same establishment, in the same locality with remuneration of the labor corresponding to the work performed, 
but not lower than an average monthly pay at the former post.  
Kyrgyzstan  Can be transferred to another job for not longer than one month with compensatory wage of not less than 
his/her  average earnings. 
Tajikistan  Can be transferred to another job in the same firm, or to another firm with his/her consent, for not longer than 
one month with compensatory wage of not less than his/her average earnings. 
Uzbekistan  Compensatory wage of not less than two-thirds of average earnings 
Source: National labor legislation.  
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Table A 12:  Restricted Right to Terminate Employment of Specially Protected Workers in Case of Layoffs in ECA Countries 
    Categories of specially protected workers from contract termination 
Czech Republic     
Hungary     
Poland    An employee who will have acquired the right to receive a retirement pension from the Social Security 
Fund within less than two years. This provision shall not apply if the employee becomes eligible for a 
disability pension because of the total incapacity to work 
Slovakia    As a rule, an employer cannot immediately terminate the employment relationship with a pregnant 
employee, a female employee on maternity leave, or a female or male employee on parental leave, with a 
solitary female or male employee caring for a child younger than three years of age, or with an employee 
who personally cares for a close person with severe disability.  
Slovenia    A. Criteria for determining redundant workers:  (i) the worker’s professional education and/or 
qualification for work and the necessary additional skills and capacities, (ii) working experience, (iii) job 
performance, (iv) years of service, (v) health condition, (vi)  the worker’s social condition, (vii) that he or 
she is a parent of three or more minor children or the sole bread-winner in the family with minor 
children.  When determining the workers whose work will become redundant, under the same criteria the 
priority shall be given to the preservation of jobs by those workers who are in a bad social condition. 
B. Preferential right to protection of employment contract: (i) new workers within the term of one year, 
(ii) the older worker, without written consent of this worker, until this worker completes the minimum 
conditions upon which the right to old-age pension is conditioned, unless he is assured the right to the 
unemployment benefit or until the fulfillment of minimum conditions for old-age pension, (iii) the female 
worker during the period of pregnancy and all the time she is breastfeeding (iv) parents in the period 
when they are on parental leave in the form of a full absence from work. (Notwithstanding the provisions 
of (iii) and (iv), the employer may terminate the employment contract after the preliminary consent by 
the labor inspector, if there are reasons for extraordinary termination or due to the introduction of the 
procedure for the termination of the employer.) (v) a disabled worker because of an established disability 
of second or third degree or for a business reason, unless 
it is possible to assure him another appropriate work or part-time work in accordance with the 
regulations on pension and invalidity insurance, and some other categories of disabled individuals. 
Estonia    An employer may not cancel an employment contract due to the following: 1) an employee is pregnant or 
has the right to pregnancy and maternity leave; 2) an employee performs important family duties; 3) an  
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employee does not, in the short term, cope with the performance of duties due to their state of health; 4) 
an employee represents other employees on the basis provided by law; 5) a full-time employee does not 
want to continue working part-time or a part-time employee does not want to continue working full-time; 
6) an employee is in military service or alternative service. 
Termination of employment contracts with the employees is only permitted with the consent of the labor 
inspector. Of the persons who are employed in a principal job, preference is given to those who have 
better performance results. In the case of equal performance results, preference is given to employees 
who have contracted an occupational disease or received a work injury by the fault of the employer; who 
have worked for the employer longer; who have dependants; or who are developing their professional 
skills and expertise in an educational institution which provides special education. 
Latvia    Preference to continue employment relations shall be for those employees who have higher performance 
results and higher qualifications. If performance results and qualifications do not substantially differ, 
preference to remain in employment shall be for those employees: 1) who have worked for the relevant 
employer for a longer time; 2) who, while working for the relevant employer, have suffered an accident or 
have fallen ill with an occupational disease; 3) who are raising a child up to 14 years of age or a disabled 
child up to 16 years of age; 
4) who have two or more dependants; 5) whose family members do not have a regular income; 6) who 
are disabled persons or are suffering from radiation sickness; 7) who have participated in the rectification 
of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Plant; 8) for whom less than five years 
remain until reaching the age of retirement; 9) who, without discontinuing work, are acquiring an 
occupation (profession, trade) in an educational institution; and 10) who have been granted the status of 
politically repressed person. 
As a rule, an employer is prohibited from giving a notice of termination of an employment contract to (i) a 
pregnant woman, as well as to a woman following the period after birth up to one year, but if a woman is 
breastfeeding – during the whole period of breastfeeding; (ii) an employee who is declared to be a 
disabled person, (iii) an employee – member of a trade union – without prior consent of the relevant trade 
union. 
Lithuania    Preferential groups: (i) employees who will be entitled to the full old age pension in not more than five 
years; (ii) persons under 18 years of age; (iii) disabled persons, and (iv) employees raising children under 
14 years of age. Contracts with these employees may be terminated only in extraordinary cases where the 
retention of an employee would substantially violate the interests of the employer. 
Restrictions on the termination of an employment contract: 1) an employee during the period of 
temporary disability, as well as during his leave; 2) an employee called up to fulfil active national defence  
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service or other duties of the citizen of the Republic of Lithuania,  
Additional guarantees: as a rule, an employment contract may not be terminated with (i) a pregnant 
woman from the day on which her employer receives a medical certificate confirming pregnancy, and for 
another month after maternity leave, (ii) with employees raising a child (children) under three years of 
age; (iii) employees, who have lost their functional capacity as a result of injury at work or occupational 
disease, until they recover their functional capacity or a disability is established; (iv) employees, who are 
elected to representative bodies of employees - without the prior consent of the body concerned during 
the period for which they have been elected.       
In the event of reduction in the number of employees on economic or technological grounds or due to the 
restructuring of the workplace, the right of priority to retain the job shall be enjoyed by those employees: 
1) who sustained an injury or contracted an occupational disease at that workplace; 2) who are raising 
children (adopted children) under 16 years of age alone or caring for other family members recognised as 
the disabled of group I or II; 3) whose continuous length of service at that workplace is at least ten years, 
with the exception of employees, who have become entitled to the full old age pension or are in receipt 
thereof; 4) who will be entitled to the old age pension in not more than three years; 5) to whom such a 
right is granted in the collective agreement; 6) who are elected to the representative bodies of employees. 
The priority to retain the job shall apply only to those employees whose qualification is not below the 
qualification of the other employees of the same speciality, who work in that enterprise, establishment or 
organisation. 
Bulgaria    An employer may dismiss only with prior consent of the labor inspectorate for each specific case: (i) 
employees -  mothers of children younger than 3 years of age, or spouses of persons who have entered 
their regular military service; (ii) employees who have been reassigned due to reasons of health; (iii) 
employees suffering from certain diseases, listed in a Regulation of the Minister of Health. 
Romania    Employees’ dismissal shall not be ordered:  (i) for the duration of the temporary industrial disablement: 
(ii) for the duration an employed woman is pregnant, if the employer learnt about this fact prior to the 
issuance of 
the dismissal decision; (iii) for the duration of the maternity leave; (iv) for the duration of the leave for 
raising a child up to the age of 2, or, in case of a disabled child, up to the age of 3; (v) for the duration of 
the leave for looking after a sick child up to the age of 7 or, in case of a disabled child, for intercurrent 
diseases, up to the age of 18; (vi) for the duration of the military service. 
Albania    Termination of employment contract is invalid in the period during which the woman receives the 
benefit income from Social Insurance because of child delivery or adoption. 









   
Croatia    During pregnancy, maternity leave, the exercise of the right to shortened working hours by parents or 
adoptive parents, adoption leave and leave for taking care for the child with serious developmental 
problems, and during a period of fifteen days after the cessation of pregnancy or the cessation of the 
exercise of these rights, the employer may not dismiss from work a pregnant woman or a person 
exercising one of the rights mentioned. 
Montenegro    An employer shall not cancel the labor contract with the parent who works half of the full time due to 
attending a child with severe development difficulties, a single parent of a child under seven years of age, 
or a child with severe disability, or with a person using one of the aforementioned rights. 
Serbia      
FYR Macedonia    The employer must not terminate the employment contract to the female employees during the period of 
pregnancy, childbirth and parenthood or absence for the purpose of taking care of children.  
Belarus    Preferential groups: workers with higher labor productivity and qualification, and other cases according 
to th legislation. An employer cannot terminate the employment relationship with a pregnant employee, 
with a female employee caring for a child younger than three years of age, with a solitary female employee 
caring for a child between three years and fourteen years of age (disabled child(ren) – up to 18 years of 
age), except in case of liquidation of the firm or organization and in few other cases according to 
legislation.  
Moldova    In case of equal qualification and labor productivity the priority right to be kept on work have: a) 
employees who have a family and have two or more persons to take care of; b) employees in whose 
families there are no other persons with an independent income; c) employees having a greater work 
experience at the enterprise; 
d) employees who had to suffer because of a production accident or got an occupational disease at the 
given enterprise; e) employees raising their qualification in higher and secondary specialized educational 
institutions without work discontinuance; f) war invalids and members of the military men families who 
died or have disappeared without any trace; g) participants to military operations for the protection of 
the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova; h) inventors; i) persons who got or 
have suffered from radiation sicknesses or others diseases connected to the irradiation, because of the  
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accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station; j) invalids for whom there has been established the 
causal relationship between their physical inability and the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power 
station, participants at the liquidation of 
the consequences of the failure on the Chernobyl atomic power station in the zone of alienation in 1986-
1990; 
k) employees who have more encouragements for successes in work and don't have disciplinary 




  Preferential groups: (i) married employees having two or more dependants (disabled members of the 
family who are dependent on the employee for support or who receive assistance form him which is the 
only source of means of subsistence for them); (ii)  employees in whose families there are no other 
employees having independent earnings; (iii) employees who got a maiming in work or a professional 
disease in this organization; (iv) invalids of the Great Patriotic War and invalids of military actions in 
defending the Motherland; (v) employees sent by the employer to improve their qualifications while 
continuing their work.  
 
Ukraine    Preferential groups: 1) persons with two or more family dependants; 2) persons that are the only 
breadwinner in their families; 3) persons with a long uninterrupted job tenure with a given enterprise, 
organization or institution; 4) employees that study part-time at higher and secondary special schools 
while continuing normal work; 5) former combatants, war invalids and other persons; 6) authors of 
inventions, utility designs, industrial prototypes and rationalization proposals; 7) employees that 
developed an occupational disease or were mutilated during their work at the enterprise, organization or 
institution; 8) former deportees, for the first five years after their return to Ukraine for permanent 
residence; 9) former servicemen of the military service and alternative (non-military) service, for the 
period of two years after discharge. 
 
Armenia    Preferential groups: (i) pregnant women from the day on which their employer receives a medical 
certificate confirming pregnancy, and for another month after maternity leave, as well as with employees 
taking care of a child till the age of  one year; (ii) employees, who have lost their functional capacity as a 
result of injury at work or occupational disease until they recover their functional capacity or are granted 
a disability status ; (iii) employees, who have temporary lost their functional capacity, if they are absent 
from work due to temporary loss of functional capacity for not more than 120 successive days or for not 
more than 140 days within the last 12 months; (iv) employees elected to representative bodies of  
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employees (trade unions), during the period for which they fulfil their authorizations without the 
preliminary consent of the state labour inspector. 
   
Azerbaijan    A. Preferential groups: (i) Members of families of shekhids (martyrs); (ii) war veterans; (iii) spouses of 
soldiers and officers; (iv) individuals supporting two or more children under the age of 16; (v) individuals 
disabled on the job or who contracted job-related ailments at that enterprise; (vi) persons with refugee 
and displaced status; (vii) other employees as stipulated in collective agreements and employment 
contracts.  
B. Employees whose employment contracts may not be terminated: (i) pregnant women and women with 
children under age three; (ii) employees whose only income source is the enterprise where they work and 
who are bringing up children under school age alone; (iii) employees temporarily disabled; (iv) 
individuals because they are members of trade unions or other political parties;  (v) individuals on 
vacation or on a business trip or engaged in collective bargaining  
Georgia     
Kazakhstan     
Kyrgyzstan    Preferential groups: workers with higher labor productivity and qualification, and according to other 
criteria  established in collective agreement or employment contract.  
Tajikistan    Preferential groups: 1) persons with two or more family dependants; 2) persons that are the only 
breadwinner in their families; 3) persons with a long uninterrupted job tenure with a given enterprise, 
organization or institution; 4) employees that study part-time at higher and secondary special schools 
while continuing normal work; 5) employees that developed an occupational disease or got occupational 
injury during their work at the enterprise, organization or institution; (6) invalids of the Great Patriotic 
War and invalids of military actions;  (7)  persons who got or have suffered from radiation sicknesses or 
others diseases connected to the irradiation; (8) inventors. 
Uzbekistan    Preferential groups: 1) persons with two or more family dependants; 2) persons that are the only 
breadwinner in their families; 3) persons with a long uninterrupted job tenure with a given enterprise, 
organization or institution; 4) employees that study part-time at higher and secondary special schools 
while continuing normal work; 5) employees that developed an occupational disease or got occupational 
injury during their work at the enterprise, organization or institution; (6) invalids of the Great Patriotic 
War and invalids of military actions;  (7)  persons who got or have suffered from radiation sicknesses or 
others diseases connected to the irradiation. 
Source: National labor legislation.  
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Table A 13:  Minimum Advance Notice and Severance Payments Preconditioned by Changes in the Volume of Production, Economic and 
Technological Conditions and Conditions of Organization of Work, as well as by Production Needs in ECA Countries 






Severance pay depending on the 















2 months  -  3  3  3  3 months; 12 months if not allowed to 
work due to an industrial injury or 
occupational disease 
Hungary   1 month but shall be 
extended 
a) by five days after three 
years of service, 
b) by fifteen days after five 
years of service, 
c) by twenty days after eight 
years of service, 
d) by twenty-five days after 
ten years of service, 
e) by thirty days after fifteen 
years of service, 
f) by forty days after 
eighteen years of service, 
g) by sixty days after twenty 




-  1  2  6   a) one month for up to three years of 
service; 
b) two months for up to five years; 
c) three months for up to ten years; 
d) four months for up to fifteen years; 
e) five months for up to twenty years; 






Poland  1)  Two weeks, if the 
employee has been 
employed for less than six 
months; 
  2)  One month, 
if the employee has been 
employed for at least six 
months; 
  3)  Three 
months, if the employee has 
been employed for at least 
three years. 
 
-  -  -  -  Only the employee who is eligible for 
disability or old age pension, and 
whose employment relationship 
expired as a result of retirement or 
pensioning, shall be entitled to a 
severance pay in the amount of one 
monthly remuneration. 
 
Slovakia  Minimum 2 months; 3 
months if an employee has 
worked for the employer for 
at least five years 
-  2  2  3  2 months; three months if an 
employee has worked for the 
employer for at least five years  
Slovenia  30 days if the worker’s 
period of service with the 
employer is less than five 
years, 
45 days if the worker’s 
period of service with the 
employer is at least five 
years, 
75 days if the worker’s 
period of service with the 
employer is at least 15 
years, 
150 days if the worker’s 
period of service with the 
employer is at least 25 
years. 
12 months  0  0.8 
months 
6 months  1/5 of average wages for each year of 
employment with 
the employer, if the worker has been 
employed for more than one and up 
to five years; 
1/4 of wages for the period from five 
to fifteen years; 
1/3 of wages for the period 




Estonia  1) less than one year of 
employment  –  no less than 
15 calendar days; 2) one to 
five years of employment – 
no less than 30 calendar 
days; 3) five to ten years of 
employment  –  no less than 
60 calendar days; 
4) ten  or more years of 
employment  –  no less than 
90 calendar days. 
 
-  1  1  1  One monthly wage of the employee 
Latvia  1 month  -  1  1  4  1 monthly wages if employed for a 
period up to 5 years; 2 monthly wages 
for 5-10 years; 3 monthly wages for 
10-20 years; and 4 monthly wages for 
more than 20 years 
Lithuania  2 months; 4 months if 
entitled to the full old age 
pension in not more than 
five years, persons under 18 
years of age, disabled 
persons and employees 
raising children under 14 
years of age           
 
-  1  3  6              1) employment under 12 
months – one monthly average wage; 
            2) 12 to 36 months – two 
monthly average wages; 
            3) 36 to 60 months – three 
monthly average wages; 
            4) 60 to 120 months – four 
monthly average wages; 
            5) 120 to 240 months – five 
monthly average wages; 
            6) over 240 months – six 
monthly average monthly wages. 
 
Bulgaria  1 month  -  1 month  1 month  1 month  4 months if on the initiative of 




Romania  15 days  -  …  …  …  Severance pay is negotiated through 
the collective labor contracts and 
varies across the industries 
Albania  1 month for up to one year 
of work; 2 months for 2-5 
years of work, and 3 months 
for more than 5 years of 
work 
 
3 years  0  1 month  10 
months 
Wages for 15 days of work for 





Not less than 14 days  -  1.33 
monthly 
wages 
2  3  1.33 monthly wages for up to 5 years 
of work; 2 monthly wages for 5-10 
years of work; 2.66 monthly wages 
for  10-20 years of work; 3 monthly 











At least one third of the average 
monthly wage for each year of service 
Croatia  Two weeks for less than one 
year of service; one month 
for one year of service; one 
month and two weeks for 
two years of service; two 
months for five years of 
service; two months and 
two weeks for ten years of 
service;  three months for 
twenty years of service. The 
notice period is extended by 
two weeks if the worker has 
reached 50 years of age, and 
by one month if the worker 
has reached 55 years of age. 






Not less than one-third of the average 




Montenegro  1 month  -  6  6  6  Minimum 6 monthly wages; minimum 
in the amount of 24 average wages in 
the Republic if disability is caused by 
injury out of work or disease: 
2) minimum in the amount of 36 
average wages in the Republic if 
disability is caused by injury at work 
or occupational disease 
 





Not less than one-third of the salary of 
the employee for each completed year 
of employment for the first 10 years 
of employment and one fourth of the 
salary of the employee for each 
subsequent completed year of 




1 month; 2 months in case 
of termination of 
employment contracts to 
more than 150 employees 
or 5% of the total number of 
employees with the 
employer prior to 
termination of the labor 
relation 
 
-  1  1  5  up to 5 years of employment – in the 
amount of one salary; 
from 5 to 10 years of employment – in 
the amount of two salaries; 
from 10 to 15 years of employment - 
in the amount of three salaries; 
from 15 to 20 years of employment - 
in the amount of four salaries; 
from 20 to 25 years of employment - 
in the amount of five salaries; and 
over 25 years of employment – in the 
amount of six salaries.  
Belarus  2 months  -  3  3  3  Not less than 3 monthly wages 
Moldova  2 months  -  3  3  3  a) the average week wage payments 
for every year worked at the given 
enterprise, but it should not be less  
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than one average monthly wages; 
b) preservation of the average 
monthly wages for the period of 
looking for another job, but no more 
than three months, including the 
severance pay. For the third month 
the average wages are kept provided 
that, the employee in a fortnight term 
after the dismissal has applied to the 
employment agency, has been 
enlisted as unemployed and has not 





2 months  -  3 months  3 months  3 months  One average monthly wages. His or 
her average monthly wages are 
preserved for the period of taking up 
a job but not more than for two 
months from the date of dismissal 
(considering a dismissal allowance). 
In exceptional cases the average 
monthly wages are preserved for the 
employee during the third month 
from the date of dismissal on the base 
of the decision made by the 
employment agency providing that 
the employee applied to this 
employment agency within two 
weeks after dismissal but was not 
placed in a job.  
 






1 monthly wage  
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1 monthly wage 
Azerbaijan  2 months  -  3 months  3 months  3 months  the lowest average monthly wage;  
the average monthly wage for the 
second and third months after 
dismissal until he finds a new job.  
 






Not less than 1 monthly wage 






1 monthly wage 
Kyrgyzstan  1 month  -  Up to 4 
monthly 
wages 
Up to 4 
monthly 
wages 
Up to 4 
monthly 
wages 
Not less than 2 monthly wages  for 
first month of severance, and for   
period of up to 3 months if looking for 
a    job and in 10 days after contract 
termination registers at the state 
employment service 






Not less than 1 monthly wage 






One average monthly wages but up to 
3 monthly wages for the period of 
looking for job if registered at the 
local employment authority in 10 
days from the date of dismissal 
(considering also a dismissal 
allowance) 
Source: National labor legislation.  
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Table A 14:  Collective Redundancies in ECA Countries: Criteria and Procedures 
Czech Republic  Criteria: An employer intends to terminate the employment relationship (a) of at least ten workers, when employing 
more than 20 and less than 100 employees; b) of 10 percent of the employees, when employing 100 or more, but less 
than 300 employees; c) of at least 30 persons, when employing 300 or more employees.   
Procedure: Before giving a notice to employees, the employer has to inform the trade union organization or the 
works council in time, latest 30 days in advance and to provide relevant information.           
Hungary  Criteria: An employer intends to terminate the employment relationship (a) of at least ten workers, when employing 
more than 20 and less than 100 employees; b) of 10 percent of the employees, when employing 100 or more, but less 
than 300 employees; c) of at least 30 persons, when employing 300 or more employees within a period of 30 days.   
Procedure: When an employer is planning to implement collective redundancies, he shall begin consultations with 
the workers' council or, in the absence of a workers' council, with the committee set up by the local trade union 
branch and by the workers' representatives within 15 days prior to the decision, and shall continue such negotiations 
until the decision is adopted or until an agreement is reached. 
Poland   
Slovakia  Criteria: An employer terminates an employment relationship by giving notice with at least 20 employees over a 
period of 90 days.  
Procedure: With a view to reaching an agreement, the employer shall be obliged, at least one month prior to 
commencement of collective redundancies, to negotiate with the employees’ representatives measures enabling 
avoidance of collective redundancies of employees, or reduction thereof, mainly negotiate the possibility of placing 
them in appropriate employment at the employer’s other workplaces, and measures for mitigating the adverse 
consequences of collective redundancies of employees. An employer shall negotiate with the National Labor Office 
such measures enabling prevention of collective redundancies or its limitation.  
Slovenia  Criteria: An employer within the period of 30 days the work terminates contract with (i) at least 10 workers with the 
employer employing more than 20 and less than 100 workers; (ii) at least 10 percent of workers with the employer 
employing at least 100 workers, and less than 300 workers; (iii) at least 30 workers with the employer employing 
300 or more workers. 
Procedure: An employer is obliged to elaborate the dismissal program for redundant workers. 
The employer must as soon as possible inform the trade unions and the Employment Service. 
Estonia  Criteria: Within thirty days (i) an employer who employs up to 19 employees terminates the employment contracts of 
at least 5 employees or releases at least 5 employees from service; (ii)   an employer who employs 20 to 99 
employees terminates the employment contracts of at least 10 employees or releases at least 10 employees from  
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service; (iii) an employer who employs 100 to 299 employees terminates the employment contracts of at least 10 
percent of the employees or releases at least 10 per cent of the employees from service; (iv) an employer who 
employs at least 300 employees terminates the employment contracts of at least 30 employees or releases at least 30 
employees from service. 
Procedure: The employer shall consult with the representatives of the employees, and shall apply for the approval of 
the labor inspectorate. The labor inspectorate shall approve the collective termination of employment contracts if the 
employer has complied with the requirements provided for collective termination of employment contracts.  
Latvia  Criteria: A reduction in the number of employees within a 30-day period (i) at least five employees if the employer 
normally employs more than 20 but less than 50 employees in the undertaking; (ii) least 10 employees if the 
employer normally employs more than 50 but less than 100 employees; (iii) at least 10 percent of the number of 
employees if the employer normally employs at least 100 but less than 300 employees; or (iv) 4) at least 30 
employees if the employer normally employs 300 and more employees. 
Procedure: An employer shall in good time commence consultations with employee representatives, and shall, not 
later than 60 days in advance, notify the State Employment Agency and the local government. 
Lithuania  Criteria: An employer intends to make redundant within 30 calendar days: (i) 10 and more employees where an 
enterprise employs up to 99 employees; (ii) over ten percent of employees where an enterprise employs 100 to 299 
employees; (iii) 30 and more employees where an enterprise employs 300 and more employees. 
The procedure and characteristics of collective dismissal shall be established by the Government. 
Bulgaria  Criteria: reasons, under Article 328, Paragraph 1, items 1-4, in cases where the number of discharge is: (i) at least 10 
in enterprises, where the list of the employed staff during the month, which is before the general discharge, is more 
than 20, and less than 100 workers and employees for the period of 30 days; (ii ) at least 10% of the number of 
workers and employees in enterprises, with at least 100, but not more than 300 workers and employees for the 
period of 30 days; (iii) at least 30 in enterprises, where the list of the employed staff is at least 300, or more workers 
and employees for the period of 30 days; (iv) at least 20 in enterprises, notwithstanding of the number of workers 
and employees for the period of 90 days.  
Procedure: In cases where the employer intends to undertake collective redundancy, he/she shall be obliged to 
undertake consultations with the worker and employee representatives timely, but not later than 45 days before the 
redundancy act, and to lay efforts for achieving an agreement with them so that be avoided, or limited the collective 
redundancy, and to relieve its consequences. 
Romania  Criteria: Within 30 calendar days of: (i) at least 5 employees, if the employer who is dismissing them has more than 
20 employees and less than 100 employees; (ii) at least 10 percent of the employees, if the employer who is 
dismissing them has at least 100 employees but less than 300 employees; (iii) at least 30 employees, if the employer 
who is dismissing them has at least 300 employees.  
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Procedure: The employer has (i) to draw up a plan of social measures, after having consulted the trade union or the 
employees representatives; (ii) to propose vocational training program (iii) to place at the disposal of the trade union 
all the relevant information about the collective dismissal, with a view to receiving proposals from them. The 
employer shall notify in writing the trade union, the territorial labor inspectorate and the territorial employment 
agency. The employer cannot employ new people for the positions of the employees dismissed for a period of 12 
months from the date of their dismissal.  
Albania  Criteria: Within 90 days (i) at least 10 employees for the enterprises employing up to 100 employees; (ii) 15 for the 
enterprises employing 100-200 employees; (iii) 20 for the enterprises employing 200-300 employees; and (iv) 30 for 
the enterprises employing more than 300 employees. 
Procedure: The employer is obliged to inform the employees organization recognized as the representative of the 
employees. In absence of this, the employer informs his/her employee through advertisements put on the workplace, 





Criteria and procedure: An employer employing over 15 employees who intends, because of economic, technical or 
organizational reasons, to cancel, over a 3 month period, the employment contracts of more than 10% of employees 
but not less than 5 employees, shall consult with the works council in the enterprise or, in the absence of a works 
council, with all trade unions representing at least 10% of employees. The employer is obliged to prepare a program 
to manage the excess employees. Within a two year period, the employer may not employ another person with 




Criteria: An employer employing more than 15 employees intends to terminate employment contracts to at least five 
or 10 percent of the total number of employees over the following three months. 
Procedure: The employer shall consult the employees’ council or, if there is no employees’ council established with 
the employer, with all trade unions representing at least 10 percent of the employees. If within a year after the 
termination of employment contract the employer intends to conclude contracts of employment with a number of 
employees which are required to have qualifications similar to the former employees, the jobs shall be offered to the 
former employees first.  
Croatia  Criteria: At least 20 labor contracts being terminated in the period of 90 days. 
Procedure: The employer must prepare a redundancy social security plan, and shall consult with the workers' council 
and the competent employment service. 
Montenegro  Criteria: Dismissal due to technological, economic and restructuring changes within the period of 30 days at least (i) 
10 employees with the employer employing more than 20, and less than 100 employees; (ii) 10% of employees with 
the employer employing minimum 100 and maximum 300 employees; (iii) 30 employees with the employer 
employing more than 300 employees; (iv) at least 20 employees within the period of 90 days, regardless of the total 
number of employees.  
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Procedure: The employer shall immediately inform the trade union, i.e. representatives of the employees, and the 
Employment Agency of Montenegro. The employer shall adopt the program of measures for resolving redundancy. 
Serbia   Criteria: Contract termination within a 30 day period of at least: (i) 10 employees with an employer who employs 
more than 20, and less than 100 employees; (ii) 10 percent of employees with an employer engaging a minimum of 
100, and a maximum of 300 employees; (iii) 30 employees with an employer employing more than 300 employees. 
Procedure: The employer shall develop a social program. The employer shall be bound to communicate the proposal 
of the program to the trade union referred to the republic organization in charge of employment, within eight days at 
the latest, from the day of developing the proposal of the program, in order to obtain an opinion.  
FYR Macedonia  Procedure: The employer shall be obliged to notify of the intention, and not later than 30 days prior to passing the 
decision on termination of the labor relation to a larger number of employees due to business reasons, of the reasons 
for ceasing the need for work of the  employees, of the foreseen number and category of redundant employees and of 
the foreseen period within which the need for work of the employees will cease, the representative trade union at the 
employer, and if there is no such than the employees’ representative, and must consult them about the possible ways 
of preventing and limiting the number of terminations and about the possible measures for preventing and mitigating 
the harmful consequences.  
Belarus  Criteria: Termination of 20% of contracts (but not less than 25 individuals) within one months in firms and 
organizations with the number of employees of less than 1,000;  15% in firms with 1,001 to 2,000 employees; 10% in 
firms with 2,001 to 5,000 employees; 10% within two months in firms with 5,001 to 10,000 employees; and 5% 
within two months in firs with more than 10,000 employees. 
Procedure: The employer has to inform two months in advance the State Employment Service about the expected 
mass redundancies. 
Moldova   
Russian 
Federation 
Procedure: If a decision on reduction of the staff or number of employees and possible termination of labor 
agreements with employees is taken, the  employer must inform elected trade union authority about this decision in 
written form no later than two months prior to the commence of the according measures, and if the decision on 
reduction of the staff or number of employees can lead to mass dismissal of employees - no later than three months 
prior to the commence of the according measures. Criteria of mass dismissal is defined in industrial and (or) 
territorial agreements 
Ukraine   
Armenia  Criteria: Termination of contracts within two month period of more than ten percent of the total number of 
employees, but not less than 10 employees.  
Procedure: The employer shall submit the information about the number of the dismissed employees to the State 
Employment Service and the representative of the employees not later than three months in advance.  
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Azerbaijan  Criteria: Termination of contracts within three months (i) in firms with the number of employees from 100 to 500, 
more than 50 percent of the staff; (ii) 5 in firms with 500 to 1000 employees, more than 40 percent of the staff; (iii) in 
firms with more than 1000 employees, more than 30 percent of the staff. 
Georgia   
Kazakhstan   
Kyrgyzstan   
Tajikistan  In order to prevent or mitigate collective redundancies, the employer is obliged, in consent with the trade unions and 
employment agencies, to implement the following measures: (i) limit or freeze new hirings; (ii) limit overtime; (iii) 
introduce administrative leave; (iv) conduct staff reduction by stages; (v) introduce other relevant measures.  
Uzbekistan   
Source: National labor legislation.Social Protection Discussion Paper Series Titles 
 
No.   
 
Title 
0920  Labor Laws in Eastern European and Central Asian Countries: Minimum Norms 
and Practices 
  by Arvo Kuddo, November 2009 (online only) 
 
0919  Openness and Technological Innovation in East Asia: Have They Increased the 
Demand for Skills? 
  by Rita K. Almeida, October 2009 (online only) 
 
0918  Employment Services and Active Labor Market Programs in Eastern European 
and Central Asian Countries 
  by Arvo Kuddo, October 2009 (online only) 
 
0917  Productivity Increases in SMEs: With Special Emphasis on In-Service Training 
of Workers in Korea 
by Kye Woo Lee, October 2009 (online only) 
 
0916   Firing Cost and Firm Size: A Study of Sri Lanka's Severance Pay System 
by Babatunde Abidoye, Peter F. Orazem and Milan Vodopivec, September 2009 
(online only) 
 
0915  Personal Opinions about the Social Security System and Informal Employment: 
Evidence from Bulgaria 
by Valeria Perotti and Maria Laura Sánchez Puerta, September 2009 
 
0914  Building a Targeting System for Bangladesh based on Proxy Means Testing 
  by Iffath A. Sharif, August 2009 (online only) 
 
0913  Savings for Unemployment in Good or Bad Times: Options for Developing 
Countries 
  by David Robalino, Milan Vodopivec and András Bodor, August 2009 (online 
only) 
 
0912  Social Protection for Migrants from the Pacific Islands in Australia and New 
Zealand 
  by Geoff Woolford, May 2009 (online only) 
 
0911  Human Trafficking, Modern Day Slavery, and Economic Exploitation 
by Johannes Koettl, May 2009 
 
0910  Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Latin America: Overview and 
Assessment 




0909  Definitions, Good Practices, and Global Estimates on the Status of Social 
Protection for International Migrants 
  by Johanna Avato, Johannes Koettl, and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, May 2009 
(online only) 
 
0908  Regional Overview of Social Protection for Non-Citizens in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) 
by Marius Olivier, May 2009 (online only)  
 
0907  Introducing Unemployment Insurance to Developing Countries 
  by Milan Vodopivec, May 2009 (online only) 
 
0906  Social Protection for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) 
  by Mpho Makhema, April 2009 (online only) 
 
0905  How to Make Public Works Work: A Review of the Experiences 
  by Carlo del Ninno, Kalanidhi Subbarao and Annamaria Milazzo, May 2009 
(online only) 
 
0904  Slavery and Human Trafficking: International Law and the Role of the World 
Bank 
  by María Fernanda Perez Solla, April 2009 (online only) 
 
0903  Pension Systems for the Informal Sector in Asia 
  edited by Landis MacKellar, March 2009 (online only) 
 
0902  Structural Educational Reform: Evidence from a Teacher’s Displacement 
Program in Armenia 
  by Arvo Kuddo, January 2009 (online only) 
 
0901  Non-performance of the Severance Pay Program in Slovenia 
  by Milan Vodopivec, Lilijana Madzar, Primož Dolenc, January 2009 (online 
only) 
 
0838  Investing for the Old Age: Pensions, Children and Savings 
  by Vincenzo Galasso, Roberta Gatti and Paola Profeta, December 2008 (online 
only) 
 
0837  Can the Introduction of a Minimum Wage in FYR Macedonia Decrease the 
Gender Wage Gap? 
  by Diego F. Angel-Urdinola, December 2008 (online only)  
0836  Highly Labor-Intensive Public Works in Madagascar: Issues and Policy Options 
      by Nirina Haja Andrianjaka and Annamaria Milazzo, October 2008 (online only) 
 
0835  Can Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Play a Greater Role in Reducing 
Child Undernutrition? 
by Lucy Bassett, October 2008 
 
0834  The Performance of Social Pensions in India: The Case of Rajasthan 
  by Puja Vasudeva Dutta, July 2008 (online only) 
 
0833  Labor Regulations in Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and 
Directions for Future Research 
  by Tito Boeri, Brooke Helppie, Mario Macis, October 2008 (online only) 
 
0832  The Incentives to Invest in Job Training: Do Strict Labor Codes Influence this 
Decision? 
  by Rita K. Almeida and Reyes Aterido, October 2008 (online only) 
 
0831  Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on 
Pensions in Argentina and Chile 
  by Rafael Rofman, Eduardo Fajnzylber and German Herrera, May 2008 
(online only) 
 
0830  Community-based Risk Management Arrangements: An Overview and 
Implications for Social Fund Programs 
  by Ruchira Bhattamishra and Christopher B. Barrett, October 2008 
 
0829  Work History and the Access to Contributory Pensions in Uruguay: Some 
Facts and Policy Options 
  by Marisa Bucheli, Alvaro Forteza and Ianina Rossi, May 2008 (online only) 
 
0828  A Theory of Contribution Density and Implications for Pension Design 
  by Salvador Valdés-Prieto, July 2008 (online only) 
 
0827  On the Financial Sustainability of Earnings-Related Pension Schemes with 
“Pay-As-You-Go” Financing 
  by David A. Robalino and András Bodor, July 2008 (online only) 
 
0826  An Ex-Ante Evaluation of the Impact of Social Insurance Policies on Labor 
Supply in Brazil: The Case for Explicit Over Implicit Redistribution 
  by David A. Robalino, Eduardo Zylberstajn, Helio Zylberstajn and Luis 
Eduardo Afonso, July 2008 (online only) 
 
0825  The Portability of Pension Rights: General Principals and the Caribbean Case 
  by Alvaro Forteza, May 2008 (online only)  
0824  Pension Systems and Reform Conceptual Framework 
by Robert Holzmann, Richard Paul Hinz and Mark Dorfman, September 
2008 (online only) 
0823  Mandated Benefits, Employment, and Inequality in a Dual Economy 
by Rita Almeida and Pedro Carneiro, August 2008 (online only) 
 
0822  The Return to Firm Investments in Human Capital 
  by Rita Almeida and Pedro Carneiro, June 2008 (online only) 
 
0821  Population Aging and the Labor Market: The Case of Sri Lanka 
  by Milan Vodopivec and Nisha Arunatilake, August 2008 (online only) 
 
 
0820  China: Improving Unemployment Insurance 
by Milan Vodopivec and Minna Hahn Tong, July 2008 (online only) 
 
0819  Management Information Systems in Social Safety Net Programs: A Look at 
Accountability and Control Mechanisms 
by Cesar Baldeon and Maria D. Arribas-Baños, August 2008 (online only) 
 
0818  Guidance for Responses from the Human Development Sectors to Rising 
Food Prices 
  by Margaret Grosh, Carlo del Ninno and Emil Daniel Tesliuc, June 2008 
(revised and published as a non-SP Discussion Paper) 
 
0817  Levels and Patterns of Safety Net Spending in Developing and Transition 
Countries 
by Christine Weigand and Margaret Grosh, June 2008 (online only) 
 
0816  Labor Regulation and Employment in India’s Retail Stores 
  by Mohammad Amin, June 2008 (online only) 
 
0815  Beyond DALYs: Developing Indicators to Assess the Impact of Public 
Health Interventions on the Lives of People with Disabilities 
  by Daniel Mont and Mitchell Loeb, May 2008 
 
0814  Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Firm Size 
by Rita Almeida and Pedro Carneiro, May 2008 (online only) 
 
0813  Labor Markets Lending and Analytical Work at the World Bank: FY2002-
2007 
  by Milan Vodopivec, Jean Fares and Michael Justesen, May 2008 
 
 0812  Risk and Vulnerability Analysis in the World Bank Analytic Work: FY2000-
2007 
  by Valerie Kozel, Pierre Fallavier and Reena Badiani, May 2008 
 
0811   Pension Lending and Analytical Work at the World Bank: FY2002-2007 
  by Richard Hinz, Melike Egelmelzer and Sergei Biletsky, May 2008 (online 
only) 
 
0810  Social Safety Nets Lending and Analytical Work at the World Bank: 
FY2002-2007 
  by Margaret Grosh and Annamaria Milazzo, May 2008 
 
0809  Social Funds as an Instrument of Social Protection: An Analysis of Lending 
Trends - FY2000-2007 
  by Samantha De Silva  and June Wei Sum, July 2008 
 
0808  Disability & Development in the World Bank: FY2000-2007 
  by Jeanine Braithwaite, Richard Carroll, and Karen Peffley, May 2008 
 
0807  Migration, Labor Markets, and Integration of Migrants: An Overview for 
Europe 
  by Rainer Münz, April 2008 (online only) 
 
0806  Is the Window of Opportunity Closing for Brazilian Youth? Labor Market 
Trends and Business Cycle Effects 
  by Michael Justesen, April 2008 
 
0805  Disability and Poverty: A Survey of World Bank Poverty Assessments and 
Implications 
  by Jeanine Braithwaite and Daniel Mont, February 2008 
 
0804  Poverty Traps and Social Protection 
  by Christopher B. Barrett, Michael R. Carter and Munenobu Ikegami, 
February 2008 
 
0803   Live Longer, Work Longer: Making It Happen in the Labor Market 
  by Milan Vodopivec and Primoz Dolenc, February 2008 (online only) 
 
0802  Disability in Kazakhstan: An Evaluation of Official Data 
  by Ai-Gul S. Seitenova and Charles M. Becker, February 2008 (online only) 
 
0801  Disability Insurance with Pre-funding and Private Participation: The Chilean 
Model 
  by Estelle James, Augusto Iglesias and Alejandra Cox Edwards, January 
2008 
  
0719  The Life-Course Perspective and Social Policies: An Issues Note 
  by A.L. Bovenberg, November 2007 
 
0718  Social Safety Nets and Targeted Social Assistance: Lessons from the 
European Experience 
  by Chris de Neubourg, Julie Castonguay and Keetie Roelen, November 2007 
(online only) 
 
0717  Informality and Social Protection: Preliminary Results from Pilot Surveys in 
Bulgaria and Colombia 
  by Franco Peracchi, Valeria Perotti and Stefano Scarpetta, October 2007 
(online only) 
 
0716  How Labor Market Policies can Combine Workers’ Protection with Job 
Creation: A Partial Review of Some Key Issues and Policy Options 
  by Gaëlle Pierre and Stefano Scarpetta, October 2007 (online only) 
 
0715  A Review of Interventions to Support Young Workers: Findings of the Youth 
Employment Inventory 
  by Gordon Betcherman, Martin Godfrey, Susana Puerto, Friederike Rother, 
and Antoneta Stavreska, October 2007 
 
0714  Performance of Social Safety Net Programs in Uttar Pradesh 
  by Mohamed Ihsan Ajwad, October 2007 
 
0713  Are All Labor Regulations Equal? Assessing the Effects of Job Security, 
Labor Dispute and Contract Labor Laws in India 
  by Ahmad Ahsan and Carmen Pagés, June 2007 
 
0712  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Its Implementation 
and Relevance for the World Bank 
  by Katherine Guernsey, Marco Nicoli and Alberto Ninio, June 2007 
 
0711  Reaching the Poor and Vulnerable: Targeting Strategies for Social Funds and 
other Community-Driven Programs 
  by Julie Van Domelen, May 2007 
 
0710  The Macedonia Community Development Project: Empowerment through 
Targeting and Institution Building 
  by Caroline Mascarell, May 2007  
 
0709  The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: Implementing 
Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context 
  by Kathy Lindert, Anja Linder, Jason Hobbs and Bénédicte de la Brière, May 
2007 (online only)  
0708   Globalization and Employment Conditions Study 
  by Drusilla K. Brown, April 2007 
 
0707   The Kosovo Pension Reform: Achievements and Lessons 
  by John Gubbels, David Snelbecker and Lena Zezulin, April 2007 (online 
only) 
 
0706  Measuring Disability Prevalence 
  by Daniel Mont, March 2007 
 
0705  Social Safety Nets in World Bank Lending and Analytic Work: FY2002-
2006 
  by Annamaria Milazzo and Margaret Grosh, March 2007 (online only) 
 
0704   Child Labor and Youth Employment: Ethiopia Country Study 
    by Lorenzo Guarcello and Furio Rosati, March 2007 
 
0703  Aging and Demographic Change in European Societies: Main Trends and 
Alternative Policy Options 
by Rainer Muenz, March 2007 (online only) 
 
0702  Seasonal Migration and Early Childhood Development 
by Karen Macours and Renos Vakis, March 2007 
 
0701  The Social Assimilation of Immigrants 
  by Domenico de Palo, Riccardo Faini and Alessandra Venturini, February 
2007 (online only) 
 
 
To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2007, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. About this series...
 
Social Protection Discussion Papers are published to communicate the results of The 
World Bank’s work to the development community with the least possible delay. The 
typescript manuscript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with 
the procedures appropriate to formally edited texts. The findings, interpretations, and 
conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 
and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or 
the governments they represent. 
The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. For 
free copies of this paper, please contact the Social Protection Advisory Service, The World 
Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Room G7-703, Washington, D.C. 20433-0001. Telephone: (202) 
458-5267, Fax: (202) 614-0471, E-mail: socialprotection@worldbank.org or visit the Social 
Summary Findings
This study focuses on internationally accepted labor standards and norms governing 
the individual employment contract, including ILO conventions and recommendations, 
EU labor standards (Directives) and the European Community Social Charter (Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers). The study also analyzes relevant provisions in 
the main labor law of each Eastern European and Central Asian (ECA) country associated 
with commencing or terminating employment and during the period of employment. 
References are made to relevant practices from EU15 countries. Overall, despite 
similar origin of country labor laws, the current set of labor regulations in the region 
provides a wide array of legal solutions. The minimum content of the employment 
contract in most ECA countries coincides, and goes beyond, the requirements of the 
labor standards even in the countries that are non-signatories of relevant treaties. 
Some of these entitlements, however, have the potential to adversely affect labor 
market participation.
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